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Abstract
This thesis conducts positive and normative analysis of inequality based on human capital
theory. In Chapter 2, we document important differences in early child investments by family
income and study four leading mechanisms thought to explain these gaps: intergenerational
ability correlation, consumption value of investment, information frictions, and credit con-
straints. We evaluate whether these mechanisms are consistent with other stylized facts related
to the marginal returns on investments and the effects of parental income on child investments
and skills.
In Chapter 3, I study optimal higher education subsidies when parents willingness to pay
for their children’s education differs due to heterogeneity in altruism. I first document sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the fraction of college expenditure paid by parents across families and
provide evidence that this heterogeneity can be explained by parental altruism. Then I analyt-
ically characterize optimal education subsidies when the social planner minimizes distortions
generated by borrowing constraints and can observe neither the amount of parental transfers
nor parental altruism. I show that redistributing towards constrained students of low altruism
parents is socially beneficial, but it involves substantial deadweight loss. The calibrated model
suggests that the deadweight loss due to unobservable heterogeneity in parental altruism can
be quantitatively large and therefore limit redistribution towards students with low parental
transfers.
In Chapter 4, we study the role of returns to unobserved skills in the rising residual earnings
inequality for the past few decades in the U.S. We identify and estimate a general model of
earnings residuals that incorporates (i) changing returns to unobserved skills, (ii) changing
distribution of unobserved skills, and (iii) changing volatility of earnings that is not related
to skills. Using data from the PSID, we find that the returns to unobserved skills went down
since the mid-1980s despite the steady increase in the residual inequality. Using a simple
demand and supply framework, we show that both demand and supply factors contributed to
the downward trend in the returns to skills over time.
Keywords: Human capital, inequality, intergenerational mobility, credit constraints, edu-
cation subsidies, technical change, earnings dynamics
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Why do some people earn more than others? According to human capital theory, differences
in earnings can be attributed to differences in early life human capital investment, but can
also be also be affected by economy-wide factors later in life. In this thesis I conduct posi-
tive and normative analysis of inequality based on human capital theory. The thesis consists
of three chapters, each focusing on a different stage of the life-cycle. Chapter 2 studies hu-
man capital investment during early childhood and asks why children from low income fam-
ilies obtain lower cognitive achievement than those from high income families. Chapter 3 is
concerned with efficient financial aid policy for post-secondary education in the presence of
credit constraints and unobservable heterogeneity in parents’ willingness to invest in their chil-
dren. Finally, Chapter 4 investigates dynamics of earnings inequality during adulthood and
asks whether the rise in U.S. residual earnings inequality over the past few decades is due to
increasing returns to unobserved human capital/skills or rising volatility of earnings.
It is well-known that poor children perform significantly worse academically and on achieve-
ment tests than their more economically advantaged counterparts. The most immediate expla-
nation for these differences is that poor parents invest less in their young children. While
there are many competing theories for these investment and skill gaps, few studies attempt
to sort amongst them. In Chapter 2, which is a joint work with Professors Lance Lochner
and Elizabeth Caucutt, we systematically study four leading investment-based theories/mech-
anisms thought to drive income-based skill gaps: an intergenerational correlation in ability, a
consumption value of investment, information frictions, and credit constraints. In order to help
understand which mechanisms drive family investments in children, we consider the extent to
which they also explain other important stylized facts related to the marginal returns to invest-
ment and the effects of parental income on child investment and skills. Although all competing
explanations are consistent with some of the stylized facts, only the binding credit constraints
are consistent with all of the stylized facts we consider. This suggests that the inability of
2families to borrow against (parents’ or children’s) future income can be an important source of
inequality in skill acquisition.
The importance of credit constraints motivates government policies that aim to lower the
cost of higher education for students who receive little support from parents and thus are likely
to be constrained. For example, the U.S. federal government provides grants and subsidized
loans for students from low income families. But it is challenging to design a financial aid sys-
tem that specifically targets constrained students, as parental transfers may be imperfectly cor-
related with family resources and are difficult to observe. In Chapter 3, I first show that Ameri-
can parents with similar income contribute very differently towards their children’s college ed-
ucation and that these differences are not easily explained by differences in monetary/psychic
returns to college across families. Motivated by this evidence, I next study how education sub-
sidies should be distributed when students receive different amount of parental transfers due to
differences in parental altruism and the policymaker can observe neither parental transfers nor
altruism. When the social planner minimizes distortions generated by borrowing constraints,
it is optimal to give higher subsidies for early years of college than late years, because it helps
constrained students who do not stay long in college due to low parental transfers. However,
such policy also provides an incentive to attend college and quit too early, which is ineffi-
cient due to a fixed cost of college attendance, for those who otherwise would not attend. The
calibrated model shows that the efficiency cost due to unobservable heterogeneity in parental
altruism can be quantitatively large and therefore severely limit the extent to which subsidy
policies can address the inefficiencies due to borrowing constraints.
Skills that are acquired through educational investment are important determinants of earn-
ings, but the returns to skills may change over time, leading to changes in earnings inequality.
A change in cross-sectional earnings inequality, however, cannot be simply interpreted as a
change in the returns to skills because it could also reflect a change in the volatility of earnings
that is unrelated to skills. In Chapter 4, along with Professors Lance Lochner and Youngki
Shin, I study the role of returns to unobserved skills in the rising residual earnings inequal-
ity for the past few decades in the U.S. We identify and estimate a general model of earnings
residuals that incorporates (i) changing returns to unobserved skills, (ii) changing distribution
of unobserved skills, and (iii) changing volatility of earnings that is not related to skills. Using
data from the PSID, we find that the returns to unobserved skills went down since the mid-
1980s despite the steady increase in the residual inequality. Using a simple demand and supply
framework, we show that both demand and supply factors contributed to the downward trend
in the returns to skills over time.
3Chapter 2
Correlation, Consumption, Confusion, or
Constraints: Why do Poor Children
Perform so Poorly?1
2.1 Introduction
Adolescent skill and achievement gaps by parental income explain a substantial share of sub-
sequent differences in educational attainment and lifetime earnings (Cameron and Heckman,
1998, Keane and Wolpin, 1997, Carneiro and Heckman, 2002), suggesting that an impor-
tant component of intergenerational economic and social mobility is determined by the time
children reach adolescence. Perhaps more troubling, sizeable differences in achievement by
parental income are already evident by very young ages, persisting throughout childhood
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2002, Cunha et al., 2006, Cunha and Heckman, 2007, Cunha, 2013).
This raises the possibility that a generation’s fate may be sealed by the time it enters school.2
Altogether, this evidence suggests that a complete understanding of intergenerational mobility
and its implications for economic and social policy requires convincing answers to the vexing
question: Why do poor children perform so poorly?
Given the importance of family investments for early child development (Todd and Wolpin,
2007, Cunha and Heckman, 2008, Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010, Del Boca, Flinn,
and Wiswall, 2014, Pavan, 2014), we concentrate on understanding why low-income fami-
lies invest so much less in their young children compared to higher income families (Guryan,
Hurst, and Kearney, 2008, Kaushal, Magnuson, and Waldfogel, 2011). We consider four broad
1A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication by Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
2Recent studies show that these early achievement and educational attainment gaps have been growing in the
United States for decades (Belley and Lochner, 2007, Reardon, 2011).
4mechanisms often thought to explain early investment and achievement gaps by family income.
1. The natural ability of children and parents may be correlated (Becker and Tomes, 1979,
1986). If child achievement is an increasing function of own ability, then a positive
intergenerational ability correlation can generate the income – achievement gradients
documented in the literature.
2. Parents may enjoy making investments in their children. If investments provide a direct
benefit to parents above and beyond the future labor market returns to children, parents
will choose to invest more as their income rises like they would purchase more of any
other normal good (Lazear, 1977). It is also possible that low- and high-income families
place different intrinsic value on investments or human capital more generally (Abbott
et al., 2013).
3. Low-income parents may be poorly informed about the productivity of or returns to
investments in their children (Cunha, Elo, and Culhane, 2013, Cunha, 2014, Dizon-Ross,
2015). For example, poor parents may incorrectly believe that investments in their young
children are unproductive (or poorly rewarded in the labor market), or they may simply
face greater uncertainty in the productivity of or returns to investments. Alternatively,
poor parents may recognize the importance of investing in their children, but they may
not know which types of investment activities/goods are most productive.
4. Poor families may be unable to invest efficiently in their children due to limits on their
capacity to borrow against their own future income or against the potentially high returns
on investments in their children (Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986, Caucutt and Lochner,
2006, 2012, Cunha et al., 2006, Cunha and Heckman, 2007, Cunha, 2013, Lee and Se-
shadri, 2014).
We use a simple framework of dynamic human capital investment to formally examine
whether these mechanisms are also able to account for other important stylized facts in the
literature on child development. In particular, we focus on four well-established findings re-
lated to the marginal returns to early investment and the role of family income: (i) the high
marginal returns to early investments in economically disadvantaged children, (ii) lower returns
on marginal investments in higher income children, (iii) exogenous increases in family income
lead to greater investments in children and improved childhood outcomes, and (iv) the impacts
of income on child investments, achievement and educational attainment are greater if the in-
come is earned (or received) when children are young.3 While our analysis is not intended to
3We also briefly discuss other evidence related to specific mechanisms in Sections 2.5-2.8 where those mech-
anisms are considered in detail.
5determine which mechanism is most important for explaining income-based achievement gaps,
it is useful for helping understand which mechanisms are needed to provide a more complete
picture of the child development process and the role of family income.4 This is important,
because the different mechanisms can have very different policy implications. For example, if
investment and achievement gaps are driven only by intergenerational ability correlations or a
‘consumption’ value of investment, then investments in children are likely to be economically
efficient (in the absence of human capital externalities) and policies designed to improve equity
will be inefficient.5 By contrast, either information-based or credit market frictions can lead to
inefficiently low investments in economically disadvantaged children. In this case, it may be
possible to simultaneously improve both equity and efficiency through well-designed policies.
We organize this chapter in the following way. In Section 2.2, we briefly document dif-
ferences in child achievement and investment levels by family income using data from the
Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (CNLSY). Then, we summarize ev-
idence on four additional stylized facts from the literature on child development in Section
2.3. Sections 2.4-2.8 develop and analyze a unified framework of dynamic skill investment
that incorporates all four potential mechanisms commonly thought to drive investment and
achievement gaps by family income. We use this framework to formally examine whether the
explanations are consistent with the stylized facts in Section 2.3 as well as other evidence in the
child development literature. In Section 2.9, we conclude with a summary of our main results
and their implications for future research.
2.2 Child Achievement and Investment Gaps by Family In-
come
In this section, we document differences in child achievement and investment behavior by
family income using data from the CNLSY. A longitudinal survey that links mothers with their
children, the CNLSY contains excellent measures of family background and income (starting
in 1979), as well as biennial measures of child math and reading achievement and family
4See Cunha (2014) for a novel effort to empirically decompose the relative importance of a similar set of
mechanisms using unique data on parental perceptions and stated choices about investments in children under
different hypothetical budget sets. While we do not empirically evaluate the relative importance of different
mechanisms, our theoretical analysis is based on a more general dynamic human capital investment model. We
consider a wide range of information frictions and explicitly model intertemporal borrowing constraints.
5Of course, it may be socially desirable to encourage investment beyond the privately optimal amount due to
human capital externalities in production (Moretti, 2004a,b) or related to crime (Lochner and Moretti, 2004) or
citizenship (Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos, 2004).
6Figure 2.1: Ages 6-7 Achievement Gaps by Parental Income Quartile (Relative to Quartile 1)
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7Figure 2.2: Family Investments in Children Ages 0-1, 2-3, and 4-5 by Parental Income Quartile
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8Figure 2.3: Family Investments in Children Ages 6-7 by Parental Income Quartile
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investments in children (beginning in 1986).6
We use background measures of maternal education, race/ethnicity, and “ability” as mea-
sured by the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT).7 As a medium-run measure of family
income, we average all available reports of earnings by the mother and her spouse (if married)
from the child’s birth through ages 6 or 7 (depending on which of these ages achievement and
investments in children were measured).8 Child achievement is measured by the Peabody In-
dividual Achievement Tests (PIAT) in math, reading recognition and reading comprehension;
these measures are standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one at each
age. A number of child investment activities/inputs are also reported in the CNLSY as we
discuss below.
Figure 2.1 documents sizeable differences in ages 6-7 math and reading achievement by
family income quartile. The light (beige) bars represent raw differences in achievement be-
tween the reported parental income quartile and the bottom income quartile, while the dark
6As is standard in studies using the CNLSY, our (unweighted) analysis is based on children born to mothers
from the random sample of the NLSY79. Thus, distributions are based on children born to a random sample of
American women born between 1957 and 1964, which may differ from distributions for any specific cohort of
children.
7(Nearly) all CNLSY mothers, born between 1957 and 1964, took the AFQT in 1980 as part of the survey.
The AFQT tests basic math and verbal/reading skills.
8Before averaging across time, we discount all income back to the child’s birth year using a 5% discount
rate, so our earnings measure reflects average discounted family earnings from the child’s birth through ages 6-7.
Individuals are dropped if fewer than 3 income reports are available.
9Figure 2.4: Family Investment Factor Scores by Child Age and Parental Income Quartile
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(red) bars report differences after controlling flexibly for maternal race/ethnicity, AFQT, and
educational attainment.9 Raw gaps by income are sizeable: math and reading scores of chil-
dren with parents in the highest income quartile are all more than half of a standard deviation
higher than those with parents in the lowest income quartile. Controlling for other important
maternal characteristics substantially reduces these gaps (by as much as three-quarters), but
does not eliminate them – parental income still has economically (and statistically) significant
effects on child achievement.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 document a number of early childhood family investment measures by
parental income at different ages. For all measures except ‘eat with mom and dad daily’ (ages
0-1, 2-3, 4-5) and ‘family meets friends/relatives two or more times per month’ (ages 6-7),
investments are monotonically increasing in parental income. For a number of measures, the
differences are substantial. For example, mothers of young children from the highest income
quartile are over 50% more likely to read to their child three or more times per week compared
to mothers from the lowest income quartile. High income mothers with children ages 0-1 are
more than twice as likely to have 10 or more books in the home. Among children ages 6-7,
9Standard multivariate regressions are used to control for maternal race/ethnicity (white, black, hispanic),
AFQT quartiles, and educational attainment (high school dropout, high school graduate, some college, com-
pleted college) by including three-way interactions of all three sets of indicators along with indicator variables
for parental income quartile. Sample sizes for raw differences by income are 3,449 for math, 3,436 for reading
recognition, and 3,267 for reading comprehension. Approximately 80 observations are dropped due to missing
covariates when controlling for maternal characteristics.
10
Figure 2.5: Family Investment Gaps by Parental Income Quartile (Relative to Quartile 1)
(a) Child Ages 0-1 (b) Child Ages 2-3
(c) Child Ages 4-5 (d) Child Ages 6-7
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those from high income families are more than twice as likely to be enrolled in special lessons
or extracurricular activities.
One interpretation of the investment measures reported in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 is that they
represent different types of investment inputs that influence child development. An alternative
interpretation is that they all represent noisy measures of a single underlying ‘investment’. Un-
der the latter interpretation, factor analysis can be used to uncover a more precise measure of
the latent investment (Cunha and Heckman, 2008, Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010).10
Based on this insight, we employ principal factor analysis using the measured inputs reported
in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 to create age-specific predicted investment factor scores for each child.
(See Appendix A.1.) For interpretation purposes, we normalize scores to have a mean of zero
and standard deviation of one, plotting average scores by age and parental income quartile
in Figure 2.4. The figure reveals sizeable differences in investment factor scores by parental
income that are already evident at very young ages. Investments are roughly a full standard
deviation higher among children from high income families relative to low income families.
Figure 2.5 shows that these gaps shrink by as much as 50% but remain sizeable when con-
trolling for maternal race, AFQT, and educational attainment.11 Comparing Figures 2.1 with
2.5 reveals that maternal characteristics explain a greater share of the income-based gaps in
achievement than in investments.
2.3 Additional Stylized Facts on Child Development
In this section, we discuss four stylized facts on the marginal returns to investment in children
and the role of family income in child development. Because of their general nature, these
facts can be compared against the predictions of any investment-based model of skill forma-
tion. Other, more mechanism-specific findings in the literature are briefly discussed in the next
section.
10These interpretations are not necessarily mutually exclusive if families face the same relative prices and
productivity of inputs (assuming families maintain correct beliefs about the relative productivity of inputs). In
this case, all inputs (in a given period) will be proportional to total child investment expenditure (that period),
with all families choosing the same proportional mix. One can then think about the various reported measures
as noisy measures of that specific input or of total investment expenditure (multiplied by the factor share for that
input). We study the link between multiple early inputs and total early investment expenditures in Section 2.7
along with the consequences of family mis-perceptions about relative and overall early input productivity levels.
11Sample sizes for raw income differences are 2,324 (ages 0-1), 2,749 (ages 2-3), 2,813 (ages 4-5), and 3,493
(ages 6-7). When controlling for maternal characteristics, between 50 and 80 observations are dropped due to
missing covariates.
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Fact 1
The returns to early marginal investments are higher than the return to savings for economi-
cally disadvantaged children. A number of comprehensive surveys (Karoly et al., 1998, Blau
and Currie, 2006, Cunha et al., 2006, Almond and Currie, 2011, Heckman and Kautz, 2014,
Kautz et al., 2014) document both the short- and long-term impacts of numerous early child-
hood interventions in the U.S. Most notably, an experimental evaluation of the Perry Preschool
program followed participants in the early 1960s through age 40, measuring the program’s im-
pacts on a wide-array of outcomes, including cognitive achievement, educational attainment,
earnings, and crime.12 Based on program costs and impacts measured from ages 15-40, Heck-
man et al. (2010) estimate a private internal rate of return to Perry Preschool participants of
around 8%.13 The Abecedarian Project offered high quality full-day preschool to a (randomly
assigned) sample of mostly African American children born in the mid-1970s who were at
risk for delayed intellectual and social development. Follow-up evaluations of Abecedarian
through age 21 reveal significant long-term benefits that exceed the program’s costs by a fac-
tor of roughly 2.5 (Barnett and Masse, 2007).14 Researchers have also extensively analyzed
the long-term impacts of Chicago’s Child-Parent Center (CPC) preschool program, follow-
ing a sample of low-income, mostly African American participants from the mid-1980s to the
present. Rough calculations based on program impacts measured through age 26 suggest an
average (private) benefit/cost ratio of 3.6 (Reynolds et al., 2011b).15 Finally, a number of stud-
ies document significant long-term impacts of Head Start (Currie and Thomas, 1995, 1999,
Garces, Currie, and Thomas, 2002, Deming, 2009, Ludwig and Miller, 2007, Carneiro and
Ginja, 2014); however, its full rate of return has not been systematically estimated.
Other family-based investments aimed at improving mother-child interactions and mater-
nal parenting skills can also serve as productive early investments in the child development
process, producing significant long-run benefits for children. For example, the Nurse-Family
Partnership provided regular pre- and post-natal (to age 2) home visits to low-income mothers
12Perry Preschool provided daily high quality preschool (2.5 hours per day) and weekly home visits for two
years to children ages 3 and 4. The randomized control trial sample was drawn from low IQ children from families
of low socioeconomic status.
13Social returns are even higher, largely due to benefits from crime reduction.
14As is common in this literature, these calculations assume an annual real discount rate of 3%. The benefit
calculations project lifetime earnings impacts based on average earnings differences by educational attainment
and the significant effects of Abecedarian on educational attainment. An age 30 follow-up study (Campbell et al.,
2012) estimates a sizeable but statistically insignificant increase in annual earnings for participants ($33,000 vs.
$21,000). Estimated effects on employment rates and use of public aid at age 30 are statistically significant.
15As with the Abecedarian cost-benefit analysis of Campbell et al. (2012), Reynolds et al. (2011b) use a 3%
discount rate and project lifetime earnings benefits from estimated impacts on age 26 educational attainment; they
also incorporate benefits from reductions in child care costs and child abuse/neglect. In a subsequent follow-up,
Reynolds et al. (2011a) show that the program significantly increased age 28 earnings by 7%.
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with the goals of improving pregnancy outcomes and maternal health, improving the health
and development of their children through proper care, and enhancing parental life-course de-
velopment. Studies of the program in three U.S. cities estimate long-term benefits from these
investments on a number of child outcomes (Olds et al., 2002, Eckenrode et al., 2010, Kitzman
et al., 2010). Long-term benefits of similar family-based interventions have also been docu-
mented in Jamaica and Colombia, where home visitation programs provided one-hour weekly
visits (for up to 2 years) aimed at improving mother-child interactions and developing child
cognitive, language and psychosocial skills (Gertler et al., 2014, Attanasio et al., 2015).
Fact 2
The returns to marginal investments are lower for more economically advantaged children.
Because most experimental and government-subsidized early childhood programs serve low-
income families, less is known about the lifetime returns to early investments in children from
higher income families. However, a number of studies estimate short- and medium-term im-
pacts of early childhood interventions by family income or socioeconomic status (SES). These
studies typically report greater benefits for more disadvantaged children. For example, Dun-
can and Sojourner (2013) estimate that the Infant Health Development Program (IHDP), which
provided the Abecedarian preschool curriculum to an economically diverse sample of low-birth
weight 1-2 year-olds, yielded significantly greater improvements in age five IQ for the subsam-
ple of children from low-income families relative to those from higher income families.16 A
recent analysis of Head Start (Puma et al., 2012) estimates significantly greater impacts on third
grade cognitive and learning outcomes for children from ‘high risk’ (i.e. low SES) households
relative to lower risk households. Estimated impacts of the Chicago CPC preschool program
on educational attainment and earnings at age 28 are also higher for children from ‘high risk’
families (Reynolds et al., 2011a). A few studies that estimate the impacts of introducing uni-
versal early child care subsidies in Canada and Norway find negligible or even adverse impacts
on children from middle- and high-income families, likely due to the substitution of lower
quality subsidized/free child care in place of higher quality unsubsidized family or informal
care (Baker, Gruber, and Milligan, 2008, Havnes and Mogstad, 2014, Kottelenberg and Lehrer,
2014).17
Taking a very different approach, Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) apply dynamic
factor models using multiple noisy measurements of child investments and skill levels to es-
timate the technology of human capital production from birth through the end of school.
16Brooks-Gunn et al. (1992) estimate greater effects of IHDP on age three IQ for families with lower maternal
education.
17See (Baker, 2011) for a careful discussion of recent universal early child care initiatives.
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Their estimated technology suggests that the most efficient allocation of educational invest-
ments would provide more to young disadvantaged children. The fact that actual investments
are much lower for disadvantaged children (see Figures 2.2-2.5) coupled with diminishing
marginal returns, suggests that returns on the margin are higher for the most disadvantaged.
Fact 3
Exogenous increases in parental income lead to greater investments in children and improve-
ments in childhood outcomes. A number of recent studies attempt to address concerns about
endogeneity in estimating the effects of exogenous changes in family income on children.
Dahl and Lochner (2012) exploit expansions of the Earned Income Tax Credit (primarily over
the mid-1990s) to estimate the effects of additional family income on cognitive achievement.
Their instrumental variable estimates suggest that an additional $1,000 in family income raises
combined math and reading scores by 6 percent of a standard deviation. Estimated effects
also appear to be larger for children from more disadvantaged families. Milligan and Stabile
(2011) estimate that expansions of child tax benefits in Canada led to similar improvements
in child cognitive and educational outcomes as well as improvements in child and maternal
health. Combining data from ten welfare and anti-poverty experiments, Duncan, Morris, and
Rodrigues (2011) attempt to separately identify the effects of changes in family income from
employment and other effects induced by different programs. Their analysis reaches similar
conclusions regarding the impacts of income on child achievement as Dahl and Lochner (2012)
and Milligan and Stabile (2011). Finally, Løken (2010) and Løken, Mogstad, and Wiswall
(2012) estimate the impact of family income on Norwegian children using regional variation in
the economic boom following the discovery of oil as an instrument for income. The latter study
estimates that income has sizeable impacts on education and IQ for children from low-income
families but much weaker effects for children from higher income families.18
Changes in income may affect children in many ways. In this chapter, we focus on investment-
based theories, so it is important to know whether changes in family income cause families to
make different investment choices. A few studies suggest that this is the case. Following the
approach of Milligan and Stabile (2011), Jones, Milligan, and Stabile (2015) examine how
Canadian parents altered their household expenditures in response to an expansion of child
tax benefits. Their estimates suggest that low-income families, on average, spent 13 cents out
of every additional dollar in benefits on education-related items (e.g. tuition, computers).19
18Studies on the effects of parental job displacement on children also suggest that family income may have
important effects on child schooling and labor market earnings (Oreopoulos, Page, and ann Huff Stevens, 2008,
Stevens and Schaller, 2011); however, parental job displacement may also affect child development through other
channels (e.g. family dissolution).
19Interestingly, their results for all Canadian families suggest negligible effects on average education-related
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Carneiro and Ginja (2014) estimate models of income dynamics in the U.S., examining the
extent to which family investments in children respond to permanent and transitory income
shocks. Their results suggest modest positive responses to permanent shocks but negligible
responses to transitory shocks. Effects appear to be largest for younger children and those with
less-educated parents. Among children whose mothers had not attended college, a 10% in-
crease in permanent income is estimated to increase measures of cognitive stimulation and time
investments by about .02 standard deviations. Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) and Pa-
van (2014) estimate both the technology of skill formation for children (from birth through later
school ages) and the extent to which family income, as well as maternal and child skills, affect
investments in children. Their estimated investment functions suggest that increases in family
income lead to significantly higher investments in children.
Fact 4
The timing of income matters for child development: increases in income at early ages (com-
pared to later ages) lead to larger increases in investments and achievement/educational out-
comes. The estimated child investment functions of Pavan (2014) imply significantly greater
effects of family income on investments at very early ages relative to older ages. Other studies
estimate the effects of family income received at different child ages on adolescent achieve-
ment or educational outcomes. For example, Duncan and Brooks-Gunn (1997), Duncan et al.
(1998), and Levy and Duncan (1999) all estimate that income received at earlier ages has a
greater impact on adolescent achievement than income received at later ages. Carneiro and
Heckman (2002) correctly point out, however, that (undiscounted) early income should have a
larger effect than (undiscounted) later income due purely to discounting – something not taken
into account in previous analyses.20 More recent studies address this concern by discount-
ing all income measures back to the year of birth (Carneiro and Heckman, 2002, Caucutt and
Lochner, 2006, 2012).21 Caucutt and Lochner (2006) report results consistent with the earlier
literature, finding that income received at young ages has a greater effect than income received
at older ages on subsequent child achievement. Caucutt and Lochner (2012) further show that
family income earned when children are younger has a significantly greater effect on college
attendance than does income earned at later ages; however, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) can-
not reject that income has the same effects on college enrolment regardless of the age at which
it was received. While both of these studies use data from the CNLSY, the former benefits
expenditures, so poor families appear to increase education-related spending much more than the typical family.
20That is, with perfect credit markets, income received at age 0 should have an effect that is (1+ r)a times
larger than income received at age a, where r is the annual interest rate.
21These studies all use a 5% rate to discount income back to the year of a child’s birth.
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from a sample size that is roughly twice as large, allowing for greater precision. Furthermore,
because Carneiro and Heckman (2002) are more concerned with the importance of borrowing
constraints at college-going ages, they control for age 12 math achievement levels, which may
absorb much of the effect of early income.
2.4 Understanding Investment and Skill Gaps by Family In-
come
We now develop a general model of dynamic human capital investment that incorporates four
mechanisms thought to generate child investment and skill gaps by family income. Within this
framework, we explore the extent to which these mechanisms are also capable of explaining the
additional stylized facts just discussed. The problem is written as a lifecycle problem in which
individuals invest in their human capital, while borrowing and saving (potentially subject to
borrowing constraints) in an effort to finance investments and smooth consumption over time.
However, the problem can also be interpreted as a ‘family’ investment problem, where altruistic
parents make investments in their children and family borrowing/saving decisions to smooth
family consumption.22
We assume that people live through three stages in their lives. Human capital investment
takes place in the first two stages (i.e. ‘childhood’), followed by the final stage, adulthood.
Adulthood may last for many periods; however, its length is inconsequential for most of our
analysis. We are largely agnostic about the form that investments may take, instead focusing
primarily on total investment expenditures at different ages and the dynamic nature of skill pro-
duction. Conceptually, investments may include various forms of goods inputs like computers
and books, parental time in child development activities, formal schooling, and other time in-
puts by older children.23 When considering parental time as an investment, if the marginal
product of parental time investment (in children) is proportional to the parent’s labor market
productivity (i.e. human capital), then investment is simply given by the parent’s forgone earn-
ings.24
22See Caucutt and Lochner (2012) for a direct mapping between this lifecycle problem and a more explicit
intergenerational problem.
23They might also include more general investments in families or mother-child interactions that are designed
to facilitate child development (e.g. home visitation programs as discussed in Section 2.3).
24To the extent that time investments are important, we implicitly assume that parents can flexibly adjust their
labor supply at a fixed wage. In particular, they can adjust their labor supply downwards without incurring an
hourly wage penalty. Otherwise, distortions similar to those observed for borrowing constraints (discussed below)
might arise if parental time is a key (and non-substitutable) input for young children and if parents cannot fully
reduce their work hours to make desired time investments.
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2.4.1 Technology for Human Capital Production
Denote a child’s ability to learn by θ > 0. Investment expenditures in periods 1 and 2 are given
by i1 and i2, respectively. Early investment produces an interim level of human capital,
h2 = zi1, (2.1)
where z > 0 is the productivity of early investment. Together, late investment and this interim
human capital produce stage 3 (adult) human capital:
h3 = θ f (h2, i2). (2.2)
The human capital production function f (·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in both of
its arguments. To guarantee appropriate second order conditions hold in the decision problems
described below, we assume the following throughout our analysis (without explicit reference):
Assumption 2.1 f 212 < f11 f22 and f12 > max
{
f22
(
f1
f2
)
, f11
(
f2
f1
)}
.
The first condition limits the degree of dynamic complementarity in investments and ensures
strict concavity of the production function. The second condition implies that the least costly
way to produce additional human capital h3 is to increase both early and late investments. Most
plausible specifications for human capital production would entail dynamic complementarity
(i.e. f12 ≥ 0), satisfying this condition (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010, Caucutt and
Lochner, 2012); however, the condition holds much more generally.25 We also assume standard
Inada conditions to ensure interior solutions.26
At times, our analysis will employ a CES human capital production function of the form
f (h2, i2) =
[
a1−bhb2+(1−a)1−bib2
]d/b
, (2.3)
where a ∈ (0,1), b < 1, and d ∈ (0,1); however, most of our analysis does not rely on any
particular functional form. Assumption 2.1 holds for this production function.
2.4.2 General Decision Problem
We assume a period utility function over consumption, u(c), that is strictly increasing, strictly
concave and satisfies standard Inada conditions. Tastes for early educational investment, i1, are
25For example, the condition holds for homothetic functions (e.g., CES) regardless of the degree of comple-
mentarity.
26That is, limh2→0 f1(h2, i2) = ∞, ∀i2 ≥ 0, and limi2→0 f2(h2, i2) = ∞, ∀h2 ≥ 0.
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given by ν i1. The time discount rate is β ∈ (0,1), and the gross rate of return on borrowing
and saving is R > 0. Assets saved in period j are given by a j+1.
The individual/family receives exogenous income y j during childhood periods j = 1,2. We
will sometimes refer to these as (early and late) parental income; although, it may also include
government transfers or earnings while older children are still enrolled in school (in period
2).27
Children/families allocate their resources to consumption and skill investment, leaving
some assets/debt for when the child grows up:
max
c1,c2,i1,i2,a2,a3
E
[
u(c1)+ν i1+βu(c2)+β 2V (a3,h3)
]
(2.4)
subject to human capital production equations (2.1) and (2.2); budget constraints
a j+1 = Ra j + y j− i j− c j for j = 1,2; (2.5)
initial assets a1 given; and where V (a3,h3) represents the child’s utility in adulthood given a3
and h3.
We now consider the main mechanisms commonly thought to explain income-based gaps
in early investment and skill levels. We analyze each mechanism separately, abstracting from
the others, in order to highlight the key underlying forces of each mechanism and the extent
to which it can explain other stylized facts discussed in Section 2.3. In the next two sections,
we abstract from uncertainty and other information problems, considering the consumption
value of investment and the intergenerational correlation of ability. In Section 2.7, we study
the implications of uncertainty and mis-information, at which point we describe information
sets and variables over which expectations are taken in Equation (2.4). Finally, in Section 2.8
we introduce restrictions on borrowing of the form a j+1 ≥−L j, where L j is an upper limit on
the amount that can be borrowed in period j. Until then, we assume that borrowing and saving
are unrestricted.
2.5 Correlated Ability
We begin by studying the implications of a positive intergenerational correlation in ability,
which is likely to generate a positive correlation between a child’s ability and lifetime parental
income, i.e. Cov(θ ,Y ) > 0. Indeed, this is the starting point for many economic theories of
27Even if one considers the child to be the sole decision maker with y1 and y2 reflecting inter vivos transfers
from parents, the interpretations in the text regarding parental income carry through as long as transfers are strictly
increasing in parental income.
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intergenerational correlations in human capital and earnings (Becker and Tomes, 1979, 1986,
Loury, 1981, Restuccia and Urrutia, 2004, Caucutt and Lochner, 2012, Cunha, 2013). To focus
on this potential explanation for income-based gaps in investment and achievement, we study
the effects of θ on investments, marginal returns to investment, and human capital, while ab-
stracting from any consumption value of schooling, uncertainty, and credit constraints. Specif-
ically, we assume ν = 0 and that families have full and perfect information about the produc-
tivity of human capital investments. In the absence of borrowing constraints, the length of
adulthood is irrelevant for our analysis, so we simply consider a three-period problem with
V (a3,h3) = u(Ra3+h3) and a single lifetime budget constraint. For expositional purposes, we
normalize z = 1.
With these assumptions, the problem can be written as:
max
c1,c2,c3,i1,i2
{u(c1)+βu(c2)+β 2u(c3)}
subject to the lifetime budget constraint:
c1+R−1c2+R−2c3 = Y − i1−R−1i2+R−2θ f (i1, i2),
where Y ≡ Ra1 + y1 +R−1y2, which we will often (loosely) refer to as ‘lifetime parental in-
come’. Notice, Y may also include initial family assets and government transfers; however, we
can interpret the effects of changes in Y as changes in parental income holding these constant.
Optimal investments must satisfy the following first order conditions:
θ f1(i1, i2) = R2, (2.6)
θ f2(i1, i2) = R. (2.7)
When investments are made purely for investment purposes, they are chosen to equate the
marginal labor market returns to investment, ∂h3∂ i j = θ f j(i1, i2) in both periods j = 1,2, with the
corresponding return to savings. This is the well-known result of Becker (1975): in the absence
of borrowing constraints, uncertainty, and a direct utility value from investment, human capital
investments simply maximize discounted lifetime earnings net of investment expenditures. Im-
portantly, this relationship holds regardless of ability or family income. As such, investments
are independent of family income, Y , given ability. The role of ability is summarized in the
following proposition. (All proofs can be found in Appendix A.2.)
Proposition 2.1 Optimal investments satisfy the following: (i) the marginal returns to invest-
ments are independent of ability; (ii) early and late investments are strictly increasing in abil-
ity; (iii) adult human capital h3 is strictly increasing in ability.
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Not surprisingly, a positive correlation between parental income and child ability would
produce a positive correlation between parental income and child investments and skills. Yet,
the marginal return on investments should be unrelated to parental income, because investments
in all children equate their marginal returns to the interest rate. This is inconsistent with both
stylized Facts 1 and 2, which document returns to early investments for poor children that
exceed standard interest rates as well as the returns for more economically advantaged children.
Additionally, the model implies no causal relationship between parental income and child
investments/skills. Holding the child’s ability constant, there should be no correlation be-
tween investments and parental income.28 Furthermore, exogenous changes in parental income
should have no effect on investments in children, contradicting stylized Facts 3 and 4.
2.6 Consumption Value of Investment
We next explore the implications of a consumption/utility value associated with investment in
children. Lazear (1977) provides an early analysis of education as a joint producer of human
capital/earnings and utility. Keane and Wolpin (2001), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005),
and Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2011) emphasize and estimate the role of heterogeneity
in the ‘consumption’ value of schooling in explaining differences in schooling behavior, while
Abbott et al. (2013) explicitly consider differences in tastes for schooling by parental wealth.
To study the implications of this mechanism for investments in young children, we incorporate
tastes for schooling ν 6= 0 as in Equation (2.4), while continuing to assume perfect information,
no credit constraints with V (a3,h3) = u(Ra3+h3), and z = 1.
For simplicity, we assume that β = R−1 so that optimal consumption profiles are flat: ct =
c=B−1[Y− i1−R−1i2+R−2θ f (i1, i2)] for t = 1,2,3, where B= 1+R−1+R−2. In the absence
of any consumption value associated with late investment, i2 is still determined from the first
order condition above (Equation (2.7)); however, optimal early investment must now satisfy:
θ f1(i1, i2) =
[
1− ν
u′(c)
]
R2. (2.8)
When investment provides a direct consumption or utility value to children or their families,
this must be taken into account when making investment decisions, driving a wedge between
the marginal labor market return to investment and the return to savings. For a positive con-
sumption value (ν > 0), early investment will have a low labor market return on the margin
28Figures 1 and 5 suggest that there is likely a strong intergenerational ability correlation, since the relationship
between family income and both achievement and investments is much weaker (though still non-trivial) once we
control for maternal characteristics like AFQT and educational attainment.
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(i.e. θ f1 < R2), because families will want to invest beyond the point where lifetime income is
maximized.29 The opposite is true if families/children dislike investment (ν < 0).
When investment has a non-zero consumption value, the effects of parental income on
investments and human capital, as well as the marginal labor market return to early investment,
are easily derived from the the first order conditions above and are summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.2 For ν > 0 (ν < 0), optimal investments satisfy the following: (i) the marginal
return to early investment is strictly less (greater) than the return to savings and is strictly
decreasing (increasing) in lifetime parental income Y ; (ii) early investment is strictly increasing
(decreasing) in lifetime parental income Y ; (iii) later investment is increasing (decreasing) in
lifetime parental income Y if and only if f12 ≥ 0; and (iv) final human capital h3 is strictly
increasing (decreasing) in lifetime parental income Y .
These results are intuitive. If families enjoy investing in their children (ν > 0), they will invest
beyond their income maximizing amounts and will invest more if their income rises. Thus,
the positive relationship between family income and early childhood investment and skills
requires a positive consumption value. Proposition 2.2 shows that if ν > 0, the marginal labor
market return to early investment should be low (inconsistent with Fact 1) and decreasing in
lifetime parental income (consistent with Fact 2). A positive consumption value predicts that
early investment should rise with exogenous increases in lifetime parental income (consistent
with Fact 3); however, it predicts that the timing of that income is irrelevant (inconsistent with
Fact 4).
One might reconcile the high estimated returns for early interventions targeted to econom-
ically disadvantaged children (Fact 1) by assuming that low-income parents find investment in
their children costly (i.e. ν < 0 for low-income families). However, this would then imply that
investment in young children and their skill levels should decline when poor parents receive
additional income, contradicting Fact 3.
2.7 Confusion
Poor families may face greater uncertainty about the returns to investment, or they may simply
maintain inaccurate beliefs about the productivity of various investments. We next examine
how uncertainty and mis-information influence investment behavior and highlight the impor-
tance of accounting for the dynamic nature of skill production.
29This result also holds if parents value the child’s final human capital level instead of early investment itself.
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We begin this analysis by studying uncertainty about θ . In our general framework, this may
reflect uncertainty about the child’s ability to learn, parents’ abilities to teach, or even the price
of skill (including idiosyncratic variation, e.g., due to search frictions) in the labor market. We
first consider the role of risk aversion, assuming that θ is revealed only after all investments
have been made. We then consider uncertainty about θ , as well as the marginal productivity
of early investments z, when that uncertainty is completely resolved after early investments
but before late investments have been made. To focus on the nature of skill production and
irreversibility of investments, these results abstract from risk aversion. Objective uncertainty
(i.e. rational expectations) about θ (reflecting ability or skill prices) is most commonly assumed
in the human capital literature; however, a growing number of studies highlight the role of
subjective uncertainty, typically about the returns to education (Dominitz and Manski, 1996,
Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009, Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014, Wiswall and Zafar,
2015). We discuss both forms of uncertainty.
The literature on subjective beliefs about child development also explores biases in those
beliefs. For example, Nguyen (2008) and Jensen (2010) document downward biased beliefs
(on average) about the returns to education in Madagascar and the Dominican Republic, respec-
tively, further showing that these beliefs respond to newly provided information. Both studies
show that actual schooling choices can be influenced by the provision of new information;
however, Jensen (2010) estimates no behavioral responses among the most poor who may be
financially constrained.30 In this chapter, we are more interested in the implications of biased
beliefs about the productivity/value of earlier investments in children. Cunha, Elo, and Culhane
(2013) and Cunha (2014) show that a sample of mothers from Philadelphia under-estimates,
on average, the value of time investments for cognitive development in young children. Cunha
(2014) further demonstrates that black mothers are more pessimistic about the productivity
of these investments than white mothers, arguing that this difference may explain one-fourth
of black-white early investment gaps. Dizon-Ross (2015) shows that parents in Malawi hold
distorted beliefs about their child’s school achievement levels with greater biases held by the
least-educated parents. Furthermore, providing accurate information in a simple format for
parents to understand leads to a re-allocation in the types of investments they make in their
children (e.g. purchasing remedial vs. advanced workbooks) with greater responses observed
among less-educated parents. Interestingly, the differential responses by parental education do
not lead to corresponding differences in schooling outcomes (e.g. educational expenditures,
school attendance).
30Consistent with the latter finding, Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) estimate that subjective expectations about
the returns to school are not significant predictors of college attendance for youth at the bottom of the income and
wealth distribution in Mexico, while they are significant predictors among those that are not as poor. We discuss
the role of borrowing constraints in Section 2.8.
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Motivated by this literature on subjective beliefs, we study early investments and their
marginal returns when there are many types of early investment activities/inputs, and parents
are mis-informed about the productivity of those activities/inputs. In particular, we consider the
implications of both systematic and non-systematic bias. By systematic bias, we mean incorrect
beliefs about the marginal productivity of all types of early investments, z, as emphasized by
Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013) and Cunha (2014). Non-systematic bias refers to incorrect
beliefs about the relative productivity of different types of early investments as discussed in
Dizon-Ross (2015).
In the following analysis, we use the term beliefs to reflect a family’s subjective probability
distribution for some (productivity) parameter(s). For much of our analysis, it does not matter
whether these beliefs reflect actual variation or simply subjective uncertainty. We use the
term purely objective uncertainty to refer to the case where beliefs coincide with the actual
probability distribution for the parameter(s) of interest. This is also commonly referred to
as rational expectations. We use the term purely subjective uncertainty to refer to the case
where beliefs are non-degenerate even though the actual probability distribution is degenerate
(i.e. if the true distribution for parameters were known, there would be no uncertainty). The
distinction between purely objective or purely subjective uncertainty is mainly important for the
realized marginal labor market returns to investments, because the former implies a distribution
of ex post marginal returns for the same investments while the latter does not. We return to this
point below.
Throughout this section, we continue to assume ν = 0 and V (a3,h3) = u(Ra3+h3) in order
to focus on the role of information frictions.
2.7.1 Risk Aversion and Uncertain Returns
We begin with a very natural form of purely objective uncertainty: both beliefs and the true
distribution of θ are given by θ ∼Φ(θ), with θ¯ ≡ E(θ). For this analysis, we assume that the
true value of θ is not revealed until after all skill investments have been made. We continue to
normalize z = 1.
If individuals are risk averse, the expected return to risky investments should exceed the
return on safe investments if individuals are to hold risky assets at all. With a concave human
capital production technology, this means that skill investments will be lower under uncertainty
(Levhari and Weiss, 1974).
The first order conditions for investments satisfy
f1(i1, i2) = R f2(i1, i2).
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Given the separability between θ and f (·), there is no distortion between early and late in-
vestment even if total investment spending is distorted. That is, for a given level of spending
i1+R−1i2, early and late investments are chosen to maximize f (i1, i2). Assumption 2.1 ensures
that both i1 and i2 increase when total investment spending increases.
The level of total investment spending will equate the expected marginal benefit with the
marginal cost of investment, so
θ¯ f1(i1, i2)+
Cov
(
u′(c3(θ)),θ
)
E
[
u′(c3(θ))
] f1(i1, i2) = R2,
where c3(θ) = Ra3 + θ f (i1, i2) is optimal period 3 consumption in state θ . The expected
marginal benefit of investment consists of a monetary return (first term) and a utility cost (sec-
ond term). Because the marginal utility of consumption is low in states with a high return to
investment, uncertain returns produce an additional utility cost of investment as reflected in the
(negative) covariance term. As such, the expected marginal labor market returns to investment
exceed the return to savings:
θ¯ f1(i1, i2) = Rθ¯ f2(i1, i2)> R2.
Risk averse individuals facing uncertain returns invest less at all ages relative to those who
know the return with certainty.
Moreover, if having greater resources makes people less risk averse, then investments are
increasing and marginal labor market returns decreasing in lifetime parental income Y . Because
no information about the value of θ is revealed until all investments have been made, choices
depend only on the discounted present value of income over all investment years and not the
timing of that income. The following proposition summarizes these results.31
Proposition 2.3 When there is uncertainty in the final return to investment θ , optimal invest-
ments satisfy the following: (i) expected marginal returns to investment are strictly greater
than the return to savings; (ii) expected marginal returns to investment are strictly decreasing
in parental income Y if u(·) exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion; and (iii) early and late
investments are strictly increasing in parental income Y if u(·) exhibits decreasing absolute
risk aversion.
31These results assume purely objective uncertainty; however, they also apply to the case of unbiased subjective
uncertainty. The only difference in the latter case is that all individuals would experience the same marginal
return to investments, given by the expected marginal returns in the case of purely objective uncertainty. Thus,
the marginal returns to investment exceed the return on savings (and decline with income) regardless of the form
of uncertainty.
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2.7.2 Uncertain Returns and the Irreversibility of Early Investment
We now consider the case in which families face uncertainty when making early investments
in their children; however, that uncertainty is fully resolved before late investments are chosen.
While early investments made under uncertainty are irreversible (i.e. families cannot go back in
time to modify ex post suboptimal early investment choices), families can base late investment
decisions on the realizations of early investments and full knowledge of the human capital
production process. Thus, families may be able to partially compensate for ex post suboptimal
early investment through their choice of late investment. The extent to which this is effective
depends crucially on the intertemporal complementarity/substitutability of investments.32 It
also depends on which features of technology are unknown. We consider uncertainty in the
productivity of both investments, θ , as well as in the productivity of early investments alone,
z, at the time early investments are made.
To focus on the implications of investment irreversibility and the dynamic nature of human
capital productivity, we abstract from risk aversion. We continue to focus on purely objective
uncertainty with the distribution of beliefs over (θ ,z) reflecting the true variation in these
productivity parameters; however, we comment briefly on the implications of purely subjective
uncertainty at the end of our discussion.
It is useful to begin with the second period investment problem, which conditions on early
investment and technology once θ and z are known. Let iˆ2(zi1,θ) denote the optimal second
period investment conditional on i1 and technology state (θ ,z):
iˆ2(zi1,θ)≡ argmax
i2
{− i2+R−1θ f (zi1, i2)}. (2.9)
Optimal late investment equates the marginal labor market return with the return to savings,
i.e. θ f2(zi1, i2) = R. From this, it is easy to see that second period investment is increasing in
θ . However, late investment is increasing in z if and only if early and late investments are gross
complements (i.e. f12 ≥ 0), because z only affects the marginal return to late investment indi-
rectly through h2 = zi1. Here, we begin to see the distinction between neutral and early-specific
productivity as well as the importance of intertemporal complementarity/substitutability of in-
vestments. These factors are also important in determining the response of early investment to
uncertainty about investment productivity.
Taking the late investment policy iˆ2(zi1,θ) as given, the net realized (or ex post) return to
32See Cunha and Heckman (2007) for a discussion of dynamic complementarity and the difficulty of compen-
sating for low early investments by increasing late investments. Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010) estimate
and Caucutt and Lochner (2012) calibrate a strong degree of intertemporal complementarity for investments in
children.
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early investment for actual productivity parameters (θ ,z) is given by:
Π(i1,θ ,z)≡−i1−R−1iˆ2(zi1,θ)+R−2θ f
(
zi1, iˆ2(zi1,θ)
)
. (2.10)
The following lemma establishes concavity of net realized returns in early investment and is
useful for a number of results.
Lemma 2.1 The net return to early investment Π(i1,θ ,z) is strictly concave in i1.
Because i1 must be determined before (θ ,z) is realized, optimal early investment maxi-
mizes the expected net return:
i˜1 ≡ argmax
i1
E
[
Π(i1,θ ,z)
]
,
where the expectation is taken over the distribution of (θ ,z). The first order condition equates
the expected marginal labor market return to early investment with the return to savings:
E
[
zθ f1
(
zi˜1, iˆ2(zi˜1,θ)
)]
= R2. (2.11)
With purely objective uncertainty and risk neutrality, the expected marginal labor market return
to early investment always equals the return to savings regardless of the type (i.e. θ or z) or
extent of uncertainty – the expected marginal return is independent of the (θ ,z) distribution.
In contrast with Facts 1 and 2 of Section 2.3, the average marginal labor market return should
equal the interest rate for children from all backgrounds.
We are also interested in understanding how changes in the distribution of (θ ,z) affect early
investment amounts. We consider two notions of a change in the distribution that are widely
used in economics: first order stochastic dominance and mean-preserving spread (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1970, 1971). In this framework, how i˜1 changes with the distribution of produc-
tivity parameters depends on how ∂Π(i1,θ ,z)/∂ i1 varies with (θ ,z). If ∂Π(i1,θ ,z)/∂ i1 is in-
creasing (decreasing) in θ , a first order stochastic dominance shift in θ will increase (decrease)
i˜1. If ∂Π(i1,θ ,z)/∂ i1 is concave (convex) in θ , a mean-preserving spread in θ decreases (in-
creases) i˜1. The same is true for changes in the distribution of z. We first consider investment
when θ is unknown, then turn attention to the case with z unknown. Some of our results assume
a CES production function for human capital as defined in Equation (2.3).
Neutral Productivity Shock We now consider uncertainty in the overall ability of a child
(θ ) that is fully resolved after early investments have been made but before late investments
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are chosen. We assume z is known.33
Proposition 2.4 (i) A first order stochastic dominance shift in θ increases early investment.
(ii) For the CES production function (2.3), a mean-preserving spread in θ reduces early invest-
ment if and only if b > d.
It is not surprising that a first order stochastic shift in θ unambiguously increases early
investment, because θ directly raises the marginal return to investment for any given level of
early and late investment. The effect of a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of θ is
more complicated and depends on the degree of complementarity between investments. For
a CES human capital production function, an increase in uncertainty about θ reduces early
investment if and only if early and late investments are gross substitutes (i.e. b > d⇔ f12 < 0).
With strong intertemporal substitutability, families facing uncertainty about θ will choose to
invest little in the first period and wait to learn the productivity of investment. If investment is
highly productive, the family can easily compensate for inadequate early investment by invest-
ing more in the second period. In the more empirically relevant case where investments are
gross complements ( f12 > 0), it is too costly to make up for a lack of early investment by in-
creasing late investment. As a result, early investment increases with the degree of uncertainty.
Early Investment-Specific Productivity Shock Families may be more uncertain about the
productivity of early investments in their children than they are about later investments like
college attendance. To explore this possibility, we now assume θ is known from birth and
consider the case where z is initially unknown but revealed after early investments have been
made.
A change in z has two opposing effects on the marginal return to early investment. An
increase in z directly increases the productivity of i1, but it also reduces the marginal return
because h2 = zi1 is subject to diminishing returns in the production of adult human capital h3.
The latter effect is attenuated by adjustments in late investments when f12 6= 0. The overall
effect of z depends on the following condition:
Condition 2.1 f1 >
(
f11 f22− f 212
− f22
)
zi1.
If the direct productivity effect (left hand side) is greater than the the diminishing return
effect (right hand side), then the marginal return to i1 is greater for larger z. For the CES
production function given in Equation (2.3), this condition holds if b≥ 0.
Condition 2.1 is appealing, because it is equivalent to requiring that an increase in z raises
the net marginal return to early investment.
33This case was originally considered by Hartman (1976) in the analysis of firm investment and labor demand
under uncertain output prices.
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Lemma 2.2 The marginal net return to early investment ∂Π(i1,θ ,z)/∂ i1 is strictly increasing
in z if and only if Condition 2.1 holds.
When Condition 2.1 is satisfied, a better distribution of z produces a higher marginal re-
turn to i1, on average, which makes it profitable to increase early investment. The following
proposition formalizes this result and characterizes the effects of a mean-preserving spread in
z.
Proposition 2.5 For the CES production function (2.3), (i) a first order stochastic dominance
shift in z increases early investment if b ≥ 0; (ii) a mean preserving spread in z reduces early
investment if b≥ 0.
The effect of a mean-preserving spread in z is similar to its counterpart for θ (Proposition
2.4), except that uncertainty in z discourages early investment more than does uncertainty in θ .
In contrast with an increase in uncertainty about θ , an increase in uncertainty about z can reduce
early investment even when early and late investment are gross complements (e.g. 0≤ b≤ d).
Intuitively, diminishing marginal returns to h2 = zi1 in the production of adult human capital
lessens the benefits of high z realizations for the marginal return to early investment. This force
moderates the costs of under-investment and discourages early investment when z is uncertain,
but it is absent with uncertainty in θ .
Purely Subjective Uncertainty, Investments, and Marginal Returns The previous anal-
ysis assumes individuals have purely objective uncertainty about heterogeneous productivity
levels (θ ,z). Even if all children have the same productivity levels, they may have different
subjective beliefs about the true productivity of investments. For example, the poor may have
downward biased beliefs or they may have unbiased beliefs with greater subjective uncertainty.
Regardless, Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 characterize the effects of changes in beliefs on early
investment choices.
More interestingly, purely subjective uncertainty has different implications from purely
objective uncertainty for observed marginal returns in the labor market. In the latter case,
families facing the same distribution of productivity levels make the same early investment
choices, but they experience different labor market outcomes due to heterogeneous productiv-
ity levels. As discussed earlier (see the discussion surrounding Equation (2.11)), the average
realized marginal labor market return under purely objective uncertainty always equals the
return to savings. The case of purely subjective uncertainty is quite different. All families
with the same beliefs and ability/productivity will make the same early investment choices and
will, therefore, experience the same labor market returns. Strict concavity of Π(i1,θ ,z) in i1
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(Lemma 2.1) directly implies that under purely subjective uncertainty, the observed marginal
labor market return to early investment is strictly decreasing in the level of early investment.
This, together with Propositions 2.4 and 2.5, directly implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 Assume the CES production function given in Equation (2.3). Under purely
subjective uncertainty, a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of beliefs about θ (z) in-
creases the marginal labor market return to early investment if and only if b > d (if b≥ 0).
Families with greater subjective uncertainty about θ will have a higher marginal labor mar-
ket return to early investment if and only if early and late investments are gross substitutes.
Marginal labor market returns will be increasing in the amount of subjective uncertainty about
z under a modest amount of dynamic complementarity in investments.
2.7.3 Biased Beliefs about Human Capital Production
Thus far, we have focused on the extent of uncertainty about the productivity of investments.
It is also possible that parents may have little subjective uncertainty about the productivity of
investments, but their beliefs may be biased. This possibility seems particularly likely to arise
when there are many different potential inputs/activities families may engage in to raise the
human capital of their children (e.g. reading to children, taking them to museums, teaching
them to play musical instruments, playing with them). Even if parents are correct in gauging
the average productivity across different inputs, they might easily misjudge their relative pro-
ductivity. To explore this issue, we now assume homogeneity in the productivity of different
early inputs across families; however, we allow for the possibility that families may hold bi-
ased beliefs about the productivity of any or all early child inputs. To simplify the analysis,
we abstract away from any form of uncertainty – families are certain but may be wrong. We
further assume that families learn the true outcomes of their early investments, h2, before they
need to make later investment decisions.
Assume early investment consists of n different ‘activities’ x = (x1, . . . ,xn) that produce h2
according to the following CES production function:
h2 = z
(
n
∑
j=1
w1−φj x
φ
j
) 1
φ
, (2.12)
where φ ∈ (0,1) and w = (w1, . . . ,wn) ≥ 0 satisfies ∑nj=1 w j = 1.34 Here, z reflects the total
factor productivity of early investments. Changes in z have no affect on the relative productivity
34Vector equality and inequality are defined as follows: (i) x˜ = x if x˜ j = x j for all j = 1, . . . ,n; (ii) x˜ 6= x if
x˜ j 6= x j for some j = 1, . . . ,n; (iii) x˜ ≤ x if x˜ j ≤ x j for all j = 1, . . . ,n.
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or optimal composition of different inputs. Productivity weights w j determine the relative
importance of each input as well as their optimal expenditure shares. It is straightforward to
show that demand for input x j conditional on total early investment spending i1 = ∑nj=1 x j is
given by
x j = w ji1.
By substituting these conditional demands into the production function, we obtain the indirect
production function (as a function of total early expenditure i1) equivalent to that assumed
earlier:
h2 = z
(
n
∑
j=1
w1−φj (w ji1)
φ
) 1
φ
= zi1.
To investigate the implications of incorrect beliefs about early investment productivity, it is
useful to distinguish beliefs from actual productivity parameters. Let z˜ and w˜ denote a family’s
beliefs about z and w, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume ∑nj=1 w˜ j = 1. We
say that a belief is biased if z˜ 6= z or w˜ 6= w. When z˜ 6= z, the bias is systematic in the sense that
families are, on average, biased about the productivity of early investments. When z˜ = z but
w˜ 6= w, the bias is non-systematic, because beliefs are, on average, correct even though they
are wrong about the relative productivity of different early inputs.
Let (x˜, i˜1, h˜2, h˜3) be the optimally chosen investments and realized human capital of chil-
dren with family beliefs (z˜, w˜). Let (x∗, i∗1,h
∗
2,h
∗
3) reflect these same variables when beliefs are
unbiased. Families first choose investments x and i1 based on their beliefs (z˜, w˜):
i˜1 =argmax
i1
Π(i1,θ , z˜)
x˜ j =w˜ j i˜1, ∀ j = 1, . . . ,n,
where the child’s lifetime income net of investments, Π(·, ·, ·), is defined by equation (2.10).
Notice that total early investment spending i˜1 is only affected by z˜ and not by w˜, because w
does not affect total factor productivity.
Next, interim human capital h˜2 is realized based on investments choices (x˜, i˜1) and the true
technology (z,w):
h˜2 = z
(
n
∑
j=1
w1−φj x˜
φ
j
) 1
φ
= zτ(w˜)i˜1,
where
τ(w˜)≡
(
n
∑
j=1
w1−φj w˜
φ
j
) 1
φ
≤ 1
31
reflects the distortion due to a suboptimal allocation of expenditures across inputs. When
w˜ 6= w, early investment spending is less productive than it should be (τ(w˜) < 1), so interim
human capital is low (h˜2 < zi˜1).
We assume that i2 is chosen knowing the actual realization for h˜2. That is, families are
able to evaluate their child’s skill/achievement, effectively learning that their beliefs were mis-
taken.35 Given the resulting interim human capital, late investments are determined as in the
previous subsection (see Equation (2.9)). Finally, adult human capital h˜3 is produced based on
actual h˜2 and late investment:
h˜3 = θ f
(
h˜2, iˆ2(h˜2,θ)
)
.
where iˆ2(., .) is defined in Equation (2.9).
We first study how systematic bias affects early investment and human capital accumula-
tion.
Proposition 2.6 (i) i˜1 is strictly increasing in z˜ if and only if Condition 2.1 holds for (h2, i2) =(
z˜i˜1, iˆ2(z˜i˜1,θ)
)
. (ii) Suppose that w˜ = w. If and only if i˜1 ≤ i∗1, then: x˜ ≤ x∗, h˜2 ≤ h∗2, h˜3 ≤ h∗3,
and zθ f1
(
h˜2, iˆ2(h˜2,θ)
)≥ R2.
Families with a biased belief about z behave as if the true productivity of early investment is
z˜ rather than z. As shown in Lemma 2.1, higher productivity in early investment does not nec-
essarily lead to more early investment due to the diminishing return effect. However, when this
effect is weak so Condition 2.1 is satisfied (e.g. modest dynamic complementarity or substi-
tutability), individuals with downward biased beliefs under-invest in all early inputs/activities
resulting in low levels of human capital. Moreover, under-investment implies a high observed
marginal labor market return to early investment. By contrast, when Condition 2.1 does not
hold, families with downward biased beliefs may over-invest (in all inputs) and obtain high
levels of human capital. In this case, providing information that shifts beliefs upwards towards
the truth would actually reduce early investment and human capital. Figure 2.6 demonstrates
this possibility with CES production function (2.3) and b < 0. In this example, Condition 2.1
does not hold for high values of z, so moving downward biased beliefs z˜ from the middle of
the graph towards the true (higher) value of z would result in lower (but more efficient) levels
of early investment.
Next, consider the effects of non-systematic bias.
Proposition 2.7 Suppose that z˜ = z and w˜ 6= w. Then (i) x˜ j ≤ x∗j if and only if w˜ j ≤ w j; (ii)
i˜1 = i∗1, h˜2 < h
∗
2, and h˜3 < h
∗
3; (iii) zτ(w˜)θ f1
(
h˜2, iˆ2(h˜2,θ)
)
< R2 if Condition 2.1 holds for all
(h2, i2) =
(
z′i∗1, iˆ2(z
′i∗1,θ)
)
where z′ ∈ [zτ(w˜),z].
35Note that this does not necessarily require that parents learn the true productivity values (z,w); although, it is
too late to matter.
32
Figure 2.6: Systematic Bias and Early Investment (CES with b < 0)
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Non-systematic bias does not affect total early investment spending i˜1, but it reduces the
actual return to early investment due to the misallocation of resources to the wrong inputs. As
such, it leads to low levels of human capital. In this case, providing more precise information
will not affect total early investment expenditures, but it will lead to more efficient human cap-
ital production and, consequently, greater human capital. Because non-systematic bias reduces
the productivity of early investment while leaving total investment expenditure unaffected, its
effect on the marginal return to early investment depends on Condition 2.1. When Condi-
tion 2.1 holds, families with non-systematic bias have lower marginal labor market returns to
early investment due to misallocation.
2.7.4 Information Problems and the Stylized Facts
The nature of an information problem is important for understanding its effects on human
capital investment behavior. While none of the information problems we study are able to
explain why the timing of income is important for human capital investment (Fact 4), some are
more consistent with the other stylized facts in Section 2.3.
Uncertainty about child ability θ (or labor market returns to human capital) coupled with
risk aversion causes families to under-invest in their children. With decreasing absolute risk
aversion, under-investment is worse among the poor, and an increase in lifetime parental in-
come would be met with an increase in child investments (Fact 3). Expected marginal returns
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exceed the return to savings (Fact 1) and are especially high for children from low-income
families (Fact 2). These results apply whether uncertainty is objective or subjective.
We also explore the implications of uncertainty resolved after early investments have been
made but in time for late investment choices to respond. Here, we abstract from risk aversion in
order to emphasize the role of early investment irreversibility and the technology of skill forma-
tion. If early and late investments are mildly complementary, subjective uncertainty about the
productivity of early investments, z, can lead to under-investment in young children and high
marginal returns to early investment (relative to interest rates). If poor families face greater
subjective uncertainty about z, then they will invest less in their young children than higher
income families, stopping investment when marginal returns are relatively high.36 Thus, with
modest dynamic complementarity, differences in subjective uncertainty by parental income can
help explain Facts 1 and 2. While this form of uncertainty can explain the positive correlation
between parental income and child investments, it does not help us understand why changes
in parental income lead to contemporaneous changes in child investments and achievement
(Facts 3 and 4) unless income brings new information with it.37 Uncertainty about θ (with
risk neutrality) resolved after early childhood is inconsistent with a positive parental income
– child investment relationship and other stylized facts unless early and late investments are
substitutes.38
Finally, we consider the possibility that families are simply mistaken about the produc-
tivity of early investment activities as documented in Cunha (2014) and Dizon-Ross (2015).
With modest dynamic complementarity, we show that poor families that systematically under-
estimate the productivity of early investments will under-invest in their young children and have
a high marginal return to early investment relative to the return to savings and the marginal re-
turn for high income families with accurate beliefs (Facts 1 and 2). By contrast, non-systematic
bias (i.e. over-estimation of the productivity of some inputs offset by under-estimation of the
productivity of others) has no effect on total early investment expenditures. Instead, it results in
a mis-allocation across early inputs, which tends to reduce the marginal return to early expen-
ditures.39 Thus, non-systematic bias among poor families cannot explain the basic correlation
between family income and child investment/achievement, nor can it explain the high marginal
36With purely objective uncertainty and risk neutrality, expected marginal returns to investment always equal
the return on savings.
37 Changes in income may lead to changes in information and, therefore, investment behavior, if informa-
tion about the productivity value of investment can be purchased by families. We do not explicitly model this
possibility.
38Available evidence suggests dynamic complementarity for investments (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach,
2010, Caucutt and Lochner, 2012, Attanasio et al., 2015).
39The prediction of over-investment in some inputs and under-investment in others conflicts with Figures 2.2
and 2.3, which shows that the poor generally invest less than the rich in nearly all inputs.
34
return to investment among the poor (Facts 1 and 2). Neither form of bias helps explain the
responsiveness of early investment and achievement to changes in income (Facts 3 and 4).40
2.8 Borrowing Constraints
Lastly, we consider the possibility that families may be unable to borrow against future earn-
ings to efficiently finance investments in their children. Studies of intertemporal consumption
behavior frequently document patterns consistent with borrowing constraints, with many find-
ing stronger evidence of binding constraints among younger households (e.g.Costas Meghir
(1996), Alessie, Devereux, and Weber (1997), Stephens (2008)).41 We analyze the implica-
tions of borrowing constraints at different stages of child development for human capital in-
vestment within our framework. Consistent with Cunha and Heckman (2007), we demonstrate
the importance of dynamic complementarity of investments for the impacts of both borrowing
constraints and family resources.
We incorporate borrowing constraints by imposing upper limits on the total debts families
can accumulate in any period. Specifically, we restrict assets carried into any period j+ 1 to
satisfy the constraint a j+1 ≥ −L j. To focus on the role of borrowing constraints, we consider
the problem of Section 2.4 (with borrowing constraints) assuming z = 1, ν = 0, and perfect
information.
Because we are not only concerned with borrowing constraints during the investment pe-
riod, but also later in life, we interpret the continuation utility V (a3,θ f (h2, i2)) as the solution
to the asset allocation problem for individuals entering adulthood, allowing for the possibility
of binding future constraints. We assume that individuals live to age T and that adult earnings
depend on human capital acquired through childhood investments h3, growing exogenously
thereafter with
h j = Γ jh3, j ∈ {4, ...,T}. (2.13)
Individuals entering adulthood with human capital h3 and assets a3 allocate consumption across
their remaining life in the following way:
V (a3,h3) = max
c3,...,cT
T
∑
j=3
β j−3u(c j), (2.14)
40Systematic bias in z may be consistent with Fact 3 if b > 0 and beliefs about z respond to changes in family
income. See footnote 37.
41In related work, Attanasio, Koujianou Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2008) conclude that many younger and
middle-age American households are likely to be borrowing constrained based on differential car loan demand
elasticities with respect to interest rates and loan maturity.
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subject to budget constraints a j+1 = Ra j + h j − c j for j ∈ {3, ...,T}, borrowing constraints
a j+1 ≥−L j for j ∈ {3, ...,T −1}, and aT+1 = 0.42
Given the value function defined in (2.14), families solve the maximization problem (2.4)
subject to budget constraints (2.5), initial assets a1, and borrowing constraints a2 ≥ −L1 and
a3 ≥−L2.
2.8.1 Investment Behavior
Consumption allocations satisfy u′(c j) ≥ βRu′(c j+1), ∀ j = 1, ...,T − 1, where the inequality
is strict if and only if the borrowing constraint for period j (a j+1 ≥ −L j,) binds. First order
conditions for investment are given by
u′(c1) = β 2θ
∂V (a3,h3)
∂h3
f1(i1, i2), (2.15)
u′(c2) = βθ
∂V (a3,h3)
∂h3
f2(i1, i2), (2.16)
where ∂V (a3,h3)∂h3 = ∑
T
j=3β j−3Γ ju′(c j) > 0 with Γ3 = 1. Taking the ratio of these equations
reveals that optimal investment equates the technical rate of substitution in the production of
human capital with the marginal rate of substitution for consumption: f1(i1,i2)f2(i1,i2) =
u′(c1)
βu′(c2) ≥ R.
Unconstrained optimal investments, i∗1 and i
∗
2, satisfy χθ f1(i
∗
1, i
∗
2) = R
2 and χθ f2(i∗1, i
∗
2) =
R, where χ =∑Tj=3 R3− jΓ j reflects the discounted present value of an additional unit of human
capital. As in Section 2.5, unconstrained investments maximize the discounted present value of
lifetime earnings net of investment costs. They are independent of the marginal utility of con-
sumption and income/transfers, because individuals can optimally smooth consumption across
periods. This is not true when borrowing constraints bind as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.8 (i) If and only if any borrowing constraint binds, then: optimal early invest-
ment is strictly less than the unconstrained amount, the marginal return to early investment is
strictly greater than the return to savings, and adult human capital is strictly less than the un-
constrained level. (ii) If any borrowing constraint binds and either (a) the period one constraint
does not bind or (b) f12 > 0, then optimal late investment is strictly less than the unconstrained
amount. (iii) If and only if any borrowing constraint in period two or later binds, then the
marginal return to late investment is strictly greater than the return to savings.
Early investment is always low and its marginal labor market return high (relative to the
unconstrained case) when any borrowing constraints bind. Late investment is also low and its
42Appendix A.2 shows that V2 > 0, V22 < 0, and V21 < 0. These properties are used repeatedly in proving
results below.
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marginal return high if constraints at that age or later are binding and either the early constraint
does not bind or early and late investments are complementary.
The complementarity of investments across periods plays a central role in determining in-
dividual responses to borrowing constraints and changes in parental income. If investments are
very substitutable, individuals can shift investment from constrained periods to unconstrained
periods with little loss to total acquired human capital. Their ability to do this is diminished as
investments become more complementary. In particular, the following dynamic complemen-
tarity condition is important for a number of results.
Condition 2.2 f12 ff1 f2 >
−V22(−RL2,h3)h3
V2(−RL2,h3) .
If preferences are given by the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) form
u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ (where 1/σ is the IES) and credit constraints are non-binding throughout adult-
hood, then this condition simplifies to something very intuitive:
f1 f2
f12 f︸︷︷︸
Hicksian elasticity of substitution
<
1
σ︸︷︷︸
IES
(
1− RL2
χh3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1- maximum debtlifetime income
.
See Appendix A.2 for details.43 As the Hicksian elasticity of substitution between early and
late investments declines (i.e. investments become more complementary) or the consumption
intertemporal elasticity of substitution increases (i.e. individuals become less concerned about
maintaining smooth consumption profiles), this inequality is more likely to hold. More gener-
ally, when individual preferences for smooth consumption are strong, Condition 2.2 requires
strong complementarity between early and late investments.
We are now ready to study how family income during early and late childhood affect in-
vestment behavior. As noted above, changes in family income have no effect on investments
for unconstrained individuals. The following proposition shows how constraints at different
stages of child development determine the responsiveness of investment to changes in income
at early and late ages. These results highlight how the timing of income/transfers can impact
human capital investments and accumulation when individuals are constrained.44
Proposition 2.9
I. If borrowing constraints bind in late childhood, but not early childhood, then:
43For the CES production function given in equation (2.3), the Hicksian elasticity of substitution between early
and late investments (the left hand side) is simply dd−b . The condition cannot hold for d ≤ b, but this only rules
out very strong substitution between early and late investments such that f12 ≤ 0.
44See Cunha and Heckman (2007) for a related analysis of the impacts of early vs. late income on the early-to-
late investment ratio i1/i2 when the early borrowing constraint binds.
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(i) ∂ i1∂y1 = R
∂ i1
∂y2
= ∂ i1∂ (R−1y2)
> 0;
(ii) ∂ i2∂y1 = R
∂ i2
∂y2
= ∂ i2∂ (R−1y2)
> 0;
(iii) ∂h3∂y1 = R
∂h3
∂y2
= ∂h3∂ (R−1y2)
> 0.
II. If borrowing constraints only bind in early childhood, then:
(i) ∂ i1∂y1 > 0; and
∂ i1
∂y2
< 0;
(ii) ∂ i2∂y1 > 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0; and
∂ i2
∂y2
< 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0;
(iii) ∂h3∂y1 > 0; and
∂h3
∂y2
< 0.
III. If borrowing constraints bind during both early and late childhood, then:
(i) ∂ i1∂y1 > 0; and
∂ i1
∂y2
> 0 ⇐⇒ Condition 2.2 holds;
(ii) ∂ i2∂y1 > 0 ⇐⇒ Condition 2.2 holds; and
∂ i2
∂y2
> 0;
(iii) ∂h3∂y1 > 0 and
∂h3
∂y2
> 0.
There are two key implications of this proposition. First, if the late constraint binds but
the early constraint does not, then investments depend only on the discounted present value of
family income y1+R−1y2, not the timing of income (conditional on discounting y2). Second,
when the early constraint binds, the response of investments to changes in income depends
on the timing of income, the extent of dynamic complementarity, and whether late constraints
are also binding. While constrained early investment is always increasing in y1, this is not
necessarily the case for changes in y2. Because an increase in late income exacerbates the
early borrowing constraint, early investment is unambiguously decreasing in y2 when the late
constraint does not also bind. Intuitively, families would like to consume some of the increased
late income in the earlier period as well; however, if they are borrowing constrained, they can
only do this by reducing early investments. When only the early constraint binds, the impacts
of income on late investment depend entirely on its effect on early investment and whether early
investment raises ( f12 > 0) or lowers ( f12 < 0) the marginal return to late investment. Perhaps
surprisingly, when f12 > 0 and only the early constraint binds, then an increase in family
income during late childhood reduces skill investments in both periods. When constraints
are binding throughout (early and late) childhood, increases in income in any period increase
investment in both periods if and only if there is sufficient dynamic complementarity.
To better understand the implications of policies aimed at expanding credit for educational
investments, we consider the impacts of raising borrowing limits for families at different stages
of child development, beginning with limits faced by families with older children (e.g. expand-
ing student loan programs for higher education).
Proposition 2.10 Assume that the borrowing constraint binds during late childhood (i.e. a3 =
−L2).
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(i) If the early borrowing constraint does not bind (i.e. a2 >−L1), then: ∂ i1∂L2 > 0,
∂ i2
∂L2
> 0,
and ∂h3∂L2 > 0.
(ii) If the early borrowing constraint also binds (i.e. a2 =−L1), then: ∂ i1∂L2 > 0 if Condition
2.2 holds; ∂ i2∂L2 > 0; and
∂h3
∂L2
> 0.
Relaxing the borrowing constraint during late childhood unambiguously increases late in-
vestment. If the early constraint is non-binding or if early and late investments are sufficiently
complementary, then any increase in late investment encourages additional early investment
as well. Even in the case of strong intertemporal substitutability when early investment may
decline, individuals acquire more adult human capital when the late constraint is relaxed. Al-
together, these results are fairly intuitive.
We next show that relaxing borrowing constraints on families during early childhood (e.g.
loans for preschool) can lead to more surprising effects on investment behavior depending on
the extent of dynamic complementarity.
Proposition 2.11 Assume that the borrowing constraint binds during early childhood (i.e.
a2 =−L1).
(i) If no other borrowing constraint binds, then: ∂ i1∂L1 ∈ (0,1);
∂ i2
∂L1
> 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0; and
∂h3
∂L1
> 0.
(ii) If the late borrowing constraint also binds (i.e. a3 = −L2) and Condition 2.2 does not
hold, then: ∂ i1∂L1 > 0 and
∂ i2
∂L1
< 0.
When individuals are only constrained during early childhood, relaxing that constraint leads
to an increase in early investment, which encourages late investment as long as the marginal
productivity of i2 is increasing in i1.
When children are constrained in both periods, relaxing the early constraint effectively
shifts resources from late to early childhood. If early and late investments are very comple-
mentary, they will both tend to move in the same direction. In most cases, investments will
increase; however, it is possible that investments could actually decrease in both periods. In-
tuitively, if late investment is very productive, then relaxing the early borrowing constraint can
‘starve’ that investment. By contrast, if investments are sufficiently substitutable over time,
shifting resources from late to early childhood by relaxing the early constraint causes invest-
ment to shift from the late to the early period as well.
The stylized facts of Section 2.3 and other evidence in Caucutt and Lochner (2012) are
most consistent with binding early and late constraints and sufficient dynamic complemen-
tarity (case III of Proposition 2.9). In this case, investments increase with additional family
income (Fact 3) and the timing of income matters (Fact 4). Because poor children are more
39
likely to be borrowing constrained, Proposition 2.8 implies that they are likely to have marginal
labor market returns that exceed the return to savings as well as the marginal returns for un-
constrained children from higher income families (Facts 1 and 2). Finally, Propositions 2.10
and 2.11 suggest that policies designed to expand borrowing opportunities (at either stage of
child development) can raise the investment and skill levels of children from constrained (i.e.
low-income) families, improving both efficiency and equity.
2.9 Summary and Conclusions
It is well-known that poor children perform much worse academically and on achievement
tests than their more economically advantaged counterparts. The most immediate explanation
for these differences is that poor parents invest less in their young children. As we document,
poor parents have fewer books in the home, read less to their young children, engage in fewer
lessons and extracurricular activities, etc. Important differences in investment activities and
achievement by family income remain even after controlling for maternal characteristics like
education, achievement, and race. In this chapter, we ask the next logical question: why do
poor parents invest so much less in their children?
While there are many competing theories for these investment and skill gaps, few studies
attempt to sort amongst them.45 We systematically study four leading investment-based theo-
ries/mechanisms thought to drive income-based skill gaps: an intergenerational correlation in
ability, a consumption value of investment, information frictions, and credit constraints. In or-
der to help understand which mechanisms drive family investments in children, we consider the
extent to which they also explain other important stylized facts related to the marginal returns
to investment and the effects of parental income on child investment and skills.
The main lessons from our theoretical analysis are summarized in Table 2.1, which shows
considerable differences in the extent to which each mechanism explains important stylized
facts about child development. While a positive intergenerational correlation in ability may
be partially responsible for the relationship between family income and child investment and
achievement, it is not helpful for understanding any of the other important stylized facts. A
theory based only on a positive consumption value of investment can explain the positive causal
effects of income on investment as well as decreasing marginal labor market returns in family
income; however, it predicts over-investment in skills such that the labor market returns to
investment should be less than the return to savings. This mechanism offers no explanation for
the importance of early income relative to late income.
Uncertainty coupled with risk aversion leads to under-investment in human capital and high
45Cunha (2014) is an important recent exception.
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marginal returns to additional investment. With decreasing absolute risk aversion, investment
disincentives are greater for the poor. Thus, this mechanism can explain the qualitative patterns
for marginal returns documented in the literature as well as the evidence on causal effects of
income on early child investments and achievement. Neither this mechanism nor any other
information-based explanation we explore can explain why the timing of income is impor-
tant. Even in the absence of risk aversion, subjective uncertainty in the productivity of early
investments can lead to under-investment and high marginal returns due to the irreversibility
of investments. If poor families face greater subjective uncertainty than rich families, then
predicted patterns for marginal returns are consistent with empirical evidence. This is also
true if poor families simply under-estimate the productivity of early investments compared to
higher income families. Unless changes in income directly improve the information of poor
families, these mis-information problems only generate a correlation between family income
and investment; they cannot explain why changes in income produce changes in investment or
achievement.
The inability of poor families to borrow against future income can lead to under-investment
in their children, which can further explain high marginal returns to investment among the poor.
For children in constrained families, improvements in income lead to increases in investment
and higher skill levels. If constraints are binding for families with young children, the timing
of income will be important. Thus, binding credit constraints are consistent with the four main
stylized facts we consider.46
We caution that our comparison of model predictions with the evidence should not be taken
as a score sheet, evaluating the importance of each mechanism by the number of facts it ex-
plains. A positive intergenerational correlation in ability is almost certainly important given the
extent to which maternal characteristics help explain income-based differences in investment
and achievement (see Figures 2.1 and 2.5); yet, it offers no explanation for any of the other
stylized facts. A number of recent studies also document important biases in beliefs about
the productivity of early investments or labor market returns to education; however, the extent
to which these biases explain differences in investment and achievement by parental income
remains to be seen. Our results suggest that these biases are unlikely to explain why child
achievement improves when family income rises or why the timing of income is important.
Our primary contribution is to help clarify key empirical predictions of different mecha-
nisms that can be useful in thinking about policy options or in future empirical research aimed
at quantifying the importance of those mechanisms. For example, our analysis suggests that
46Borrowing constraints cannot easily explain why many poor mothers hold biased beliefs about the produc-
tivity of investments in children (Cunha, 2013, Dizon-Ross, 2015); however, they may explain why schooling
choices among the most poor are relatively unresponsive to differences in those beliefs or to new information
(Jensen, 2010, Attanasio and Kaufmann, 2009).
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information or credit market frictions are needed to explain the high marginal returns to early
investment among the poor. This is important, because it means that appropriately designed
policies may be able to reduce inequality while improving economic efficiency. We also show
that evidence on the relative importance of early vs. late family income for child investment
and achievement is particularly useful for identifying the presence of credit market frictions,
since none of the other mechanisms predict that the timing of income matters. More gener-
ally, a better understanding of the implications and limits of different mechanisms should be
helpful in refining current theories and empirically sorting out their quantitative importance. In
particular, future empirical research should attempt to exploit data/evidence on the types of re-
lationships we highlight to aid in the identification of general models that incorporate multiple
mechanisms.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneity in Parental Altruism and
Optimal Higher Education Subsidies
3.1 Introduction
In the U.S., parents have no legal obligations to pay for their children’s higher education.
However, for the purposes of financial aid, most undergraduate students are still considered
dependent1 and their parents’ financial resources limit the amount of financial aid they qualify
for. Because aid is awarded not based on the actual amount of parental transfers but on parents’
fiscal ability to contribute, students from high income families can have a hard time financing
college costs if their parents do not support them through college. In the presence of borrowing
constraints, it would be socially beneficial to provide financial aid to students who receive
little support from parents, regardless of family background. But it is challenging to design
a financial aid system that specifically targets those students, because parental transfers and
preferences are difficult to observe. In this chapter, I provide empirical evidence that parents’
contributions towards college costs are partly driven by heterogeneous parental altruism and
study optimal higher education subsidies when the policymaker can observe neither the amount
of parental transfers nor altruism.
In the first part of the chapter, I derive testable implications of heterogeneous parental
altruism and empirically examine them. I begin with presenting a model similar to Becker and
Tomes (1986) and Brown, Scholz, and Seshadri (2012) in which parental transfers and college-
going decisions are jointly determined. Students choose years of schooling but face limited
borrowing opportunities. Parents care about their children’s well-being (i.e., they are altruistic)
1When filing for the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA), a student is considered independent
if one of the following criteria is satisfied: at least 24 years old, married, a graduate or professional student, a
veteran, a member of the armed forces, an orphan, a person with dependants, or homeless.
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and decide how much to pay for college education (‘schooling transfer’) and how much to
give after schooling has been completed (‘non-schooling transfer’). Among wealthy parents,
those with sufficiently low altruism give low transfers and their children are constrained. On
the other hand, sufficiently altruistic parents not only give enough money for college for their
children to be unconstrained but also give additional cash transfers after college. Therefore,
heterogeneity in parental altruism generates a positive correlation between schooling and non-
schooling transfers among families with similar resources. The positive correlation between
the two types of parental transfers cannot be generated by other factors that affect parental
transfers through net return to schooling, such as ability or tastes for schooling: as the monetary
or psychic return to schooling rises, parents will substitute away from non-schooling transfer
towards schooling transfers.
I empirically investigate these predictions using data from the NLSY97, which collects de-
tailed information on how students pay for college and the parental transfers they receive in
each year. The data also contains a rich set of family characteristics. I first document that there
is substantial heterogeneity across families in the fraction of net college expenditure2 paid by
parents. In each parental income quartile, there exist many parents who paid nothing and many
who paid everything. Moreover, I find that conditional on observable family characteristics and
a measure of student ability, schooling transfers and non-schooling transfers are positively cor-
related, suggesting that some variation in parental transfers is driven by differences in altruism.
Because only 50% of the total covariance between the two types of transfers are explained
by observable family characteristics, there is a potentially important role for heterogeneous
parental altruism.
In the second part of the chapter, I characterize the properties of optimal subsidies with
heterogeneous parental altruism. Borrowing constraints distort schooling choices as well as
intertemporal and intergenerational consumption allocations. The social planner aims to mini-
mize the distortions but cannot directly eliminate the borrowing contraints. Instead, the social
planner can distribute subsidies based on schooling choices and observable characteristics of
students, such as ability and family income. Neither the amount of parental transfers nor altru-
ism are observable, but students with identical observable characteristics may choose different
years of college due to different parental transfers. Thus, the social planner can target specific
types of students by linking subsidies to years of college.
The first analytical result shows that the optimal subsidy policy tends to subsidize early
years of college more heavily than late years. More precisely, I show that even students from
high income families can receive subsidies in early years of college, but the subsidy should
2Net college expenditure is defined as the sum of tuition and living expenses net of non-repayable financial
aid such as grants and tuition discounts.
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phase out as they progress towards late years if there are some unconstrained students. This
means that late years in college should be taxed, not subsidized. The subsidy over early years
of college relaxes borrowing constraints for students whose parents have low altruism and give
insufficient transfers to finish college. Thus, the subsidy can help constrained students stay in
school longer. However, it also benefits unconstrained students whose parents are altruistic and
give enough transfers to graduate college. Because subsidies to unconstrained students do not
improve economic efficiency but are costly, the optimal subsidy is reduced at high levels of
schooling.
The second result shows that the amount of subsidies allocated to early years of college
is limited due to distortionary costs related to college attendance at the extensive margin. In
particular, I show that the optimal subsidy is increasing in years of schooling at the lowest
level (i.e., the subsidy phases in) when there are some students who do not attend college.
Providing a more generous subsidy at early years of college reduces distortions at the intensive
margin (i.e., it improves efficiency for constrained families with college attending children),
but it also increases distortions at the extensive margin (i.e., it reduces efficiency for families
with children who switch from non-college to college). Because marginal families affected by
the policy change are indifferent between going to college and not, the public funding spent
on them is purely deadweight loss. Therefore, the total amount of subsidy is not maximized at
the lowest level of schooling even when the welfare gain of additional subsidy at the intensive
margin is the greatest at that level.
The two results show a fundamental trade-off faced by the social planner: redistributing
to students of parents with low altruism generates large welfare gains at the intensive margin,
but it can also involve large distortionary costs at the extensive margin. This trade-off is also
important in determining how subsidies are allocated across income groups. The presence of
borrowing constraints means it can be more efficient to offer larger subsidies to low income
families compared to high income families. However, the amount of subsidy given to low
income families may be limited by relatively large behavioral responses in college attendance
among those with low altruism, which generates substantial deadweight loss.
To quantify these mechanisms, I calibrate the model to match college attainment by fam-
ily income and ability in the NLSY97 under current U.S. financial aid policy. I then solve for
budget-neutral optimal subsidy schedules for high ability (80th percentile) students with differ-
ent income levels. Compared to current policy, the optimal policy provides larger subsidies for
children with low altruism parents by offering greater subsidies to low levels of schooling. This
reduces the dispersion of education and improves efficiency in human capital production. The
results further suggest that students from high income families should receive larger subsidies
(at the current level of aggregate spending) than those from low income families. Although the
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optimal policy significantly changes the allocation of subsidies as well as schooling outcomes,
its welfare gain is modest.
The implications of heterogeneous parental altruism has been recently studied in the opti-
mal taxation literature by Weinzierl (2008) and Farhi and Werning (2013). They study optimal
consumption allocation within and across generations under various social welfare functions.
In their environment, there are no frictions that justify redistribution across individuals, so the
social planner’s only goal is to reduce inequality. Therefore, the properties of the optimal al-
location inevitably depend on how the social planner values consumption inequality and how
much weight is put on each individual. By contrast, in this chapter, borrowing constraints
generate distortions that can be reduced by proper redistribution. Therefore, there is room for
policy intervention even when the social planner does not care about inequality per se. Based
on Be´nabou (2002), I develop a social objective where concerns for inequality can be com-
pletely separated from those for efficiency, and focus on characterizing policies that minimize
distortions.
There is a large literature on education policies in the presence of borrowing constraints.3
A closely related paper is de Fraja (2002), which characterizes optimal education policies when
parents have private information. However, as commonly assumed in the literature, parents’
willingness to pay for children’s education is heterogeneous due to differences in returns to
schooling, instead of altruism. In this chapter, I show that heterogeneity in returns to school-
ing and parental altruism lead to very different conclusions about optimal education policies.
When families choose different schooling levels because of heterogeneous returns to schooling,
families with high ability students attain more schooling and are more likely to be constrained.
Thus, additional subsidies given for late years of college can relax borrowing constraints and
have large welfare gains. By contrast, when parental altruism is heterogeneous, students of
altruistic parents obtain more schooling and are less likely to be constrained. Therefore, subsi-
dies given to late years of college attendance have smaller welfare effects.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 builds a model of intergenera-
tional transfers and schooling choices, and derives comparative statics results on how different
sources of heterogeneity across families generate different patterns of parental transfers. Sec-
tion 3.3 reports U.S. evidence on the relationship between parental transfers and schooling,
and empirically examines the comparative statics results. Section 3.4 theoretically character-
izes optimal policies. Section 3.5 calibrates the model and computes the optimal policy for
families with different income. Section 3.6 concludes.
3For example, Keane and Wolpin (2001), Caucutt and Kumar (2003), Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Johnson
(2013), Abbott et al. (2013), Hanushek, Leung, and Yilmaz (2014), Findeisen and Sachs (2014); to name a few.
See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012) for a recent review and references therein.
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3.2 Model
This section develops a model of intergenerational transfers and education choice and derives
testable implications. I begin by assuming that parents give one-time transfers at the beginning
of their children’s post-secondary schooling and then consider the case where the transfers
occur again when children finish their schooling.
3.2.1 Environment
A family consists of a parent and a child (youth). At time t = 0, the child is age 18 and lives
until time t = Tk. The parent lives until t = Tp. Time is continuous. Each family member
i ∈ {p,k} accrues a flow of utility from consumption ci(t) in each period t and they discount
future utility flows at a subjective discount rate ρ . The lifetime utility from a consumption
profile ci(·) is
Ui =
∫ Ti
0
e−ρtu
(
ci(t)
)
dt,
where u(c) = c1−σ/(1−σ) and 1/σ ∈ R+ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Parents are altruistic towards their children, so they care about both Up and Uk. Parents’
preferences over (Up,Uk) are represented by the following twice continuously differentiable
and strictly increasing function
V =W (Up,Uk,δ ), (3.1)
where δ is the degree of parental altruism. Parents with high δ are more altruistic, and this is
captured by the following single-crossing condition:
∂
∂δ
(
∂W (Up,Uk,δ )/∂Uk
∂W (Up,Uk,δ )/∂Up
)
> 0.
Parents with lifetime wealth W ∈ R++ make one-time transfer B ≥ 0 to their children at
the beginning (time t = 0). Taking parental transfer B as given, youth decide when to leave
school. Let s≥ 0 denote the time when youth quit schooling, so s also reflects years of college
education. While all individuals can borrow and save at interest rate r = ρ , youth cannot
borrow more than an exogenous limit D ≥ 0 during the schooling period. Schooling involves
both direct (out-of-pocket) costs and opportunity costs (forgone earnings). The direct flow cost
for the tth year of schooling is p(t)≥ 0.
Individuals start working at t = s, accumulate experience x(s, t) = t− s while working, and
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retire at t = TR. Those with schooling s, ability a, and experience x earn y(s,a,x) ≥ 0 in each
period, where y(s,a,x) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in s and a.
Let Y (s,a) be the discounted value of lifetime earnings evaluated at the end of the schooling
period
Y (s,a) =
∫ TR
s
e−r(t−s)y
(
s,a,x(s, t)
)
dt.
High ability individuals have not only high earnings conditional on schooling but also high
returns to schooling. The following condition imposes some complementarity between ability
and schooling:
∂ 2 lnY (s,a)
∂ s∂a
≥ 0.
This condition, known as log-supermodularity, ensures that high ability students attain more
schooling in the absence of borrowing constraints. The condition holds when ability is mul-
tiplicatively separable (i.e., y(s,a,x) = µ(a)ι(s,x)), which is commonly assumed in empirical
studies.
3.2.2 Schooling Choice
I begin with analyzing the schooling choice of a youth endowed with (B,a). Because B is
endogenous, we can think of this as a youth’s choice conditional on B.
For each period in school t ≤ s, the youth consumes and pays for schooling costs by accu-
mulating debt (or running down savings when D(t)< 0)
D˙(t) = rD(t)+ ck(t)+ p(t) (3.2)
with the initial condition D(0) =−B and the end-of-schooling borrowing constraint
D(s)≤ D. (BC)
Youth can fully smooth consumption within the schooling period and after schooling, but
consumption will exhibit a jump at the end of the schooling period if the borrowing constraint
(BC) binds. The optimality condition for schooling is 4
∂ lnY (s,a)
∂ s
≥ r+ p(s)
Y (s,a)
, (3.3)
4See Appendix B.1.1 for analytical results and derivations in this section.
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where the inequality is strict if and only if (BC) binds.
Additional schooling increases lifetime income, but it also involves opportunity cost due to
delayed labor market entry, which is reflected in r, as well as the direct cost p(s) (Mincer, 1958,
Card, 2001, Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006). In the absence of binding credit constraints,
schooling is chosen to maximize net lifetime income. As such, high ability students attain more
schooling, while schooling is independent of the parental transfer (Becker, 1967).
Students with high ability or low parental transfers accumulate more debt by the end of the
schooling period. When the borrowing constraint binds, the marginal return to schooling is
high because schooling incurs an additional utility cost due to low consumption during school
(Becker, 1967, Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011). In order to stay longer in school, youth
must suffer from lower consumption during the schooling periods and endure low consump-
tion for a longer period of time. For youth with less initial resources (parental transfer), the
cost of this distortion is larger, so they attain less schooling. Given any level of transfer, the
consumption distortion is larger for high ability students (income effect), but the monetary ben-
efit is also greater (substitution effect). With borrowing constraints, the relationship between
schooling and ability depends on which effect dominates (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011).
I discuss this issue in detail in Section 3.2.4.
3.2.3 Parental Transfer
Parents with lifetime wealth W choose B to maximize (3.1) subject to the constraint that trans-
fers should be nonnegative
B≥ 0, (TC)
their lifetime budget constraint
∫ Tp
0
e−rtcp(t)dt+B≤W,
and youth’s utility Uk conditional on the transfer.
Parents’ utility function (3.1) is often parameterized as (e.g. Becker and Tomes, 1986)
V =Up+δUk, (3.4)
with δ ∈ R+. This functional form assumes that the desire to smooth consumption over time
is equal to the desire to smooth consumption across generations, so 1/σ measures both the
elasticity of substitution across periods and generations. I use a more general specification that
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allows attitudes towards intertemporal and intergenerational substitution to be distinguished
(Co´rdoba and Ripoll, 2014). As discussed in Section 3.4.2, this generalization facilitates mea-
suring distortions generated by borrowing constraints.
To separate preferences for intertemporal smoothing, I first transform each family mem-
ber’s utility into its consumption value, and then define parents’ preferences over the consump-
tion values of each member. Let ci(Ui) be the utility of family member i ∈ {p,k}, measured in
constant-equivalent value of consumption flow
ci(Ui) = min
c(·)
{
1
Λ(Ti)
∫ Ti
0
e−rtc(t)dt
∣∣∣∫ Ti
0
e−ρtu
(
c(t)
)
dt ≥Ui
}
, (3.5)
where Λ(T ) =
∫ T
0 e
−rtdt. ci(Ui) is the minimum flow cost to achieve the utility level Ui. When
consumption is intertemporally distorted, Λ(Ti)ci(Ui) is strictly less than discounted present
value of lifetime consumption and the magnitude of this gap depends on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
Parents’ preferences over (Up,Uk) are represented by the following utility function
V =
∫ Tp
0
e−ρtv
(
cp(Up)
)
dt+δ
∫ Tk
0
e−ρtv
(
ck(Uk)
)
dt, (3.6)
where v(c) = c1−η/(1−η). The parameter 1/η ∈ R+ is the ‘intergenerational elasticity of
substitution’, because it governs smoothing between cp and ck. When v(·) = u(·) (i.e. σ = η)
(3.6) is equal to (3.4).
The optimality condition for B is
v′
(
cp(Up)
)≥ δv′(ck(Uk)), (3.7)
where the inequality is strict if and only if (BC) or (TC) is binding. The gap in the first
order condition (3.7) represents distortions in intergenerational consumption smoothing, and
the magnitude of the distortion depends on the intergenerational elasticity of substitution.
Condition (3.7) shows that, in the absence of binding constraints, parental transfers are de-
termined to equate the marginal utilities across generations. Therefore, the amount of parental
transfer varies by the relative wealth between the parent and the child as well as the degree of
parental altruism. Rich or altruistic parents give higher transfers, and high ability youth receive
lower transfers.
When parental transfers are sufficiently low such that (BC) or (TC) binds, condition (3.7)
holds as an inequality. In this case, children are relatively better off than parents (i.e., v′(cp)>
δv′(ck)), so transfers should be reduced further to equalize marginal utilities. Parents cannot
58
do so when (TC) binds. But parents who give positive transfers may not want to further re-
duce transfers (i.e., only (BC) binds), because it would distort the schooling and consumption
allocation of children too much.
3.2.4 Comparative Statics
I now study how family characteristics (W,δ ,a) affect schooling and parental transfers. The
comparative statics results give testable implications about how different sources of hetero-
geneity shape the relationship between schooling and parental transfers.
I begin by stating a condition that is important in determining the effects of ability with
binding (BC):
Condition 3.1
η ≤ σ ≤
Ysa(s,a)
Ya(s,a)
− r
Ys(s,a)
Y (s,a)−D +
e−rTk∫ Tk
s e−rtdt
.
The relationship between ability and schooling for constrained families is determined by
the balance of two opposing forces. On the one hand, there is a substitution effect: more able
students earn a higher income return on schooling, so parents give higher transfers so that
students can stay in school longer. On the other hand, there is an income effect: more able
students have higher earnings, so parents would like to give lower transfers and increase their
own consumption, while students would like to increase consumption during school by going
for fewer years. If Condition 3.1 holds, ability is sufficiently complementary with schooling
compared to the intertemporal/generational consumption smoothing motive, so the substitution
effect dominates the income effect.5
The next proposition summarizes how differences across families in (W,δ ,a) affect both
schooling and total parental transfers. See Appendix B.1 for all proofs.
Proposition 3.1 Let sˆ(W,δ ,a) and Bˆ(W,δ ,a) be the solution to the family’s problem. Then
1. sˆ(W,δ ,a) and Bˆ(W,δ ,a) are nondecreasing in W and δ .
2. If Condition 3.1 holds, then
(a) sˆ(W,δ ,a) is nondecreasing in a;
(b) Bˆ(W,δ ,a) is (i) nonincreasing in a if (BC) does not bind; (ii) nondecreasing in a if
(BC) binds.
5A similar condition is derived by Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011).
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Richer or more generous (altruistic) parents give larger transfers, which positively affect school-
ing when (BC) binds. In contrast, the relationship between ability and parental transfers is not
monotonic. When (BC) does not bind, parental transfers are decreasing in ability due to the
intergenerational consumption smoothing motive. High ability students are more likely to be
constrained, because they borrow more for a given amount of parental transfer and they re-
ceive lower transfers. When (BC) binds, additional parental transfers reduce distortions in
schooling and intertemporal consumption allocations. Furthermore, if Condition 3.1 holds, the
marginal benefit of transfers strongly increases with ability. Therefore, parental transfers are
first decreasing and then increasing with ability.
The non-monotonic relationship between ability and total parental transfers reflects the fact
that parental transfers are motivated by two different concerns: efficient investment in human
capital, and consumption smoothing within the family. If parental transfers occur repeatedly,
the former is likely to affect the amount of transfers while children are enrolled in college
(‘schooling transfer’) and the latter is likely to affect the amount of transfers when they are not
in college (‘non-schooling transfer’).
To derive the relationship between schooling and non-schooling transfers, I extend the
model to allow repeated transfers as in Brown, Scholz, and Seshadri (2012). Parents move
first by giving a transfer Bs ≥ 0 that is tied to s years of college. Parents also choose their
own savings. After observing parents’ decisions, youth go to college for s years. Out of initial
wealth Bs, youth consume, pay tuition p(t) and accumulate debt D(s). After schooling is over,
parents observe D(s) and give additional transfer Bn ≥ 0 (discounted back to period 0). The
following corollary characterizes the equilibrium allocation of this game.
Corollary 3.1 Let s˜(W,δ ,a), B˜s(W,δ ,a), and B˜n(W,δ ,a) be the subgame-perfect equilib-
rium outcome of the game with two-time transfers. Suppose that D = 0, η ≤ σ , and that
e−rsY (s,a)− ∫ s0 e−rt p(t)dt is strictly concave in s. Then the following hold:
1. s˜(W,δ ,a), B˜s(W,δ ,a), and B˜n(W,δ ,a) are nondecreasing in W and δ .
2. Suppose that Condition 3.1 holds. Then
(a) s˜(W,δ ,a) and B˜s(W,δ ,a) are nondecreasing in a;
(b) B˜n(W,δ ,a) is nonincreasing in a.
When youth expect parental transfers after schooling, they have incentives to consume and
borrow too much while in college, because parents will give higher transfers if youth have
larger debt (Buchanan, 1975, Bruce and Waldman, 1991). If youth cannot borrow, parents can
prevent this strategic behavior by giving low schooling transfers so that youth have no assets at
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the end of the schooling period. In this case, the model with one-time transfers and that with
two-time transfers give identical allocation in terms of schooling and total amount of parental
transfers. The assumption that net earnings are concave in schooling ensures that only youth
whose schooling is not distorted receive additional transfers after college.
This result shows that factors that positively affect schooling are also positively related
with the amount of schooling transfers, but they have different effects on the amount of non-
schooling transfers. Rich or altruistic parents would like to raise the overall welfare of their
children, which can be achieved by increasing consumption during schooling as well as non-
schooling periods. Parents with higher ability children give larger schooling transfers due
to higher returns to schooling, but it makes them relatively poor compared to their children.
Thus, they would give less money when schooling is over. As shown in Appendix B.1.3, this
conclusion also holds when heterogeneity in the return to schooling derives from heterogeneity
in ‘psychic’ returns (i.e., heterogeneous tastes) instead of monetary returns.
Corollary 3.1 gives testable implications about the nature of heterogeneity among fami-
lies with identical wealth.6 If parents give different amounts of schooling transfers due to
differences in altruism, then schooling transfers and non-schooling transfers are positively cor-
related. On the other hand, if schooling transfers are mainly motivated by differences in the
return to schooling, the two types of transfers are negatively correlated. In the next section, I
empirically examine these implications.
3.3 Empirical Relationship Between Parental Transfers and
Schooling
In this section, I provide empirical evidence on the relationship between parental transfers
and schooling. From NLSY97 data, I document that parental transfers are important sources
of funding to attend college, but the role of parents differs from family to family. Using the
comparative statics results, I investigate whether observed heterogeneity in parental transfers
can be explained by differences in parental altruism.
Data on Parental Transfers The NLSY97 is a longitudinal survey of 8,984 Americans from
the cohort born between 1980 and 1984. They have been sampled annually since 1997. The
survey contains extensive information on each youth’s educational outcomes, together with
detailed information about family background. A unique feature of the NLSY97 data is that
6Unobserved differences in wealth will yield results similar to those assuming unobserved heterogeneity in
altruism.
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it contains a set of questions about how youth pay for college costs in each semester (amount
of family transfer, grant, loan, and own earnings) as well as the amount of cash transfers re-
ceived from family in each year.7 From these questions, I construct measures of total schooling
transfers and total non-schooling transfers, discounted at a 5% annual interest rate back to age
17.
Suppose that youth j was age 17 in year t = 1. Let b j,t be the amount of transfer youth j
received in year t and d j,t be a dummy variable indicating whether the youth was enrolled in
college or not. Then, total schooling transfer Bs, j and non-schooling transfer Bn, j for youth j
are defined as
Bs, j =
T
∑
t=1
b j,t1{d j,t=1}
(1+ r)t−1
, Bn, j =
T
∑
t=1
b j,t1{d j,t=0}
(1+ r)t−1
.
Table 3.1: Present Discounted Value of Parental Transfers and College Costs (2014 U.S. dol-
lars)
Years Enrolled
Total College Cost Paid from Each Source Total Parental Transfer
(Bs+Bn)Schooling Transfer (Bs) Grant Loan Total Cost
0 0 · · · 1,817
(0,2] 2,390 3,288 3,254 10,333 4,188
(2,4] 21,299 16,857 9,467 52,950 23,170
(4,6] 26,402 21,496 14,237 70,756 28,334
6+ 32,229 34,868 20,608 100,561 33,202
Table 3.1 shows the average amount of parental transfers by years enrolled in college.
Schooling transfers, as well as total parental transfers, are strongly positively related with years
of schooling. On average, about 1/3 of total college expenditure is paid by parents, which is
consistent with Sallie Mae and Ipsos (2012). However, the parents’ role in paying for college
costs is different from family to family. Figure 3.1 shows the cumulative distribution of the
fraction of schooling transfer out of net college cost (total cost net of grant). Within each
schooling and parental income quartile, the distribution shows large dispersion: there are some
parents who gave nothing for college and others who paid for everything. The dispersion is
lower among students who attain more schooling, while parents with high income paid a larger
fraction of college costs, on average. Large dispersion in parental contributions to college
costs across families is also documented in Haider and McGarry (2012), using the data from
the Health and Retirement Study.
7In this chapter, money received from other family members is counted as part of parental transfers. These
variables were used in earlier studies by Johnson (2013) and Abbott et al. (2013).
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Parental Contribution Towards Net College Expenditure
Source of Heterogeneity Heterogeneity in schooling transfers may be explained by various
observable as well as unobservable factors. To systematically investigate the source of this
heterogeneity, I utilize the relationship between schooling and non-schooling transfers theo-
retically predicted by Corollary 3.1. Factors that affect the amount of schooling transfers also
affect the amount of non-schooling transfers, and the direction of influence depends on the na-
ture of heterogeneity. Factors that increase total resources available to youth, such as parental
wealth and altruism, will have positive effects on both types of transfers, while factors that
raise monetary or psychic returns to education will only increase schooling transfers. There-
fore, the correlation between the two types of transfers is crucial in identifying the nature of
heterogeneity.
Let X be observable family characteristics that determine total parental resources, such
as income and assets. Then we can decompose the covariance between schooling and non-
schooling transfers into covariances explained by observables and unobservables:
Cov(Bs,Bn) = Cov
(
E[Bs|X ],E[Bn|X ]
)
+E
[
Cov(Bs,Bn|X )
]
. (3.8)
The first component captures the variation of parental transfers due to differences in parental
wealth W ; it is likely to be positive if X is a good predictor of W . The second component
captures the variation of parental transfers among families with similar wealth, and its sign
depends on whether the remaining heterogeneity is mainly driven by differences in return to
schooling or parental altruism.
I implement the covariance decomposition (3.8) by regressing Bs and Bn on X and compute
the covariance between the residuals of the two equations. For the baseline specification, X
includes dummy variables for parental income and asset quartiles, parent age and education,
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single parenthood, number of siblings, and youth cohort.8 An alternative specification also in-
cludes quartiles of Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) scores to see whether heterogeneity
in returns to schooling has effects that are predicted by Corollary 3.1.9
Table 3.2: Correlation Between Schooling and Non-Schooling Transfers
All Ever Enrolled in College
Raw
Residual
Raw
Residual
Baselinea
Ability
Controlsb
Baseline
Ability
Controls
Correlation Coefficient
0.072 0.038 0.045 0.101 0.063 0.067
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Fraction of Covariance
Not Explained by Observables
0.445 0.514 0.528 0.555
(0.165) (0.144) (0.116) (0.117)
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parentheses (1,000 repetitions).
aIncludes controls for parent income, asset, age, education, single parenthood, number of siblings, youth
cohort.
bAdditionally includes dummy variables for AFQT quartiles.
Table 3.2 shows the estimation results. The correlation between schooling and non-schooling
transfers is positive and statistically significant, even after observables are controlled for. More-
over, about 50% of the total covariance between Bs and Bn cannot be explained by observable
variables. This suggests that some variation in parental transfers is driven by heterogeneous
altruism. Controlling for observable ability makes the correlation stronger, suggesting that het-
erogeneous returns to schooling generates a negative correlation between schooling transfers
and non-schooling transfers, consistent with Corollary 3.1.
Altogether, these results imply considerable unobserved heterogeneity in parental transfers
across families and suggest that differences in parental altruism are an important part of the
story. However, subsidy policies will in general differ across youth of different abilities and
from families with different wealth levels. We devote more attention to these differences in the
quantitative analysis of Section 3.5.
8Parent education might be correlated with unobserved factors such as ability, tastes for schooling, or altruism.
But it can be an important determinant of parental wealth due to, for example, heterogeneity in life-cycle income
profile by education. Cohort matters for two reasons. First, parental income and assets are measured in early
years of the survey (income 1997-2000, assets 1997), and youth were different ages depending on their birth year.
Second, parental transfers are measured until 2010.
9The AFQT test scores are widely used as a measure of cognitive ability. Most NLSY97 respondents took the
test as part of the survey.
64
3.4 Theory of Optimal Education Subsidies
In this section, I explore how heterogeneity in parental altruism across families affects the
way education should be subsidized based on the model of Section 3.2 (where parents make
one-time transfers). To study how college choice at the extensive margin affects the optimal
subsidy policy, I introduce a fixed monetary cost χ > 0 for college attendance. Let s0 and
s1 be arbitrarily small and large schooling levels such that conditional on attending college,
nobody chooses schooling outside the interval [s0,s1]. Let S = {0}∪ [s0,s1] be the choice set
of schooling.
3.4.1 Policy Instruments
The social planner is endowed with budget E ≥ 0 that can be used to subsidize higher education.
Only those who go to college can receive these subsidies, effectively limiting the planner’s
ability to do lump-sum redistribution. The social planner can condition the amount of subsidies
on observable characteristics of students, such as family income and student ability; however,
the planner can observe neither parental transfer B nor altruism δ . Thus, the planner specifies
subsidy schedules as a function of years of schooling for each group of students with identical
observable characteristics (W,δ ). In most of this section, I focus on families with identical
resources and ability and omit the explicit dependence of the policy on those characteristics.
Let g(t) be the flow subsidy (or ‘marginal’ subsidy) and κ(t)≥ 0 be the flow resource cost
at schooling t, and denote their present discounted values for those who complete s years of
schooling by G(s) and K(s), respectively:
G(s) =
∫ s
0
e−rtg(t)dt, K(s) =
∫ s
0
e−rtκ(t)dt.
Define the flow of net payment students face as p(t) = κ(t)−g(t). I assume κ(t) is continuous
and e−rsY (s,a)−K(s) is strictly concave in s.
Let sˆ(δ ) be the schooling choice of a family with parental altruism δ under policy G(·).
Parental altruism is distributed over [δ0,δ1]⊂ R+ with distribution function F(δ ) and density
f (δ ) that is strictly positive and continuous. The planner’s budget constraint must satisfy
∫ δ1
δ0
G
(
sˆ(δ )
)
dF(δ )≤ E. (3.9)
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3.4.2 Social Objectives
The planner sets G(·) in order to minimize the distortions generated by borrowing constraints.
In order to separate the concern for inequality from that for efficiency, I assume that the social
planner does not care about inequality. Based on Be´nabou (2002), I measure distortions by
individual’s willingness to pay in order to eliminate them (i.e., the amount that makes indi-
viduals indifferent between the distorted and undistorted allocations). The degree of aggregate
distortions in the economy is equal to the sum of these amounts across individuals.
There are three sources of distortions: (i) schooling; (ii) intertemporal consumption alloca-
tions; (iii) intergenerational consumption allocations. I explain the measure of distortions for
each of these. Consider a family with characteristic δ who chooses allocation
(
sˆ, cˆp(·), cˆk(·)
)
under policy G(·), which gives utilities (Vˆ ,Uˆp,Uˆk).
Distortion in Schooling Let s∗ be the first-best level of schooling that maximizes total family
consumption in the absence of education subsidies (G(s) = 0)
s∗ = argmax
s∈S
{
W + e−rsY (s,a)−K(s)−χ ·1{s>0}
}
,
and denote the family consumption associated with s∗ by C∗.
Schooling can be distorted because of borrowing constraints and/or distortionary subsidy
policy (g(t) 6= 0). Consider families who chose sˆ 6= s∗ and received subsidy G(sˆ). If they were
given a cash grant equal to the subsidy amount G(sˆ) and borrowing constraints were removed,
they would choose s∗ and consume C∗+G(sˆ), which is is higher than their actual consumption
∑i∈{p,k}
∫ Ti
0 e
−rt cˆi(t)dt. Therefore, the welfare due to schooling distortion is defined by the gap:
Ωs =
(
C∗+G(sˆ)
)− ∑
i∈{p,k}
∫ Ti
0
e−rt cˆi(t)dt. (3.10)
Distortion in Intertemporal Consumption Allocation The second source of inefficiency
is the distortion in intertemporal consumption allocation due to borrowing constraints, i.e.
u′(cˆi(t)) 6= u′(cˆi(t ′)) for some t 6= t ′. For family member i, welfare loss due to intertempo-
ral consumption distortion can be measured by the gap between the total consumption and the
constant-equivalent value of the consumption flow defined by (3.5):
Ωc,i =
∫ Ti
0
e−rt cˆi(t)dt−Λ(Ti)ci(Uˆi). (3.11)
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Distortion in Intergenerational Consumption Allocation Third, the intergenerational con-
sumption allocation is distorted if (BC) or (TC) is binding, i.e., v′(cp(Uˆp)) 6= δv′(ck(Uˆk)).
In this case, the utility level Vˆ can be achieved at a lower cost than the actual constant-
equivalent consumption∑i∈{p,k}Λ(Ti)ci(Uˆi) if parents were allowed to directly choose (cp,ck).
Let C(V,δ ) be the minimum resource cost that delivers a certain level of utility V to parents:
C(V,δ ) = min
cp,ck
{
∑
i∈{p,k}
Λ(Ti)ci
∣∣∣Λ(Tp)v(cp)+δΛ(Tk)v(ck)≥V}.
The distortion in intergenerational consumption allocation is measured by the gap between the
actual and the minimum cost that delivers the current level of utility Vˆ to parents:
Ωg = ∑
i∈{p,k}
Λ(Ti)ci(Uˆi)−C(Vˆ ,δ ). (3.12)
Aggregating Distortions The total distortion of the family is the sum of the amount each
member of the family is willing to pay to remove all distortions.
Ω=Ωs+ ∑
i∈{p,k}
Ωc,i+Ωg. (3.13)
By using (3.10), (3.11), and (3.12), (3.13) can be written as
C(Vˆ ,δ ) =C∗−Ω+G(sˆ). (3.14)
The identity (3.14) gives a clear way to decompose the family’s welfare (C), represented by
parents’ utility, into its frictionless benchmark (C∗) and the welfare loss generated by frictions
(Ω), as well as the amount of transfer received (G). The social planner’s budget constraint (3.9)
implies that, the planner can minimize aggregate distortions, the sum of Ω, by maximizing
aggregate welfare, the sum of C. Because C(V,δ ) is a monotone transformation of parent’s
utility V , the social planner respects parents’ preferences over (Up,Uk). However, when the
social planner cares about inequality across generations, the planer may disagree with parents
about how (Up,Uk) should be allocated (Phelan, 2006, Farhi and Werning, 2010, Ray, 2013).
Welfare Effect of a Lump-sum Transfer The social planner can affect family welfare only
through Ω and G, because the potential family consumption C∗ is policy invariant. A one
dollar increase in transfers G mechanically raises family welfare by one dollar, but total family
welfare can be increased by more than a dollar if the additional transfer improves efficiency
and reduces the welfare loss Ω. In this case, I say the lump-sum transfer has ‘excess welfare
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gain’.
For a given policy G(·), consider a perturbed policy G˜(s) = G(s) + z and let V˜ (z,δ ) be
parent’s utility under the perturbed policy. Then the effect of a small increase in lump-sum
transfer on the welfare of families with schooling s = sˆ(δ ), denoted by m(s), is
m
(
sˆ(δ )
)
=
∂C
(
V˜ (z,δ ),δ
)
∂ z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=0
. (3.15)
The following Lemma shows that the excess welfare gain exists only for constrained families.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that (TC) does not bind and sˆ(δ )> 0 for families with δ . Then
m
(
sˆ(δ )
)≥ 1,
where the inequality is strict if and only if (BC) binds.
An increase in z shifts up the subsidy schedule G(s) for all s and increases the amount of sub-
sidies given to students without affecting the marginal cost of schooling or the unconstrained
optimal level of schooling. Therefore, for unconstrained families with Ωc,i = Ωg = 0, an in-
crease in z is translated one-to-one into an increase in total family consumption and there are no
excess welfare gains. On the other hand, a one dollar increase in subsidy improves constrained
families’ welfare by more than a dollar by relaxing borrowing constraints.
This the key result that determines the direction of redistribution among families with dif-
ferent parental altruism. Redistributing from unconstrained families with altruistic parents to
constrained families with low altruism parents improves social welfare. Now, I investigate its
implications for the design of education subsidies.
3.4.3 Deriving Optimality Conditions
To understand how optimal policy G(·) and associated marginal subsidy g(·) is determined at
the optimum, I derive the optimality condition heuristically, following Diamond (1998), Saez
(2001) and Jacquet and Lehmann (2015).10 The optimality conditions derived in this section
will be the basis for characterizing the optimal policy in the next subsection.
Let Φ(s) be the distribution function of s under a given policy G(·) and let φ(s) be its den-
sity whenever it exists. Because sˆ(δ ) is nondecreasing in δ , Φ(s) is related to the distribution
function of altruism Φ
(
sˆ(δ )
)
= F(δ ). Also let s > s0 be the lowest level of schooling chosen
by students who attend college.
10Formal derivation can be found in Appendix B.1.8
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Figure 3.2: Policy Perturbation: Increasing Marginal Subsidy
Raising Marginal Subsidies Consider the effects of a small increase in g(t) by dg around
tˆ on the social planner’s objective function. First, as depicted in Figure 3.2, it reduces the
marginal cost of schooling around tˆ, encouraging those with sˆ(δ ) = tˆ to stay longer in school
by ds via the Hicks substitution effect. While the policy change does not have a first order
effect on the welfare of those with schooling around tˆ, the amount of total subsidies they
receive increases by e−rtˆg(tˆ)ds due to behavioral responses, which reflects the increased cost
to the social planner. In this sense, this effect can be seen as the cost of distorting the allocation
at tˆ.
Second, the change dg mechanically affects the present value of subsidies by dG = e−rtˆdg
for those who attain more schooling than tˆ, i.e. sˆ(δ ) = t > tˆ. The lump-sum increase in the
total amount of subsidy increases welfare by dC = m · dG (m is defined in (3.15)), but it also
leads to higher schooling ds via an income effect, which further increases the total amount of
subsidies by e−rtg(t)ds.
Around the optimal policy, a small change dg cannot improve the planner’s objective func-
tion, so the total effects of the policy change must be zero at any schooling levels s, which gives
the optimality condition
g(s)φ(s)
ds
dg︸ ︷︷ ︸
substitution effect
+
∫
(s,s1]
{
1︸︷︷︸
mechanical
− m(s
′)
λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare gain
+e−rs
′
g(s′)
ds
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
income effect
}
dΦ(s′) = 0, (3.16)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier on the social planner’s budget constraint (3.9). This
condition (3.16) reveals the key trade-off the social planner faces: increasing flow subsidy g(t)
at t incurs distortionary cost for those who choose s= t, but it can generate net welfare gains for
those who attain more schooling than t. Therefore, the social planner will subsidize schooling
only when the net welfare gains are large enough to compensate distortionary costs.
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Raising Subsidy Levels Next, consider a small increase in G(s) by dG for all levels of
schooling [s0,s1], as shown in Figure 3.3. Such a policy change affects everyone who at-
tends college (sˆ(δ ) ≥ s) through a lump-sum increase in the level of subsidies. Moreover, it
makes attending college cheaper and induces more students to go to college via a substitu-
tion effect, increasing the number of college students by d(1−Φ(0)). For every student who
switches from non-college to college, it costs G(s) to the social planner but there are no first
order effects on welfare. Therefore, the total additional cost due to behavioral response along
the extensive margin, G(s)× d(1−Φ(0)), can be seen as the distortionary cost of increasing
subsidy levels. Around the optimal policy, the sum of these effects is zero, giving the following
optimality condition:
G(s)
d
(
1−Φ(0))
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
substitution effect
+
∫
[s,s1]
{
1︸︷︷︸
mechanical
− m(s
′)
λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare gain
+e−rs
′
g(s′)
ds
dG︸ ︷︷ ︸
income effect
}
dΦ(s′) = 0. (3.17)
s
G(s)
Lump-Sum Change G(s) ↑
s0 s10
Marginal Rate Change
G(s) ↑
s
Figure 3.3: Policy Perturbation: Increasing Subsidy Levels
3.4.4 Properties of the Optimal Policy
In this section, I characterize the optimal policy using the optimality conditions (3.16) and
(3.17).
Phasing out Towards the Top
The first result shows that there is a tendency to assign higher subsidies, G(s), to lower years of
schooling. In particular, the amount of total subsidies is decreasing toward the highest level of
schooling that is chosen by unconstrained families. This result is most relevant for high income
families, since low income families may not have enough resources to be unconstrained.
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Proposition 3.2 Suppose that under the optimal policy G(·), (i) Φ(0) = 0, (ii) (TC) does not
bind for all δ ∈ [δ0,δ1], (iii) (BC) does not bind for δ1 and it binds for strictly positive measure
of families. Then (i) λ > 1, (ii) there exists δλ = inf
{
δ ∈ [δ0,δ1]
∣∣m(sˆ(δ ′))< λ , ∀δ ′ ∈ [δ ,δ1]},
and (iii) there exists δ and s such that sˆ(δ ) = s for almost all δ ∈ [δ ,δ1], (BC) does not
bind for all δ ∈ [δ ,δ1], (BC) would bind for all δ ∈ [δ0,δ ) if they chose s. Moreover, if
sˆ(δλ )< limδ↑δ sˆ(δ ), then (iv) limδ↑δ sˆ(δ )< s= s
∗, (v) limδ↑δ G(sˆ(δ ))>G(s), and (vi) G(sˆ(δ ))
is nonincreasing in δ for all δ ∈ [δλ ,δ1] where sˆ(δ ) is continuous.
Proposition 3.2 shows that optimal subsidies have to phase-out towards high schooling
levels when there are unconstrained students. When parents are rich enough, sufficiently al-
truistic parents give enough transfers so that their children are unconstrained. Among students
with identical abilities (implicitly assumed thus far), unconstrained students choose the same
schooling level (sˆ(δ ) = sˆ(δ ) for all δ ≥ δ ), and constrained students whose parents have low
altruism choose lower schooling (sˆ(δ )< sˆ(δ ) for all δ < δ ).
The fact that the unconstrained schooling level is the highest means that there is no need
to distort schooling incentives (sˆ(δ ) = s∗) at that level. However, as shown in Lemma 3.1,
because subsidies given to unconstrained families cannot improve efficiency and thus have
lower returns, the level of subsidy decreases toward the unconstrained level of schooling. This
can be seen from the optimality condition (3.16). For unconstrained families, there are neither
income effects (ds/dG = 0) nor excess welfare gains (m = 1). So, from (3.16), the net cost of
increasing G becomes positive as we approach the unconstrained families δ from below
lim
δ↑δ
∫
(sˆ(δ ),s1]
{
1− m(s
′)
λ
+ e−rs
′
g(s′)
ds
dG
}
dΦ(s′) =
(
1− 1
λ
)(
1− lim
δ↑δ
Φ
(
sˆ(δ )
))
> 0. (3.18)
An additional dollar given to unconstrained families increases their welfare by only one
dollar. Because additional subsidies to constrained families provides an excess welfare gain
(λ > 1), the social planner wants to extract revenue from the unconstrained families instead
of spending on them. To reduce the total subsidies given to unconstrained families, schooling
levels close to the unconstrained amount should not be marginally subsidized even though
it discourages schooling for some constrained students. Note that Φ(s) is discontinuous at
s∗, where all unconstrained families are bunched together. This leads to a discontinuity in
allocations near s∗ (Hellwig, 2010).
Figure 3.4 depicts an example of the optimal subsidy schedule. The amount of total subsi-
dies G(s) may be increasing at low years of schooling, but it declines at high levels of school-
ing.11 This property is fundamentally at odds with the current financial aid system in the U.S.,
11Note that even though the graph illustrates the case g(t)> 0 for some t, it is also possible that g(t)≤ 0 for all
t.
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where additional schooling always leads to nonnegative additional subsidies. This inconsis-
tency can be explained if the current policy is designed to achieve different goals or designed
to deal with different types of heterogeneity across families. Next, I study properties of op-
timal education subsidies under different environments in order to clarify the implication of
heterogenous parental altruism on the design of optimal education subsidies.
t
g(t)
s∗
0
lim
δ↑δ
sˆ(δ)s
s
G(s)
s∗lim
δ↑δ
sˆ(δ)s
Figure 3.4: Illustration of Optimal Policy
Different Social Objectives Optimal policies are inevitably sensitive to the social planner’s
objectives. Here, I introduce two elements that are commonly assumed in public finance:
inequality aversion and externalities.
I first study the role of inequality aversion. So far, we have assumed that the social plan-
ner does not care about inequality across families. That is, when evaluating the welfare
gain of a lump-sum transfer to families, the social planner cares about reducing distortions
(m= dC/dG), but not about the welfare level of families (C). Now assume that the social plan-
ner’s objective is to maximize the average of Γ(C) instead of C, where Γ(·) is a strictly increas-
ing and strictly concave function. Then the welfare gain of a lump-sum transfer is Γ′(C) ·m.
In Appendix B.1.4, I show that C is nondecreasing in δ . Unconstrained families not only have
lower marginal welfare (m), but they also have higher welfare levels (C) than constrained fami-
lies. Thus, they have lower Γ′(C) ·m and redistribution towards them is undesirable. Therefore,
this type of inequality aversion strengthens the result of Proposition 3.2.
Next, I consider the role of externalities. Suppose that the social planner’s objective does
not coincide with parents’ objectives due to various factors such as human capital spillover
effect (de Fraja, 2002), social concerns for inequality across generations (Farhi and Werning,
2010), or distortionary taxation (Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005). In the presence of positive ex-
ternalities, the private return to education is lower than the social return, so the social planner
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marginally subsidizes education to correct this private behavior even when there are no bor-
rowing constraints. Let C˜ be the externality that positively depends on schooling, and suppose
that the social planner maximizes the average of C+C˜ instead of C. Then the formula for the
optimal subsidy becomes(
g(s)− 1
λ
dC˜
ds
)
φ(s)
ds
dg
+
∫
(s,s1]
{
1− m(s
′)
λ
+
(
e−rs
′
g(s′)− 1
λ
dC˜
ds
)
ds
dG
}
dΦ(s′) = 0.
(3.19)
The ‘Pigouvian’ correction term dC˜/ds captures the social benefit of schooling that is not in-
ternalized by parents, and it raises marginal subsidies overall. However, redistributing towards
unconstrained families is still undesirable, since ds/dG = 0 and m = 1 hold for them. There-
fore, the phase-out effect remains as long as the externality is not too large.
Different Sources of Heterogeneity I have assumed that other characteristics of family, i.e.
family wealth W and return to schooling a, are observable to the social planner, and thus can
be conditioned on when designing the optimal policy. This can be justified by the fact that they
are easier to observe (compared to parental altruism) and that government and institutional
financial aid currently condition on need and/or merit. However, some of these characteristics
might not be observed perfectly, which will affect the nature of the social planner’s problem.
First, it is straightforward to see that unobserved heterogeneity in family resources W does
not change the conclusions of Lemma 3.1 and Proposition 3.2. Rich families are unconstrained
and attain more schooling, while poor families are constrained. Because additional subsidies
given to unconstrained families cannot improve efficiency, the optimal subsidy has to phase-
out. Thus, Proposition 3.2 applies when there is unobserved heterogeneity in parents’ willing-
ness to pay in general, regardless of whether it stems from variation in the actual amount of
resources or not.
Second, when families differ only in children’s return to schooling, the optimal subsidy is
increasing in years of schooling, redistributing to those who attain high levels of schooling.
To state this result formally, consider families with identical parental wealth and altruism, but
with heterogeneous ability distributed over [a0,a1]. Let sˆ(a) be the schooling choice of a family
with student ability a under a given policy G(·).
Proposition 3.3 Suppose that under the optimal policy G(·), (i) Φ(0) = 0, (ii) (TC) is not
binding, (iii) (BC) is binding for strictly positive measure of families, and (iv) Condition 3.1
holds. Then G(sˆ(a)) is nondecreasing in a for all a ∈ [a0,a1] where sˆ(a) is continuous.
This result is similar to that of de Fraja (2002). The crucial difference from the case of het-
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erogenous altruism is that, when families choose different schooling levels because of hetero-
geneous returns to schooling, families with high ability students attain more schooling and
are more likely to be constrained. Thus, additional subsidies given for late years of college
attendance can relax borrowing constraints and have large welfare gains. When ability is un-
observable, the marginal subsidy should be positive over all levels of schooling in order to give
higher subsidies to high ability students. More generally, when there is unobserved hetero-
geneity in both parental altruism and students’ ability, these two types of private information
will create conflicting forces for how subsidies should vary with years of schooling.
Phasing in at the Bottom
In the previous section, I showed that unobservable heterogeneity in altruism creates a force to
redistribute towards those who attain less schooling, thus assigning higher subsidies to early
years of college. In this section, I show that increasing subsidies at early years of college can
involve a significant distortionary cost, limiting the degree to which the social planner wants to
redistribute towards students with less altruistic families. In particular, I show that the amount
of subsidies is increasing at the lowest level of schooling when there are behavioral responses at
the college attendance margin. In other words, the subsidy phases in at the bottom of schooling
distribution even when the welfare gain of additional subsidy at the intensive margin is the
largest at the lowest schooling levels.
Proposition 3.4 Suppose that (i) Φ(0) ∈ (0,1), (ii) Φ(s) = lims↑sΦ(s), and (iii) G(s) > 0.
Then g(s)> 0.
The result can be derived directly from the optimality conditions (3.16) and (3.17). At the
lowest schooling level s, the marginal subsidy is determined by the optimality condition (3.16):
g(s)φ(s)
ds
dg
=−
∫
(s,s1]
{
1− m(s)
λ
+ e−rsg(s)
ds
dG
}
dΦ(s). (3.20)
The right-hand side is equal to the marginal benefit of a lump-sum increase of the subsidy
schedule over the whole range [s0,s1] when there is no mass point at s. This is equated with
the additional cost due to increased college attendance according to condition (3.17). Then
condition (3.20) becomes
g(s)φ(s)
ds
dg
=G(s)
d
(
1−Φ(s))
dG
. (3.21)
WhenΦ(0)> 0 and G(s)> 0, we have g(s)> 0, so additional schooling at s leads to higher to-
tal subsidies, as shown in Figure 3.4. Note that this result holds even when additional subsidies
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assigned to lower schooling levels have larger welfare gains at the intensive margin (i.e., m(s)
is decreasing at s). This is due to the distortionary cost G(s)d(1−Φ(s))/dG at the extensive
margin.
To see why it is costly to increase subsidies at low levels of schooling, recall that the
family’s welfare can be written as C =C∗+G−Ω and consider a small increase in G(s) that
makes a marginal family (i.e., who is indifferent between s = 0 and s = s) to switch from non-
college to college. Let ∆C, ∆G, and ∆Ω be the resulting changes in C, G, and Ω. Because the
marginal family is indifferent between the two options, the welfare gain of switching is zero:
∆C = ∆G−∆Ω= 0,
which implies ∆G = G(s)−0 = ∆Ω. That is, an additional subsidy given to a marginal student
is translated into a one-to-one increase in distortion. Encouraging college attendance reduces
distortions in schooling, but it worsens consumption smoothing. Moreover, the benefit of re-
duced schooling distortion may be small at low levels of schooling due to the fixed cost.
This result crucially depends on the non-convexity that generates behavioral responses at
the extensive margin. The distortionary cost due to the extensive margin of college attendance
not only limits the amount of subsidies given to the lowest schooling level within an income
group, but it also affects the amount of subsidies given to everyone in that income group. This
result is explained in the next subsection.
Allocation of Subsidies Across Income Groups
In this subsection, I explore implications for how public funding should be allocated across
income groups. Let h= 1, . . . ,H be the group identity for families with wealth Wh and suppose
that each group has mass pih. The social planner sets policy for each income group separately,
which is denoted by Gh(s). And let Φh(s) be the distribution function of families with income
Wh over schooling under a given policy. Then, by summing up the budget constraint for each
income group (3.9), the economy-wide budget constraint can be derived as follows:
H
∑
h=1
pih
∫
[s0,s1]
Gh(s)dΦh(s)≤ E. (3.22)
Because family wealth Wh is observable, within each income group, the social planner’s prob-
lem can be solved as before. In particular, the optimality condition for subsidy level (3.17)
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holds for each income group. Rewriting the formula, the following condition holds
λ =
∫
[sh,s1]
mh(s)
dΦh(s)
1−Φh(s)
d ln(1−Φh(s))
d lnGh(s)
+
∫
[sh,s1]
{
1+ e−rsgh(s)dshdG
} dΦh(s)
1−Φh(s)
, ∀h = 1, . . . ,H. (3.23)
This condition states that the social planner allocates resources to each income group such
that the average marginal benefit of public funding is equalized across groups. First, for the
same level of spending on all income groups, the allocation of low income families would
be more distorted. They would, therefore, have a large welfare gain mh compared to higher
income families. It is optimal to increase subsidies to low income families until the average
marginal gain is equalized. Second, additional spending on low income families can also entail
a large distortionary cost if the college attendance rate is elastic to subsidies. This lowers the
average marginal return to spending on low income families. Altogether, the optimal budget
allocation across income groups depends on which of these effects dominates. In the next
section, I examine this question quantitatively.
3.5 Quantitative Analysis
I now explore the quantitative implications of heterogeneous altruism for the design of educa-
tion subsidies. I first calibrate the distribution of parental altruism, costs and returns to college
education by student ability and family income to match both the distribution of schooling and
the relationship between schooling, ability, and family income in the U.S. I then characterize
the optimal policy for different income groups.
Thus far, I have assumed a fixed cost of schooling χ . To better fit the distribution of
schooling, I extend this assumption by introducing a more general form of ‘psychic’ cost of
schooling:
Ψ(s) = χ ·1{s>0}+ γ1s+ γ2s2.
This cost represents various forms of schooling costs that are not captured by tuition costs
or foregone earnings, which could be psychic or monetary. The psychic cost is commonly
assumed in models of schooling choices (e.g. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber, 1998, Bils and
Klenow, 2000), and is also consistent with empirical studies (Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro,
2005, Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2006).
When education investment incurs utility cost, it generates a counterfactual negative rela-
tionship between income and investment due to income effects (Caucutt, Lochner, and Park,
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2015). Thus, a positive correlation between tastes for schooling and family income is some-
times required to match the data (Abbott et al., 2013). Because of this issue, I assume the
psychic cost enters youth’s utility function as follows:
Vk = Λ(Tk)ck(Uk)−Ψ(s).
Since the utility function is linear in constant-equivalent consumption, there are no income
effects (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman, 1988) and schooling is independent of initial
wealth if (BC) does not bind.
To incorporate the psychic cost, parents care about Vk/Λ(Tk) = ck(Uk)−Ψ(s)/Λ(Tk), in-
stead of ck(Uk). The definition of the schooling distortion Ωs is also modified accordingly.
3.5.1 Calibration
I normalize time so that a unit interval represents a calendar year. All monetary amounts are
denominated in 2004 U.S. dollars using the consumer price index (CPI-U-RS). As a measure
of ability, I use standardized AFQT scores that are comparable between NLSY79 and NLSY97
cohorts constructed by Altonji, Bharadwaj, and Lange (2009).
Externally Calibrated Parameters
At t = 0, youth choose s∈ {0,1, . . . ,8} years of college. All individuals work until age JR = 65
and die at age J = 80. Thus, youth retire at time TR = JR−18= 47 and die at time Tk = J−18=
62. I assume an annual interest rate r = 0.05 based on historical average of the riskless rate
and the return to capital in the U.S. I also set ρ = r.
Table 3.3: Externally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
JR Retirement age 65
J Lifetime 80
ρ = r Discount rate 0.05
α0
Log earnings lny(s,a,x)
8.12
α1 0.19
α2 0.17
α3 0.2
α4 -0.005
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Earnings Function I use data on wage income, education, age, and AFQT scores from the
random sample of NLSY79 (1979-2006) to estimate parameters of the following earnings func-
tion:
lny(s,a,x) =α0+α1 · lna+α2 · s+α3 · x+α4 · x2, (3.24)
where s is completed years of post-secondary schooling and x is potential labor market expe-
rience. The scale of ability is set such that log ability is standard normally distributed. The
earnings function (3.24) is estimated by OLS, assuming it is measured by wage income with
idiosyncratic errors. The estimated earnings function, shown in Table 3.3, is used to calculate
youth’s as well as parent’s lifetime earnings.
Table 3.4: Tuition Costs and Borrowing Limit by Years of College ($)
Years of College Corresponds to:
Annual Amount
Average
Tuition
Stafford
Loan Limit
Average Earnings
While Enrolled
1
Public 2 Year 1,843
2,625
4,464
2 3,500
3
Public 4 Year 4,664 5,500 3,1554
5
6
Public Graduate/
Professional
7,960 18,500 10,4767
8
Tuition Costs, Financial Aid, and Borrowing Limits Using data from the National Post-
secondary Student Aid Study (academic year 2003-2004), I calculate average annual tuition
costs and financial aid amounts of full-time students attending public institutions by schooling
level and family income.12 I associate different years of college with different schooling levels
when calculating tuition costs κ(t) and financial aid amounts, as shown in Table 3.4. I assume
students can borrow up to annual limits of the Stafford Loan Program, presented in Table 3.4,
for each year of college. This means that the total amount students can borrow depends on
years of schooling. Instead of imposing annual borrowing limits, I only impose the total bor-
rowing limit D(s), implied by annual limits up to s years of college. I also assume that students
12For undergraduate students, the calculation is based on dependent students who applied for federal aid and
attended in-state public institutions.
78
Ta
bl
e
3.
5:
A
ve
ra
ge
A
nn
ua
lF
in
an
ci
al
A
id
by
Fa
m
ily
In
co
m
e
($
)
Pu
bl
ic
2
Y
ea
r
Pu
bl
ic
4
Y
ea
r
Pu
bl
ic
G
ra
du
at
e
Fa
m
ily
In
co
m
e
N
on
-R
ep
ay
ab
le
Fi
na
nc
ia
lA
id
Su
bs
id
iz
ed
L
oa
n
N
on
-R
ep
ay
ab
le
Fi
na
nc
ia
lA
id
Su
bs
id
iz
ed
L
oa
n
N
on
-R
ep
ay
ab
le
Fi
na
nc
ia
lA
id
Su
bs
id
iz
ed
L
oa
n
L
es
s
th
an
20
K
4,
03
0
29
8
6,
80
4
2,
33
0
3,
19
9
3,
40
1
20
K
-3
0K
3,
77
7
47
0
6,
01
8
2,
43
4
30
K
-4
0K
2,
63
8
44
8
4,
56
1
2,
75
9
40
K
-5
0K
1,
98
2
57
2
3,
12
4
2,
61
2
50
K
-6
0K
1,
03
4
48
1
2,
06
6
2,
25
8
60
K
-7
0K
1,
12
6
28
2
1,
68
7
1,
81
7
70
K
-8
0K
67
3
30
7
1,
59
5
1,
51
4
80
K
-9
0K
70
8
17
0
1,
24
0
92
6
90
K
-1
00
K
66
6
11
8
1,
29
9
1,
00
5
10
0K
-1
20
K
58
4
94
1,
12
7
69
9
M
or
e
th
an
12
0K
68
6
22
6
1,
30
4
20
7
Ta
bl
e
3.
6:
Ta
rg
et
St
at
is
tic
s
an
d
M
od
el
Fi
t
Sc
ho
ol
in
g
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n
Sc
ho
ol
in
g
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
Y
ea
rs
E
nr
ol
le
d
Fa
m
ily
In
co
m
e
Q
ua
rt
ile
A
FQ
T
Q
ua
rt
ile
C
on
st
an
t
0
(0
,2
]
(2
,5
]
5+
2
3
4
2
3
4
D
at
a
0.
34
7
0.
18
7
0.
29
0
0.
17
7
0.
20
3
0.
68
3
1.
17
2
0.
90
4
1.
82
0
2.
83
4
0.
72
8
M
od
el
0.
29
9
0.
19
8
0.
38
7
0.
16
0
0.
19
2
0.
64
5
1.
72
9
1.
07
6
1.
62
9
2.
31
3
0.
64
4
79
earn part time income during the schooling period.13
Table 3.5 shows the amount of subsidy distributed through financial aid. This is calcu-
lated separately for 11 family income groups only for undergraduate students, since graduate
students are considered independent and their parental income is irrelevant in determining fi-
nancial aid amounts. The present value of subsidy amount G(s) as well as flow subsidy g(t)
are calculated from the sum of all financial aid excluding loans (‘non-repayable aid’) and the
subsidy value of subsidized loans (Perkins and subsidized Stafford loans). The subsidy value
of subsidized loans are interest payments while students are still in school. Let n(t) and l(t) be
the flow of non-repayable aid and subsidized loans, respectively. Then, the flow subsidy is
g(t) =n(t)+ r
∫ t
0
l(t ′)dt ′.
Internally Calibrated Parameters
The remaining parameters—parameters of the psychic cost function (χ,γ1,γ2), consumption
smoothing parameters (σ ,η), and the distribution of altruism—are calibrated by simulating
the model and comparing the resulting allocations with those observed in the data. I assume
parental altruism follows a beta distribution that is defined over the interval from 0 to 1. The
beta distribution is flexible and can take different shapes depending on the values of the param-
eters, but it may not have density at 0 and 1, which is problematic when calculating the optimal
policy. So I truncate parental altruism to the interval [δ0,δ1] = [0.05,0.95].
Simulation Method For each individual in the NLSY97, I draw parental altruism δ from the
parameterized distribution and calculate the present discounted value of parental wealth W by
adding parents’ net worth and present discounted value of income as of 1997. To calculated
parents’ lifetime income, I first back out the individual-specific intercept of the log earnings
equation (3.24) using parental education, age, and parental income, which is averaged over
4 years (1997-2000). Then I calculate the present value of earnings from 1997 to age 65. I
numerically solve the family’s problem laid out in Section 3.2. Parents give one-time transfers
and students choose schooling s ∈ {0,1, . . . ,8} based on their ability, earnings function (3.24),
psychic cost, monetary costs and borrowing limits calibrated in Section 3.5.1. Finally, I calcu-
late the target statistics for the simulated data, take averages over 100 simulations, and compare
them with their empirical counterparts. I choose parameters that minimize the weighted sum
of squared errors between target statistics (reported in Table 3.6) in the simulated and actual
data. In estimating schooling regression using NLSY data, I additionally include dummies for
13Teaching and research assistantship for graduate students are included as earnings.
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birth year, number of siblings, and non-single parenthood to control for variables not modelled.
Note that the model assumes that youth are 18 years old, have no siblings, and have a single
parent.
Table 3.7: Internally Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
σ Intertemporal smoothing 3.18
η Intergenerational smoothing 0.98
χ
Psychic cost Ψ(s)
34,531
γ1 2,966
γ2 5,668
E[δ ] Parental altruism δ 0.39
Var[δ ] 0.09
Calibrated Parameters and Model Fit As Table 3.6 shows, the model can generate the
distribution of schooling as well as the relationship between schooling, ability, and family
income that are close to the data. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1/σ = 0.31
is smaller than 1, which is consistent with Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999). The
intergenerational elasticity is larger than intertemporal elasticity, consistent with Co´rdoba and
Ripoll (2014). Calibrated density of parental altruism is shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Calibrated Density of Parental Altruism
3.5.2 Optimal Policies
I now use the calibrated model to compute optimal subsidies for low ($20K-$30K), middle
($50K-$60K), and high ($100K-$120K) income families. Parents within each income group
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are assumed to have identical lifetime wealth, which is computed by averaging lifetime wealth
of the parents used in calibration. Youth ability is also fixed at the 80th percentile, so families
that belong to the same income group are only different in the degree of parental altruism.
Conditional on attending college, students face a continuous choice set [s0,s1] = [1,8].
I compute two sets of budget-neutral optimal policies. I first characterize the optimal policy
for middle income families that keeps constant the total amount of subsidies given to them as
a group. I then solve for the optimal policy when the budget for low, middle, and high income
groups is pooled together.
Optimal Policy for Middle Income Families
Figure 3.6 plots the current and the optimal subsidy. Subsidy schedules are shown at schooling
levels chosen by any students under each policy. The optimal policy reallocates the budget
from late years of college to early years. The total amount of subsidy for those who complete
2 years of college is increased by around $1,500 and, as a result, college attendance increases.
On the other hand, a lower marginal subsidy beyond 3 years of college induces students with
altruistic parents to attain less schooling. Figure 3.7(a) shows schooling allocations by parental
altruism. Note that schooling exhibits jumps due to the fixed psychic cost, discontinuities in
the flow cost of schooling, and borrowing limits. Even though there are some unconstrained
students under the optimal policy, the amount of subsidy is monotonically increasing in years
of schooling (i.e., Proposition 3.2 does not hold), because not everyone goes to college.
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Figure 3.6: Current and Optimal Policy for Middle Income Families
Table 3.8 summarizes average effects of the optimal policy on schooling, welfare, and
distortions. The optimal policy improves efficiency in schooling by reducing inequality in ed-
ucational attainment, but increased college attendance for youth from low altruism families
worsens intertemporal and intergenerational consumption allocations. Although the optimal
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Figure 3.7: Schooling and Marginal Welfare for Middle Income Families
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policy leads to changes in the subsidy schedule and allocation of schooling, its total welfare ef-
fect is negligible. One reason for the small welfare effect is the absence of inequality aversion.
Reallocating subsidies to families with less altruistic parents reduces inequality in the level of
welfare across families and youth, but this is not valued very much by the social planner.
Another reason for the small welfare effect is that the social planner’s ability to redistribute
across families using education subsidies is limited. Although the optimal policy is more re-
distributive to families with low altruism compared to the current policy, the amount of subsidy
is still increasing in years of schooling. Consequently, unconstrained families with the most
altruistic parents receive the highest amount of subsidy, even though families with lower altru-
ism have higher marginal welfare (see Figure 3.7(b)). This reflects the large distortionary cost
due to behavioral responses at the attendance margin, which limits subsidy levels at early years
of college. The distortionary cost lowers the average marginal benefit of subsidies, so that
one dollar increase in budget only increases social welfare by less than a dollar (i.e., λ < 1).
Therefore, giving subsidies to unconstrained families is not a waste in this case.
Figure 3.8 shows efficiency gains from the optimal policy by parental altruism. For all fam-
ilies with students who attend college under the current policy (δ greater than 0.25), the optimal
policy improves efficiency. The efficiency gain is largest among families who over-invest un-
der the current policy (δ greater than 0.8). By reducing their schooling below the first-best
level, the optimal policy improves efficiency in schooling as well as consumption allocations.
Among families with middle levels of altruism, the efficiency gain in consumption allocation
is large enough to compensate for the efficiency loss from reduced schooling. The optimal pol-
icy increases schooling for families with low altruism, but it worsens consumption smoothing
across time and generations, which results in the smallest efficiency gain among families with
college students. For families who switch from non-college to college, the efficiency gain is
very negative: attending college improves efficiency in schooling substantially, but it severely
distorts consumption allocation. Although relatively few families switch from non-college to
college, the magnitude of the efficiency loss is several times larger than the efficiency gain
obtained from families who attend college under the current policy.
Optimal Policy for Low, Middle, and High Income Families
Now, suppose that the social planner sets the subsidy schedules for all three income groups
using pooled budget (3.22). The planner may give different amounts of subsidies to different
groups, redistributing resources. Since the planner does not value equity, the objective is only
to increase aggregate efficiency.
Figure 3.9 plots the current and the optimal policy for each income group. The optimal
policy redistributes from low and middle income to high income families. As we can see from
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Figure 3.10, among families whose children attend college, low income families have signifi-
cantly higher marginal welfare than high income families. However, a higher fraction of low
income families does not attend college, which raises the total cost of increasing subsidies. Al-
though some high income students do not attend college under the current policy, a sufficiently
high subsidy under the optimal policy allows all of them to attend. Even high income students
who do not receive any parental transfers finish 2 years of college.
Table 3.9 shows average effects of the optimal policy. Average welfare gain is about $550,
with most of this gain coming from taking money away from low income families. The optimal
policy takes $6,020 and $1,050 away from low and middle income families, and gives it to
high income families. Interestingly, this reduces distortions for low income and middle income
families by $1,270 and $170, while it increases distortions for high income families by $210.
Lower schooling among low income families significantly raises distortions in schooling, but it
is offset by improved consumption smoothing. For high income families, the opposite is true:
improved efficiency in schooling is not large enough to compensate for worsened consumption
smoothing.
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Figure 3.9: Current and Optimal Policy for Low, Middle, and High Income Families
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter argues that heterogeneous parental altruism can be an important determinant of
parental transfers and youth’s education investment, and it significantly affects how educa-
tion subsidies should be distributed. Parental transfers are important sources of funding for
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college students, but the amount of parental transfers vary from family to family. Since par-
ents who give higher transfers during schooling also give higher transfers after schooling, the
heterogeneity in transfers is likely to be driven by differences in parental altruism rather than
differences in returns to schooling. In the presence of borrowing constraints, heterogeneous
parental altruism generates dispersion in education attainment among students with similar
ability and family income. Those with altruistic parents receive enough transfers to make effi-
cient education investment while those of parents with low altruism are constrained and attain
less schooling due to low transfers. Since additional subsidies to unconstrained students do
not improve economic efficiency, the social planner redistributes towards students of low al-
truism parents who attain less schooling. This implies that early years of college should be
more heavily subsidized than late years. However, increasing subsidy for early years of college
distorts college-going decision at the extensive margin. The distortionary cost can be large
and can severely limit the amount of subsidy assigned to early years of college for a given
income group as well as the amount of subsidy given to low income families with low college
attendance rate.
In this chapter, I focus on one dimension of heterogeneity, parental altruism, across families
and policies that care only about efficiency. The implications of different sources of unobserved
heterogeneity across families, such as returns to schooling and parental wealth, and different
social objectives are briefly discussed in the chapter, but quantitatively evaluating the impor-
tance of various heterogeneity across families and different social objectives on the design of
education policies is an important extension to be addressed in future work.
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Chapter 4
Earnings Dynamics and Returns to Skills
4.1 Introduction
In the past few decades, the U.S. has experienced a sharp surge in labor income dispersion.
Earnings differentials across workers with different observed characteristics such as education
and age/experience all rose substantially, but residual earnings inequality (i.e. inequality con-
ditional on observable characteristics) increased simultaneously. Although there is widespread
agreement that the returns to observable skills have increased dramatically (e.g., Katz and Au-
tor, 1999), there are different views about the factors underlying changes in residual earnings
inequality. Changes in residual inequality have often been equated with changes in returns
to unobserved skills (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993) or changes in the distribution of un-
observed skills (Lemieux, 2006) in the literature. However, a sizeable portion of the rise in
residual inequality is attributable to short-term fluctuations in earnings (Gottschalk and Mof-
fitt, 1994), which are unlikely to reflect changes related to skills. Distinguishing between these
explanations is important for understanding the causes and welfare consequences of rising
earnings inequality.
In this chapter, we consider a general model of log earnings residuals that incorporates (i)
changing returns to unobserved skills, (ii) changing distribution of unobserved skills, and (iii)
changing volatility of earnings unrelated to skills. We begin by discussing identification when
unobserved skills are subject to permanent shocks and the volatile (non-skill) component of
earnings is subject to permanent and transitory shocks as in much of the literature on earnings
dynamics. We show that, when the panel data cover long periods, the returns to unobserved
skills for all periods are identified and the variances of unobserved skills as well as the volatile
component of earnings are identified except for the last few periods. Intuitively, identification
of the returns to unobserved skills derives from the fact that correlations in earnings residual
changes far enough apart in time are due to unobserved skills and not permanent or transitory
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shocks unrelated to skills.
We estimate the returns to unobserved skills, the variances of unobserved skills, and the
variances of the non-skill component of earnings using data on log annual/weekly earnings
for men ages 30-59 in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) separately by college
attendance. We highlight five main findings. (i) The returns to unobserved skills were stable
until the mid-1980s, and then fell afterwards. The decline of the return was more substantial for
those who did not attend college (‘high school workers’). (ii) The variance of unobserved skill
rose throughout the sample period. (iii) The variance of the unobserved skill component (i.e.,
return to skill multiplied by unobserved skill) rose until the mid-1980s, decreased afterwards,
and then rebounded slightly in the early 2000s only for those who attended college (‘college
workers’). (iv) The variance of permanent shocks increased since the mid-1980s. (v) The
variance of transitory shocks increased sharply in the early 1980s among high school workers
but increased only modestly in the long-run for both high school and college workers.
Our results demonstrate that accounting for changes in the distribution of unobserved skills
and in the volatility of earnings is important in estimating the returns to unobserved skills.
Time patterns of the returns to unobserved skills are quite different from those estimated in
the existing studies (e.g., Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993, Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2012) that
do not take into account these factors. The evolution of the variance of log earnings residuals
after the mid-1980s cannot be easily explained by unobserved skills alone, as the decline in the
returns to unobserved skills pushed down the share of skill-related component in total residual
variance.
We interpret our empirical findings using a simple demand and supply framework and ask
whether the changes in the returns to unobserved skills reflect changes in skill demand or sup-
ply. We present an assignment model of labor market that is similar to Sattinger (1979) where
the returns to skills are determined by production technology and how workers with hetero-
geneous skills and jobs with heterogeneous productivity are combined in production. More
skilled workers earn more partly because they work at more productive jobs. Skill distribution
affects the returns to skills by changing the equilibrium assignment. An increase in the vari-
ance of skill reduces the returns to skills by reducing the productivity differential across jobs
among workers different skill levels. We recover the demand and supply factors by combin-
ing our estimates—returns to skills and variance of skills—with the restrictions implied by the
theoretical model. We find that both demand and supply factors played important roles in the
decline of the returns to unobserved skills since the mid-1980s for both high school and college
workers. The decrease in skill demand was a more important factor than supply changes for
high school workers.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide identification results for our
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model where the returns to unobserved skills, the variance of unobserved skills, and the vari-
ance of non-skill component of earnings change over time. Section 4.3 describes the PSID data
used to estimate earnings dynamics for American men and reports our empirical findings. Sec-
tion 4.4 interprets the time patterns of the estimated returns to unobserved skills in a demand
and supply framework and Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Identifying the Returns to Unobserved Skills
In this section, we establish conditions under which the returns to unobserved skills, the vari-
ances of unobserved skills, and the variance of volatile component of earnings are identified.
Suppose that we observe log earnings residuals of a large number of individuals i= 1, . . . ,N
from period t = t to period t = t. We consider log earnings residuals for individual i in period
t of the form
wi,t = µtθi,t +ui,t , (4.1)
where θi,t represents an unobserved skill, µt a return to unobserved skills, and ui,t idiosyncratic
shocks. We assume that θi,t and ui,t are mean zero and uncorrelated with each other.
The earnings equation (4.1) reflects the classical idea of Friedman and Kuznets (1954)
that one’s earnings consists of a permanent component that is related to one’s intrinsic skills
and a transitory component that reflects a short-run variation in earnings that is not related to
skills. Although the transitory component can be serially correlated, the correlation between
transitory components that are far apart in time is likely to be small. Therefore, we begin with
the assumption that there exists k > 0 such that Cov(ut ,ut ′) = 0 for |t ′− t| ≥ k, which will
be generalized later.1 Then the “long” autocovariance of earnings residuals reflects only the
skill-related component (Carroll, 1992, Moffitt and Gottschalk, 2012): for |t ′− t| ≥ k,
Cov(wt ,wt ′) = µtµt ′Cov(θt ,θt ′). (4.2)
Time-invariant Unobserved Skills When unobserved skills do not change over time, i.e.,
θi,t = θi, then Cov(θt ,θt ′) = Var(θ). In this case, the ratio of the covariances reveals the ratio
of the returns to skills: for |t ′− t|> k,
Cov(wt ,wt ′)
Cov(wt−1,wt ′)
=
µtµt ′Var(θ)
µt−1µt ′Var(θ)
=
µt
µt−1
. (4.3)
1Let xt be a random variable and its realization for individual i be xi,t . Denote its cross-sectional second
moments by Var(xt) and Cov(xt ,xt ′).
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Therefore, if we observe individual earnings for long periods, the returns to skills are identified
up to a normalization that µt∗ = 1 for some t∗. Once the returns are identified, we can also
recover the variance of unobserved skills Var(θ) =Cov(wt ,wt ′)/(µtµt ′) as well as the variance
of earnings shocks Var(ut) = Var(wt)−Var(µtθ).
Equation (4.3) can be interpreted in the framework of instrumental variable regression. We
can obtain µt/µt−1 by regressing wi,t on wi,t−1 using wi,t ′ as an instrumental variable. To see
why, first note that wi,t and wi,t−1 are related as follows:
wi,t = µtθi+ui,t = µt
(
wi,t−1−ui,t−1
µt−1
)
+ui,t . (4.4)
Since wi,t−1 = µt−1θi + ui,t−1 is a noisy measure of unobserved skill θi, it is correlated with
the measurement error ui,t−1 (and also correlated with ui,t if ui,t and ui,t−1 are correlated) and
running an OLS regression of wi,t on wi,t−1 would give a biased estimate of µt/µt−1. To address
this endogeneity problem, an earnings residual of distant future or past wi,t ′ can be used as an
instrumental variable since it is correlated with θi but uncorrelated with ui,t−1 and ui,t .
Time-varying Unobserved Skills In more general cases where unobserved skills change
over time, let νi,t = ∆θi,t = θi,t −θi,t−1 be the skill change between period t− 1 and period t.
Then Equation (4.4) becomes
wi,t = µt
(
wi,t−1−ui,t−1
µt−1
+νi,t
)
+ui,t .
As long as the skill changes are uncorrelated with past skills,2 past earnings residuals are still
valid instruments and µt for t > t+ k is identified by Equation (4.3). However, future earnings
residuals are not valid if the skill change has permanent effects on future skills. To see this,
note that, for t ′ > t, θt ′ = θt +∑t
′
τ=t+1ντ and Cov(θt ,θt ′) = Var(θt). Then, for t ′ ≥ t+ k,
Cov(wt ,wt ′)
Cov(wt−1,wt ′)
=
µtµt ′Var(θt)
µt−1µt ′Var(θt−1)
=
µt
µt−1
Var(θt−1)+Var(νt)
Var(θt−1)
, (4.5)
which is larger than µt/µt−1 unless Var(νt) = 0. This poses an identification problem for µt in
early periods where there are no past earnings to be used as instrumental variables. However,
they can still be recovered by differencing out the bias generated by permanent skill changes.
Let ci be the period when individual i starts accumulating skills (‘cohort’) and suppose that
there exist two cohorts c and c′ such that Var(θt−1|c) 6=Var(θt−1|c′) and Var(νt |c) =Var(νt |c′).
The second condition holds when skill shock variance depends only on time, or when there
2This is the standard weak exogeneity assumption in dynamic models.
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is a non-monotonic age trend in the variance of skill change.3 In this case, the ratio of the
difference of the long autocovariance between cohorts gives the ratio of the returns to skills for
early periods: for t ′− t ≥ k,
Cov(wt ,wt ′|c)−Cov(wt ,wt ′|c′)
Cov(wt−1,wt ′|c)−Cov(wt−1,wt ′|c′)
=
µtµt ′
[
Var(θt−1|c)−Var(θt−1|c′)
]
µt−1µt ′
[
Var(θt−1|c)−Var(θt−1|c′)
] = µt
µt−1
.
Then the variances of unobserved skills for all t ≤ t− k are also identified from the covariance
between current and future earnings residuals Var(θt) =Cov(wt ,wt ′)/(µtµt ′) for t ′− t ≥ k. Al-
though the return to unobserved skill is identified for all periods, the variance of unobserved
skills is not identified for later periods near t, because we cannot distinguish between unob-
served skills and earnings shocks without future earnings residuals.
Permanent Non-skill Component of Earnings We have assumed that all permanent com-
ponents of earnings are related to skills. However, there may be factors that are orthogonal to
skills but also have permanent effects on earnings. For example, workers with identical skills
may get paid differently because of the differences in non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs
(Rosen, 1986). These differences are likely to be permanent if they reflect workers’ prefer-
ences over jobs. Also permanent shocks to firm productivity can be translated into permanent
earnings shocks among similarly skilled workers when there are labor market frictions that pre-
vent full insurance against firm level shocks (Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi, 2005, Lamadon,
2014).
In this case, a similar identification strategy works under the modified assumption that
Cov(ut ,∆ut ′|c) = 0 for all (c, t, t ′) such that t ′− t ≥ k. With this assumption, the change in
distant future earnings residual ∆wi,t ′ , instead of level wi,t ′ , can be used as an instrumental
variable in a regression of wi,t on wi,t−1 unless the return to unobserved skill stays constant
(i.e., ∆µt ′ = 0). To see this, note that ∆wi,t ′ can be written as
∆wi,t ′ = ∆µt ′θi,t ′+µt ′−1∆θi,t ′+∆ui,t ′ . (4.6)
For t ′ ≥ t− k, ∆wi,t ′ is uncorrelated with ui,t−1 and ui,t , but it is correlated with wi,t−1 through
θi,t ′ if ∆µt ′ 6= 0. Therefore, the availability of an instrumental variable hinges on some variation
in the returns to unobserved skills over time. In the extreme case where µt does not change
at all, it is impossible to separately identify the permanent skill component and non-skill com-
ponent. To simplify exposition, we impose the strong sufficient condition that ∆µt 6= 0 for all
3For example, young (old) workers may experience larger skill changes than middle age workers due to train-
ing (health shocks). Baker and Solon (2003) and Blundell, Graber, and Mogstad (2015) find this U-shaped age
profile in the variance of earnings shocks.
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periods.
We summarize the above discussion in the following Proposition. The proofs for this and
subsequent results are provided in Appendix C.1.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that (i) there exists k > 0 such that t− t > 2k and Cov(ut ,∆ut ′|c) = 0
for all (c, t, t ′) such that t ′− t ≥ k, (ii) ∆µt 6= 0 for all t, and (iii) θi,t = θi,t−1+νi,t where, for
all t, Cov(νt ,θt− j|c) = 0 for all c and j > 0 and Var(θt−1|c) 6= Var(θt−1|c′) and Var(νt |c) =
Var(νt |c′) for some c 6= c′. Then (i) µt is identified for all t, up to a normalization µt∗ = 1 for
some t∗, and (ii) Var(θt) and Var(ut) are identified for all t < t− k.
4.3 Estimation
We estimate the returns to unobserved skills, the variance of unobserved skills, and the variance
of earnings shocks using panel data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) on male
annual/weekly earnings in the U.S. from 1970 to 2008.
4.3.1 Empirical Specification
Since the relative wages between those who did not attend college and those that did have
diverged significantly during the sample periods (Katz and Murphy, 1992), we allow all pa-
rameters including the returns to unobserved skills to differ between the two groups, which we
call ‘sector’. Specifically, let si be an indicator variable for college workers for individual i.
Then, the log earnings residual for individual i in year t is
wi,t =µt(si)θi,t +ui,t , (4.7)
where µt(s) is the return to unobserved skills for an individual with si = s and, as before,
unobserved skill evolves according to
θi,t = θi,t−1+νi,t . (4.8)
We further assume that the non-skill earnings shock ui,t is the sum of a unit root process (‘per-
manent component’) and a lower order moving average process (‘transitory component’) as
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typically assumed in the literature:4
ui,t =κi,t + εi,t , (4.9)
κi,t =κi,t−1+ηi,t , (4.10)
εi,t =
q
∑
j=0
β j(si)ξi,t− j, (4.11)
where β0(s) = 1. With this specification, the identifying assumption Cov(ut ,∆ut ′|s,c) = 0 in
Proposition 4.1 holds for k = q+ 2, so the returns to unobserved skills for all periods and
the variances of unobserved skills for t < t − k = t − q− 2 are identified. Variances of per-
manent and transitory non-skill components for t < t − q− 2 are also identified as follows:
Var(κt |s) = Cov(wt ,wt ′|s)−µt(s)µt ′(s)Var(θt |s) for t ′ ≥ t+q+1 and Var(εt |s) =Var(wt |s)−
µt(s)2 Var(θt |s)−Var(κt |s).
4.3.2 PSID Data
The PSID is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of individuals and families in
the U.S. beginning in 1968. The survey was conducted annually through 1997 and biennially
since. We use data collected from 1971 through 2009. Since earnings and weeks of work were
collected for the year prior to each survey, our analysis considers annual earnings from 1970 to
2008. (Key findings also hold for weekly earnings as shown in Appendix C.3.)
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Figure 4.1: Between- and Within-group Variance of Log Annual Earnings
4See, among others, Abowd and Card (1989), Blundell and Preston (1998), Meghir and Pistaferri (2004),
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010). See MaCurdy (2007) for a review.
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Figure 4.2: Variance of Log Annual Earnings by Sector
Our sample is restricted to male heads of households from the core (SRC) sample.5 We
use earnings from any year these men were ages 30-59, had positive wage and salary income,
worked at least one week, and were not enrolled as a student. Our earnings measure reflects
total wage and salary earnings (excluding farm and business income) and is denominated in
1996 dollars using the CPI-U-RS. We trim the top and bottom 1% of all earnings measures
within year and sector by ten-year age cells. The resulting sample contains 3,194 men and
32,549 person-year observations – roughly ten observations for each individual.
Our sample is composed of 92% whites, 6% blacks and 1% hispanics with an average age
of 42 years old. We create seven education categories based on current years of completed
schooling: 1-5 years, 6-8 years, 9-11 years, 12 years, 13-15 years, 16 years, and 17 or more
years. College workers are defined as those with more than 12 years of schooling. In our
sample, 16% of respondents finished less than 12 years of schooling, 33% had exactly 12 years
of completed schooling, 20% completed some college (13-15 years), 21% completed college
(16 years), and 10% had more than 16 years of schooling.
Our analysis focuses on log annual earnings residuals after controlling for differences in
educational attainment, race, and age. Let Wi,t be earnings and xi,t be a vector of observed
5We exclude those from any PSID oversamples (SEO, Latino) as well as those with non-zero individual
weights. The earnings questions we use are asked only of household heads. We also restrict our sample to
those who were heads of household and not students during the survey year of the observation of interest as well
as two years earlier. Our sampling scheme is very similar to that of Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012), except that we
do not include earnings measures before age 30.
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characteristics for individual i in year t. Log earnings residual wi,t can be written as follows:
lnWi,t = ft(xi,t)+wi,t . (4.12)
We run year- and sector-specific regressions of log earnings on age, race, and education indica-
tors, along with interactions between race and education indicators and a third order polynomial
in age.
Figure 4.1 shows total variance, between-group variance, and within-group variance (vari-
ance of residuals) of log annual earnings. The variance of log annual earnings increases sharply
in the early 1980s and after the late 1990s. The evolution of the within-group variance closely
mirrors the evolution of the total variance. The within-group variance explains a larger share
of total variance than the between-group variance, and it also explains an increasing share of
the total variance over time. Although the within- and between-group variance follow similar
time patterns, they show a slight divergence in the mid- and late 1970s and the late 1990s.
The total and within-group variance of log annual earnings evolved quite differently across
sectors, as shown in Figure 4.2. The rise in inequality in the early 1980s is stronger among
high school workers, while the increasing inequality among college workers is the main driver
of the surge in inequality in the early 2000s. Between the mid-1980s and mid-2000s, earnings
inequality fell among high school workers and increased among college workers, which is con-
sistent with the literature on ‘polarization’ in the U.S. labor market (Autor, Levy, and Murnane,
2003, Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008, Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, Autor and Dorn, 2012).
4.3.3 Minimum Distance Estimation
We use minimum distance estimation and the residual moments described above to estimate
the model by choosing parameters that minimize the distance between the sample covariances
and the theoretical covariances implied by the model. We assume that individuals enter labor
market at age 20 with initial skill ψi and no other prior shocks, which implies that unobserved
skill in year t for individual i born in year ci (‘birth cohort’) can be written as
θi,t = ψi+
t
∑
τ=ci+20
νi,τ .
Variance of initial skill does not depend on birth cohort ci and the variances of all shocks depend
on only time and not on cohort or age. We also assume that the variances of all shocks prior to
1970 are the same as those in year 1970. We impose smooth time trend (cubic polynomials in
year) in the variances of permanent skill and non-skill shocks, while the variances of transitory
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shocks are unrestricted. We choose a normalization that µ1985(s) = 1.
The parameters we estimate are, for each s, Var(ψ|s), ρ(s), {β j(s)}qj=1, and parameters for
Var(νt |s) and Var(ηt |s), and for each (s, t), µt(s) (except for t = 1985) and Var(ξt |s). For a
given parameter vector Λ, we can compute theoretical counterpart for Cov(wt ,wt ′|s,c) implied
by the model (4.7)-(4.11) and compare them with the sample covariances. Since some cohort
(or, equivalently, age at = t− c) cells have few observations when calculating residual covari-
ances, we partition the age set A = {30, . . . ,59} into 10-year age groups A1, A2, and A3, each
corresponding to ages 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59, and aggregate within age groups.
The minimum distance estimator Λˆ solves
min
Λ
∑
(s, j,t,t ′)∈Γ
{
Ĉov(wt ,wt ′|s,A j)− C˜ov(wt ,wt ′|s,A j,Λ)
}2
,
where Γ = {s, j, t, t ′|1970 ≤ t ≤ t ′ ≤ 2008,s ∈ {0,1}, j ∈ {1,2,3}}, Ĉov(wt ,wt ′|s,A j) is the
sample covariance conditional on sector s and age group A j in year t ′, and C˜ov(wt ,wt ′|s,A j,Λ)
is the corresponding theoretical covariance.
4.3.4 Estimation Results
We discuss results for log annual earnings residuals with MA(3) transitory shocks in the text;
however, conclusions are quite similar for log weekly earnings (Appendix C.3) and different
specifications for the transitory component (Appendix C.2).
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Figure 4.3: Estimated µt(s) (thick lines) with 95% Confidence Interval (thin lines)
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Estimated Returns Figure 4.3 reports the estimated returns and 95% confidence intervals
over time. For high school workers, the return to unobserved skills increases in the early
1970s, levels off in the late 1970s and early 1980s, then falls about 80% between 1985 and
2000. It remains fairly constant thereafter. For college workers, the return to unobserved skills
increases more sharply until the mid-1970s, decreases about 75% between 1976 and 1998,
and stays constant afterwards. Overall, the returns to unobserved skills fell substantially after
1985 in both sectors despite the increasing residual inequality during the period. Although the
returns for high school and college workers display similar patterns, the return for high school
workers declines 30 percentage points more than that of college workers after 1985. Indeed,
we can reject the hypothesis that the returns to unobserved skills are identical across sectors at
the 5% significance level.6 The relatively larger decline in the returns to unobserved skills for
high school workers after 1985 is in line with the falling relative wages of high school workers
during that period (e.g., Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008). This suggests that the changing
returns to unobserved skills can be an important determinant of the evolution of between-group
inequality as well as within-group inequality.
Our finding that the returns to unobserved skills have fallen since the mid-1980s is consis-
tent with the work of Castex and Dechter (2014), who showed that the returns to cognitive abil-
ity as measured by AFQT scores fell in the 2000s relative to the 1980s by comparing NLSY79
and NLSY97 cohorts. The decreasing returns to unobserved skills, however, is inconsistent
with the conclusions reached in both the PSID- and CPS-based literatures. The CPS-based
literature, which implicitly ignores earnings shocks and equates changes in the total variance
log wages residuals with changes in the returns to unobserved skills, concludes that the returns
to unobserved skills increased steadily after the early 1970s (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993,
Katz and Autor, 1999, Acemoglu, 2002).7
The PSID-based literature explores the relative importance of permanent and transitory
shocks, typically ignoring variation in the returns of unobserved skills. A few exceptions are
Haider (2001) and Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012); however, they reached different conclusions.
Haider (2001) estimated that the returns to unobserved skills were stable in the 1970s and
then increased throughout the 1980s. Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012)’s estimates suggest that
the returns increased until the mid-1980s, stabilized, and then increased again in the mid-
1990s.8 We show that their very different conclusions are due to restrictions imposed in their
6The Wald test is used to test the hypothesis H0 : µt(0) = µt(1) for all t 6= 1985.
7One exception is Lemieux (2006), who finds that, after controlling for composition effects, the return to
unobserved skills declined in the 1970s and 1990s. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) show that the decline in
the returns to unobserved skills between 1989 and 2005 is driven by decreasing returns among workers in the
lower tail of the wage distribution. Lochner and Shin (2014) explore identification and estimation of the returns
to unobserved skills allowing for differential changes in the returns across skill levels.
8There are other studies estimating models similar to Haider (2001) and Moffitt and Gottschalk (2012) using
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models. Although assuming more persistent ARMA(1,1) transitory shocks, they assume that
earnings processes are identical across sectors and also abstract from permanent skill and non-
skill shocks with time-varying variances. Figure 4.4 shows how these restrictions affect the
estimated returns.
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Figure 4.4: Estimated µt under Different Restrictions
In version A, we assume that transitory shocks follow an ARMA(1,1) process and the
returns are identical across sectors.9 The estimates show similar patterns to our baseline es-
timates, implying that different assumptions about the persistence of transitory shocks do not
affect the results significantly. In version B, we further constrain all other parameters to be
identical across sectors. Version C additionally imposes that there are no permanent non-skill
shocks and version D further assumes that the variances of skill shocks are constant over time.
As we move from version A to version D, the estimated return changes counter-clockwise, gen-
erating increasing trends before the mid-1980s and after the mid-1990s with a muted decline
in the late 1980s and the early 1990s.
Version D is essentially identical to the models of Haider (2001) and Moffitt and Gottschalk
(2012)10 and the estimates are similar, suggesting that accounting for permanent skill and non-
skill shocks with time-varying variances greatly affects the estimates of the returns to unob-
served skills. In the absence of permanent shocks with time-varying variances, the model’s
ability to match increasing residual variance is limited, and all permanent increases in residual
inequality is explained by increasing returns to skills.
different panel data. Using the U.S. tax returns data from 1987 to 2009 (DeBacker et al., 2013) and Canadian
tax returns data from 1976 to 1992 (Baker and Solon, 2003), they reach similar conclusions that the returns to
unobserved skills increased during the sample period.
9Transitory shocks that follow an ARMA(1,1) process fade out only asymptotically, so we need a different set
of assumptions for identification, as shown in Appendix C.1.3.
10They also have heterogenous growth rate of unobserved skills that is correlated with initial unobserved skills.
Including heterogenous income profiles to version D has negligible effects on the estimates.
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Figure 4.5: Variance and Share of Each Component
Role of Unobserved Skills in Explaining Residual Variance The fact that estimated returns
have evolved quite differently from the residual inequality implies that the role of unobserved
skills in explaining residual inequality has also changed. Figure 4.5 decomposes the residual
variance of all sectors into its three components: unobserved skills (µt(s)θt), permanent (κt)
and transitory (εt) components of non-skill earnings shocks.11 Initially quite low, the variance
of the unobserved skill component rises over the 1970s and early 1980s before falling after
1985. The variance of transitory component rises in the early 1980s and the variance of per-
manent non-skill component stays constant throughout the 1970s and then rises continuously
afterwards. As a share of the total variance in log earnings residuals, the transitory component
plays the largest role in the early 1970s, after which the unobserved skill component domi-
nates. The unobserved skill component explains about 60% of the total residual variance at its
peak in the mid-1980s and its share decreases afterwards. The permanent non-skill component
explains an increasing share of the total residual variance after the mid-1980s. Between 1985
and 2002, the share of the permanent non-skill component increases from 10% to 30%.
Figure 4.6 shows the decomposition of the residual variance by sector. The broad time
patterns—the reversal of the importance of the unobserved skill component around 1985 and
the increasing importance of permanent non-skill component afterwards—can also be found in
each sector. However, the long-term fluctuation in the variance of unobserved skill component
is more pronounced for high school workers: it quadruples between 1970 and 1985, then falls
back to its original level by the early 2000s. For college workers, the variance of unobserved
skill component decreases only modestly during the 1990s and then increases again in the early
11As shown in Section 4.2, the variances of unobserved skills and non-skill earnings components are not iden-
tified for the last few years of our panel. Our figures report these variances trough 2002.
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Figure 4.6: Variance Decomposition by Sector
2000s.
To better understand the evolution of the variance of unobserved skill component, note
that the variance of residual earnings due to unobserved skills depends both on the returns to
unobserved skills and the variance of unobserved skills: Var(µt(s)θt |s) = µt(s)2 Var(θt |s). By
taking logs, we get the following additive decomposition:
lnVar
(
µt(s)θt |s
)
= 2lnµt(s)+ lnVar(θt |s).
Figure 4.7 shows that the variance of unobserved skills increases continuously throughout our
sample periods in both sectors, and that the increase is more dramatic for high school workers.
Since the returns to unobserved skills stayed relatively constant until 1985, the rising variance
of unobserved skills entirely explains the increasing variance of unobserved skill component
before 1985 in both sectors. However, after 1985, the sharp decline in returns reduces the vari-
ance of unobserved skill component despite the sustained growth of the variance of unobserved
skills.
Figure 4.8 shows that the variance of skill shocks increases substantially for high school
workers after 1985 and the variance of permanent non-skill shocks for college workers in-
creases more than high school workers. The variance of transitory shocks sharply increases for
high school workers in the 1980s and early 1990s, and it has increased continuously for college
workers since the mid-1970s, with a sharp spike in 1994.
To summarize empirical findings, the returns to unobserved skills fell after 1985 and the
decline was larger for high school workers than college workers. The variance of earnings
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Figure 4.7: Decomposing the Log Variance of Unobserved Skill Component
residuals due to unobserved skills increased until 1985 and fell afterwards despite the sustained
growth in the variance of unobserved skills. The reversal of residual inequality for high school
workers around 1985 mainly reflects the change in the variance of unobserved skill compo-
nent, although the transitory component non-skill shock also contributed. The rise in residual
inequality since the mid-1990s is due to increasing variances of permanent and transitory non-
skill shocks as well as increasing variance of unobserved skills among college workers.
4.4 Interpreting the Returns to Skills in a Demand and Sup-
ply Framework
Our analysis shows that the changing returns to unobserved skills are important in understand-
ing the evolution of residual inequality. The changes in the returns to skills documented in the
previous section could reflect shifts in the demand for skills. However, the concurrent changes
in the distribution of skills suggests that the supply of skills may also play a role. In this section,
we assess the contributions of skill demand and supply in the evolution of returns to skills using
a simple demand and supply framework based on an assignment model of Sattinger (1979).12
In the model, the return to skills is generated by differences in the productivity of skills,
but is amplified by differences in the productivity of jobs for which skills are employed. Het-
12Assignment models have been a standard theory of income inequality in labor economics. See Sattinger
(1993) for an early review. Recent theoretical and empirical studies of income inequality based on this framework
include Tervio¨ (2008), Gabaix and Landier (2008), Costinot and Vogel (2010), Lindenlaub (2014), Burstein,
Morales, and Vogel (2015), Ales, Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015), Scheuer and Werning (2015).
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Figure 4.8: Variances of Shocks (thick lines) with 95% Confidence Interval (thin lines)
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erogeneous productivity across jobs can be thought of as the different amount of resources
under each worker’s control, such as the quantity of capital or hierarchy, or different vintages
of technology embodied in capital. As in the models of ‘span-of-control’ (Lucas, 1978) and
‘superstar’ (Rosen, 1981), production technology determines how much differences in skills
are magnified to differences in earnings. In contrast to these models, however, the demand for
skills is not infinitely elastic because jobs are in fixed supply, which allows the supply of skills
to also affect the return to skills through its effect on the equilibrium assignment of skills and
jobs.
Our model is repeated static, where the distributions of skills and jobs exogenously change
over time, abstracting from endogenous skill formation and job creation.13 To focus on the
role of skills and returns to skills, we also abstract from elastic labor supply and dynamics of
non-skill component of earnings in this theoretical framework.14
4.4.1 Assignment Model of Labor Market
Endowment We consider an economy populated by a continuum of measure 1 of workers
and jobs operating in different sectors. In each period t, the fraction of workers in sector s
is the same as the fraction of jobs in that sector. In each sector, there exist workers endowed
with heterogeneous skills Θt ≥ 0 distributed with cdf Ft(Θt |s) and jobs with heterogeneous
productivity zt ≥ 0 distributed with cdf Gt(zt |s).
Technology In each sector, production takes place through one-to-one matching between
workers and jobs. If a worker with skill Θt works at a job with productivity zt in sector s,
yt(s,Θt ,zt) ≥ 0 units of output is produced. We assume that, for each s, yt(s, ·, ·) is twice
continuously differentiable and strictly increasing, and strictly supermodular:
∂yt(s,Θt ,zt)
∂Θt∂ zt
> 0.
13There is a literature explaining the trends in between- and within-group wage inequality in the framework
of endogenous human capital accumulation with heterogeneous learning ability and imperfect substitution of
human capital across groups (e.g., Heckman, Lochner, and Taber, 1998, Guvenen and Kuruscu, 2010). This
literature does not take into account idiosyncratic earnings shocks that are not related to human capital, equating
all changes in residual wage inequality with changes in the inequality of human capital quantity and time spent
on training. Using a model that is similar to ours, Jovanovic (1998) studies the effects of technical changes
on long-run inequality when the distributions of skills and jobs endogenously evolve over time in a theoretical
framework.
14Violante (2002) develops a theory of how technical changes may affect transitory shocks. An acceleration of
technological progress increases the productivity gaps across jobs, which is translated into more volatile earnings
in a frictional labor market.
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These assumptions imply that high skill workers are more productive (i.e., they have absolute
advantages) than low skill workers at all jobs, but the productivity gap between high and low
skill workers is larger at more productive jobs due to complementarity between skills and
jobs. Therefore, the efficient assignment that maximizes aggregate output features positive
assortative matching where more skilled workers work at more productive jobs (Becker, 1973).
Profit Maximization All markets are perfectly competitive. Workers in sector s with skillΘt
earn Wt(s,Θt) and output in sector s is sold at price pt(s). Producers maximize profits, solving
max
Θt
{
pt(s)yt(s,Θt ,zt)−Wt(s,Θt)
}
. (4.13)
Denote the solution by Θˆt(s,zt), which is monotone in zt due to the supermodularity of yt(s, ·, ·).
The necessary first order condition is
pt(s)
∂yt
(
s,Θˆt(s,zt),zt
)
∂Θt
=
∂Wt
(
s,Θˆt(s,zt)
)
∂Θt
. (4.14)
Market Clearing The labor market clears if the measure of producers demanding skills
Θˆt(s,zt) or less, which equals Gt(zt |s), coincides with the measure of workers supplying skills
Θˆt(s,zt) or less, which equals Ft
(
Θˆt(s,zt)|s
)
:
Ft
(
Θˆt(s,zt)|s
)
= Gt(zt |s). (4.15)
We also assume that both producers and workers have an option not to operate, in which case
they earn zero. Therefore, (4.15) is the the market clearing condition provided that profits and
earnings are nonnegative.
Equilibrium Earnings A competitive equilibrium in each sector consists of the assignment
rule Θˆt(s,zt) and the earnings function Wt(s,Θt) that satisfy the first order condition for profit
maximization (4.14) and the market clearing condition (4.15). Let zˆt(s,Θt) be the inverse of
Θt = Θˆt(s,zt) with respect to zt . Then the equilibrium skill elasticity of earnings can be written
as follows:15
∂ lnWt(s,Θt)
∂ lnΘt
=
∂ lnyt
(
s,Θt , zˆt(s,Θt)
)
∂ lnΘt
/
Wt(s,Θt)
pt(s)yt
(
s,Θt , zˆt(s,Θt)
) . (4.16)
15The same condition is derived by Costinot and Vogel (2010) for the case when workers take the whole revenue
(i.e., labor share is 1) due to free entry of jobs. In their model, skill demand is still not infinitely elastic because
outputs of different jobs are imperfect substitutes.
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The numerator is the partial skill elasticity (that is, holding productivity of job constant) of
output at the equilibrium assignment and the denominator is the worker’s share of revenue,
or labor share. The following Proposition shows that, when the production function is Cobb-
Douglas and skills and jobs are log-normally distributed, each of these terms is constant for all
skill levels and the skill elasticity of earnings, which we call the ‘return to skill’ µt(s), can be
derived in a simple closed form.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose that (i) lnyt(s,Θt ,zt) = λt(s) lnΘt + γt(s) lnzt and (ii) Θt and zt are
log-normally distributed, conditional on s. Then the labor share in each sector is
Wt(s,Θt)
pt(s)yt
(
s,Θt , zˆt(s,Θt)
) = λt(s)
λt(s)+ γt(s) σ(lnzt |s)σ(lnΘt |s)
(4.17)
and the return to skill in each sector is
µt(s)≡∂ lnWt(s,Θt)∂ lnΘt = λt(s)+ γt(s)
σ(lnzt |s)
σ(lnΘt |s) , (4.18)
where σ(x|s) is conditional standard deviation of x.
More skilled workers are more productive at all jobs, which is captured by the partial skill
elasticity of output λt(s). But they also work for jobs with higher productivity, so part of the
productivity increase comes from the productivity of jobs. Taking into account this sorting
effect, the total skill elasticity of output is
∂ lnyt
(
s,Θt , zˆt(s,Θt)
)
∂ lnΘt
+
∂ lnyt
(
s,Θt , zˆt(s,Θt)
)
∂ lnzt
∂ ln zˆt(s,Θt)
∂ lnΘt
= λt(s)+ γt(s)
∂ ln zˆt(s,Θt)
∂ lnΘt
.
(4.19)
With the log-normality assumption, the market clearing condition (4.15) implies
∂ ln zˆt(s,Θt)
∂ lnΘt
=
σ(lnzt |s)
σ(lnΘt |s) , (4.20)
which shows that relative heterogeneity between workers and jobs is important for the equi-
librium assignment. When workers are relatively homogeneous compared to jobs, a slightly
more skilled worker is assigned to a much more productive job. This generates a large total
skill elasticity of output, amplifying the innate productivity differences across workers. On the
other hand, when jobs are relatively homogeneous compared to workers, the sorting effect is
small, and the total skill elasticity of output mainly reflects the skill differences.
Equation (4.17) shows that the labor share is determined by the fraction of the worker’s
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marginal contribution, partial skill elasticity of output, out of the sum of worker’s and job’s
marginal contribution to output. By combining (4.16) and (4.17), we get (4.18), which equates
the return to skill with the total skill elasticity of output.16 The return to skill is determined
by production technology λt(s) and γt(s), distribution of jobs σ(lnzt |s), and distribution of
skills σ(lnΘt |s). An increase in the demand for high skills—an increase in λt(s) and/or
γt(s)σ(lnzt |s)—can be considered a skill-biased technical change in the sense that it increases
the return to skills and widens residual earnings inequality. On the other hand, an increase in
the dispersion of skills σ(lnΘt |s) reflects a skill supply change that reduces the return to skills
and residual earnings inequality.17 In the next subsection, we discuss how we can decompose
the changes in the returns to skills into the changes in each factor.
4.4.2 Recovering Supply and Demand Factors
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Figure 4.9: Variance of Observed and Unobserved Skills
Variance of Log Skill We assume that skills are correlated with the workers’ observed char-
acteristics but are not fully observed. Specifically, log skill of individual i in year t is
lnΘi,t = gt(xi,t)+θi,t .
16To our knowledge, the formula (4.18) is novel. Gabaix and Landier (2008) derived a similar formula with
Pareto distribution.
17Note that all of these factors, in addition to output price pt(s) and the average skill and job productivity
E[lnΘt |s] and E[lnzt |s] of each sector, also affect between-group inequality (i.e., average earnings differential
across sectors). This raises a possibility that between- and within-group inequality are driven by a common factor,
which may affect them differently.
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From (4.18), the equilibrium earnings function can be written as lnWt(s,Θt)=αt(s)+µt(s) lnΘt
for some constant αt(s). Assuming that individual log earnings lnWi,t is the sum of a skill-
related component that reflects the equilibrium earnings function and a non-skill component of
earnings ui,t ,
lnWi,t = αt(si)+µt(si) lnΘi,t +ui,t = αt(si)+µt(si)g(xi,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ ft(xi,t)
+µt(si)θi,t +ui,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=wi,t
gives the first stage regression equation (4.12). Although the time- and sector-specific constant
αt(s) is not separately identified from the location of the function gt(xt), the variance of log
skill is identified by taking variance conditional on s,
Var(lnΘt |s) = Var(lnWt |s)−Var(ut |s)µt(s)2 .
Therefore, the second stage estimates of µt(s) and Var(ut |s) can be used to compute the vari-
ances of log skills in each period except for the last k = q+ 2 periods when Var(ut |s) is not
identified. Figure 4.9 shows that the variances of observed and unobserved skills increased
over time, and the increase was much larger for high school workers.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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0.69
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0.75
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Figure 4.10: Average Labor Share
Production Function Parameters By combining (4.17) and (4.18), the labor share can be
written as λt(s)/µt(s). Therefore, the output elasticity of skill λt(s) can be identified from µt(s)
and the labor share of each sector. Then we can also get γt(s)σ(lnzt |s) = σ(lnΘt |s)(µt(s)−
λt(s)), but we cannot separately identify γt(s) and σ(lnzt |s). Recovering the output elasticity
from factor income share is a commonly used method since Cobb and Douglas (1928), but
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Figure 4.11: Production Function Parameters
implementing it in this case is complicated by the need to know the sector-specific labor shares.
The difficulty arises from the fact that data on value added by workers with different levels of
education is not available.
To overcome this difficulty, we assume that the labor share in our model can be approxi-
mated by average industry-level labor share for workers in each sector. Suppose that there are
j = 1, . . . ,J industries with value added Vj,t and labor compensation L j,t in year t. Let E j,t(s)
be the number of workers in industry j, sector s, and year t, and let Et(s) = ∑Jj=1 E j,t(s) be the
total number of workers in all industries. Then the average labor share in sector s and year t is
J
∑
j=1
E j,t(s)
Et(s)
L j,t
Vj,t
.
We use data on labor share and number of high school and college workers in the U.S. by
31 ISIC18 industries from the World KLEMS dataset.19 The number of workers is computed
by counting male workers ages 25-64. Figure 4.10 shows the average labor share by sector.
Overall, average labor shares in the two sectors tend to comove. The average labor share is
lower for college workers until the late 1990s, but the gap is closed afterwards. The low av-
erage labor share for college workers means that college workers are more likely to work in
industries with low labor share compared to high school workers. In our theoretical frame-
work, the lower labor share in the college sector means that college workers enjoy a relatively
18The International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC) is a United Nations
industry classification system.
19Available at http://www.worldklems.net. See Jorgenson, Ho, and Samuels (2012) for description.
113
larger productivity gain from jobs (i.e., λt(s) is smaller compared to γt(s)σ(lnzt |s)/σ(lnΘt |s))
compared to high school workers.
Figure 4.11 shows the production function parameters calculated from the average labor
share and the returns to skills. The time patterns of the partial skill elasticity of output λt(s)
are similar to those of the returns to skills µt(s): they are stable until 1985, decrease after-
wards, and the decline is larger for high school workers. The productivity differential across
jobs γt(s)σ(lnzt |s), however, increases until the mid-1980s and is stable afterwards for college
workers. For high school workers, γt(s)σ(lnzt |s) decreases between the mid-1980s and 2000,
showing divergence from that of college workers in the early and late 1990s.
4.4.3 Decomposing the Returns to Skills
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0.5
1
1.5
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Holding Supply Factors Constant
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(a) High School
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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Holding Supply Factors Constant
Holding Demand Factor Constant
(b) College
Figure 4.12: Actual and Counterfactual Returns (µt(s))
We assess the contributions of each factor recovered in the previous subsection in the evo-
lution of the returns to skills. Figure 4.12 shows the actual returns as well as counterfactual
returns when demand factors (λt(s) and γt(s)σ(lnzt |s)) and supply factor (σ(lnΘt |s)) are held
constant at their values in 1970. Both demand and supply factors play important roles in the
evolution of the returns to skills in the sense that each factor alone can explain the general
decreasing trend of the returns to skills. Rising variance of observed and unobserved skills
over time reduced the returns to skills by lowering productivity differentials across jobs among
workers with different skills. For high school workers, the demand for skills modestly in-
creased until 1985, which mainly reflects the change in the productivity of jobs (γt(s)σ(lnzt |s))
rather than the productivity of skills (λt(s)). The demand for skills for high school workers un-
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dergoes a steep decline between 1985 and 2000, explaining most of the decline in the returns
to skills during that period, then slightly increases afterwards. For college workers, the decline
of the demand for skills was not as drastic as that for high school workers, explaining about
half of the decrease in the return to skills between 1970 and 2000.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we show that the returns to unobserved skills and the variance of unobserved
skills are separately identified from time-varying variances of non-skill earnings shocks. Us-
ing panel data from the PSID on male earnings in the U.S. from 1970-2008, we show that
accounting for changes in the distributions of skills and the volatility of earnings is important
for the estimation of the evolution of the returns to unobserved skills. The time patterns of
the estimated returns to unobserved skills are different from those estimated in the literature.
The returns to unobserved skills were stable in the 1970s and early 1980s, but they sharply
decreased after 1985, and the decline was more sizable for high school workers than for col-
lege workers. Unobserved skills explain substantial and increasing share of the total variance
of log annual earnings residual, but their importance declined after the mid-1980s despite the
continuous increase in the variance of unobserved skills. Much of the increase in the residual
variance after the late 1990s is explained by the rise in the variance of permanent non-skill
component of earnings.
Using a simple demand and supply framework, we show that the decrease in the returns
to unobserved skills after the mid-1980s is driven by both supply and demand factors. The
decline in the demand for skills was more drastic for high school workers than for college
workers. Our finding that the demand for skills decreased since the mid-1980s seem to rein-
force the challenges (e.g., Card and DiNardo, 2002) faced by the skill-biased technical change
(SBTC) hypothesis, which typically states that the steady increase in the demand for skills
explains increasing inequality. Further work is required to understand why the skill demand
declined during the 1990s, precisely when technological progress had accelerated (Cummins
and Violante, 2002).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis is concerned with the sources of earnings inequality and their policy implications.
Differences in early human capital investment across family income is one of the most impor-
tant determinant in life-time earnings inequality. Chapter 2 sorts amongst different potential
explanations by comparing their predictions with stylized facts on child development. We find
that only the explanation based on credit constraints—children cannot invest themselves by
borrowing against their or their parents’ future income—is consistent with all facts, suggesting
that credit constraints can be an important source of inequality in human capital investment.
One way to address the inefficiency in human capital investment due to credit constraints
is to redistribute towards constrained students. The federal need-based financial aid for higher
education in the U.S. aims to achieve this goal by providing larger amount of aid for students
from lower income families. However, Chapter 3 shows that such policy cannot specifically
target constrained students because parents with similar financial resources give very different
amounts to their children. I find that the unobservable heterogeneity in parental transfers,
which I model as heterogeneous parental altruism, reduces efficiency of the education subsidy
program and limits redistribution across families with different income. These findings suggest
that it is important to investigate the sources of unobservable heterogeneity across students
when designing the financial aid policy.
The inequality in skills due to market frictions such as borrowing constraints will have
more important consequences if differences in skills are translated into larger differences in
earnings. Chapter 4 shows that the returns to unobserved skills fell in the U.S. since the mid-
1980s despite continuing rise in the overall residual earnings inequality, and that this reflects
a decline in the demand for skills. Our findings are not consistent with existing theories of
skill-biased technical change. Reconciling this inconsistency is an important avenue for future
research.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2 Appendix
A.1 Factor Score Weights
We employ principal factor analysis using the measured inputs reported in Figures 2.2 and
2.3 (separately by age) to create age-specific predicted investment factor scores for each child
using the Thomson (1951) method. Estimated weights for each factor used in constructing the
scores are reported in Table A.1. For interpretation purposes, scores are normalized to have a
mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
Table A.1: Weights used to Construct Factor Scores
Age Group
Early Investment Measure 0-1 2-3 4-5 6-7
10+ Books at Home 0.33 0.24 0.21 0.12
Mom Reads 3+ Times/Week 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.09
Child Eats with Mom and Dad Daily 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.03
Child Leaves House 4+ Times/Week 0.18 0.14 0.15
Child Sees Father Daily 0.09 0.20 0.24
Musical Instrument in Home 0.10
Child Taken to a Performance in Past Year 0.18
Child Taken to a Museum in Past Year 0.15
Child Takes Special Lessons/Extracurricular Activities 0.14
Family Gets a Daily Newspaper 0.08
Family Encourages Hobbies 0.08
Family Meets Friends/Relatives 2+ Times/Month 0.02
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A.2 Proofs and Technical Results
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Part (i): Follows directly from the first order conditions (2.6) and (2.7).
Parts (ii) and (iii): Applying Cramer’s rule to first order conditions (2.6) and (2.7) yields
di1
dθ
=
f2(i1, i2) f12(i1, i2)− f1(i1, i2) f22(i1, i2)
θ [ f11 f22− f 212]
> 0
di2
dθ
=
f1(i1, i2) f12(i1, i2)− f2(i1, i2) f11(i1, i2)
θ [ f11 f22− f 212]
> 0,
where these effects can be signed using Assumption 1. These imply that the final human capital
level, h3, is increasing in θ .
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Part (i): The difference between marginal returns to early investment and the return to sav-
ings is immediate from Equation (2.8).
Consider the effects of parental income on the marginal value of investment, ∂h3∂ i1 = θ f1(i1, i2).
Differentiating f1(i1, i2) with respect to Y at an optimum yields:
d f1(i1, i2)
dY
= f11
di1
dY
+ f12
di2
dY
=
[
νu′′(c)
[u′(c)]2B
][
f11(i1, i2) f22(i1, i2)− f 212(i1, i2)
]
/∆,
where ∆ =
[
ν2u′′(c)
[u′(c)]3B
]
f22 +β 2θ [ f11 f22− f 212] > 0 by Assumption 1. d f1(i1,i2)dY has the opposite
sign as ν , because the second term in brackets is positive by Assumption 2.1.
Parts (ii) and (iii): We can determine the effects of Y on child investments from first order
conditions (2.7) and (2.8) using Cramer’s rule:
di1
dY
=
[
νu′′(c)
[u′(c)]2B
]
f22(i1, i2)/∆
di2
dY
=
[−νu′′(c)
[u′(c)]2B
]
f12(i1, i2)/∆.
If investment has no consumption value (i.e. ν = 0), then investments are independent of
parental income Y . Otherwise, the effects of parental income on investments depend on whether
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investment has a positive (i.e. ν > 0) or negative (i.e. ν < 0) consumption value and, in the case
of second period investment, the complementarity of early and late investments f12(i1, i2).
Part (iv): The effect of parental income on final human capital levels is given by
dh3
dY
= θ
[
f1
di1
dY
+ f2
di2
dY
]
= θ
[
νu′′(c)
[u′(c)]2B
]
[ f1(i1, i2) f22(i1, i2)− f2(i1, i2) f12(i1, i2)]/∆,
which has the same sign as ν , because the second term in brackets is negative by Assumption
2.1.
A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
When the return to investment is realized after all investments have been made, we can combine
the period 1 and 2 budget constraints:
(
c1+R−1c2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡c
+
(
i1+R−1i2
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡e
+R−1a3 ≤ Y.
Notice that only discounted lifetime income Y enters the budget constraint, so the timing of
income, y1 and y2, is irrelevant.
The problem can be decomposed into 3 pieces: investment allocation between periods 1 and
2 (choosing i1 and i2 given e), consumption allocation between periods 1 and 2 (choosing c1
and c2 given c), and portfolio choice between human capital investment and savings (choosing
c, e, and a3). In proving our results, we first show how i1 and i2 (and their marginal returns)
depend on the level of total investment spending e = i1 +R−1i2 (and its marginal return) and
then focus on properties of e and its marginal return.
First, consider the investment problem for a given level of total investment expenditure e.
Let g(e) be the maximum f (i1, i2) produced by spending e:
g(e)≡max
i1,i2
{
f (i1, i2)
∣∣∣i1+R−1i2 ≤ e} .
Note that g(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave because f (·) is strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and the constraint set is convex. The first order conditions for i1 and i2,
combined with the envelope condition, are
g′(e) = f1(i1, i2) = R f2(i1, i2), i1+R−1i2 = e. (A.1)
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Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we can determine the effects of e on investments:
di1
de
=
f12− f1f2 f22
2 f12− f2f1 f11−
f1
f2
f22
,
di2
de
=
f1
f2
(
f12− f2f1 f11
)
2 f12− f2f1 f11−
f1
f2
f22
,
where we use the first order condition R = f1/ f2. Both derivatives are strictly positive by As-
sumption 2.1, so spending more on overall education means that both early and late investments
increase. We state this result as a Lemma for future reference.
Lemma A.1 Both early and late investments are strictly increasing in total investment spend-
ing if they are optimally chosen to maximize human capital.
Next, we consider the intertemporal consumption allocation problem. Define the indirect
utility of total consumption spending c on consumption in periods 1 and 2:
U(c)≡max
c1,c2
{
u(c1)+βu(c2)
∣∣∣c1+R−1c2 ≤ c} .
Note that U(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, because u(·) is strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and the constraint set is convex.
Using the indirect functions U(·) and g(·), we can write the saving and human capital
investment problem as follows:
max
e,s
{
U (Y − s)+β 2E
[
u
(
R2(s− e)+θg(e))]} ,
where s = e+R−1a3 is total savings.
The first order conditions are
U ′(c) = (Rβ )2E
[
u′(c3(θ))
]
= β 2E
[
u′(c3(θ))θ
]
g′(e), (A.2)
where c3(θ) = R2(s− e)+θg(e).
Part (i): Combining the first order conditions in (A.2), we get
R2 =
E
[
u′(c3(θ))θ
]
E
[
u′(c3(θ))
] g′(e) = θ¯g′(e)+ Cov(u′(c3(θ)),θ)
E
[
u′(c3(θ))
] g′(e).
Because c3(θ) is strictly increasing in θ and u(·) is strictly concave, the covariance term is
strictly negative. This, combined with Equation (A.1), implies that the expected marginal
returns to i1 and i2 are greater than the returns on savings.
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Parts (ii) and (iii): We first study how the portfolio choice between the safe asset a3 and
the risky human capital investment e is affected by total savings s. Specifically, we show
that optimal total investment e is increasing in total savings s under decreasing absolute risk
aversion. We then show that total savings s is increasing in lifetime parental income Y .
Optimal human capital investment for a given s solves
eˆ(s)≡ argmax
e
E
[
u
(
R2(s− e)+θg(e))].
Because the objective function is strictly concave in e, the Implicit Function Theorem reveals
that the sign of eˆ′(s) is equal to the sign of
∂ 2
∂e∂ s
(
E
[
u
(
R2(s− e)+θg(e))])∣∣∣∣
e=eˆ(s)
=E
[
u′′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+θg(eˆ(s)))(−R2+θg′(eˆ(s)))R2].
With decreasing absolute risk aversion, this term is strictly positive and eˆ′(s)> 0. To see this,
let θˆ = R2/g′
(
eˆ(s)
)
, so
E
[
u′′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+θg(eˆ(s)))(−R2+θg′(eˆ(s)))R2]
=R2
∫ [u′′(R2(s− eˆ(s))+θg(eˆ(s)))
u′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+θg(eˆ(s)))
]
u′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+θg(eˆ(s)))(−R2+θg′(eˆ(s)))dΦ(θ)
>R2
[
u′′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+ θˆg(eˆ(s)))
u′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+ θˆg(eˆ(s)))
]{∫
θ≤θˆ
u′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+θg(eˆ(s)))(−R2+θg′(eˆ(s)))dΦ(θ)
+
∫
θ≥θˆ
u′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+θg(eˆ(s)))(−R2+θg′(eˆ(s)))dΦ(θ)}
=R2
[
u′′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+ θˆg(eˆ(s)))
u′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+ θˆg(eˆ(s)))
]
E
[
u′
(
R2(s− eˆ(s))+θg(eˆ(s)))(−R2+θg′(eˆ(s)))]= 0,
where the inequality used the assumption that u′′(·)/u′(·) is increasing.
Next, we show that total savings s is increasing with Y . Define the value of total savings s:
V (s)≡ E
[
max
e,a
{
u
(
R2a+θg(e)
)∣∣∣e+a≤ s}],
and let aˆ(s)≡ s− eˆ(s) reflect the optimal investment in the safe asset conditional on s. V (s) is
strictly increasing and strictly concave, because u(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in (a,e) and the constraint set is convex.
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Optimal total savings sˆ(Y ) for a given income Y solves
sˆ(Y )≡ argmax
s
{
U(Y − s)+β 2V (s)
}
.
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the first order condition for this problem yields
sˆ′(Y ) =
U ′′
(
Y − sˆ(Y ))
U ′′
(
Y − sˆ(Y ))+β 2V ′′(sˆ(Y )) > 0,
because both U(·) and V (·) are strictly concave.
With decreasing absolute risk aversion, both sˆ(Y ) and eˆ(s) are strictly increasing, so e is
strictly increasing in Y . From (A.1), expected marginal returns to investment are equal to
the expected marginal return to total investment spending: θ¯ f1(i1, i2) = θ¯R f2(i1, i2) = θ¯g′(e).
This implies that the expected marginal returns to investment are strictly decreasing in Y (with
decreasing absolute risk aversion), because g(·) is strictly concave.
A.2.4 Proof of Lemma 2.1
We first show the properties of iˆ2(zi1,θ). The first order condition is:
θ f2
(
zi1, iˆ2(zi1,θ)
)
= R.
By applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we get the partial derivatives:
∂ iˆ2(zi1,θ ,z)
∂θ
=
f2
−θ f22 > 0,
∂ iˆ2(zi1,θ ,z)
∂ (zi1)
=
f12
− f22 ≥ 0 if and only if f12 ≥ 0. (A.3)
Then the partial derivatives of Π(i1,θ ,z) are
∂Π(i1,θ ,z)
∂ i1
=−1+R−2zθ f1,
∂ 2Π(i1,θ ,z)
∂ i21
=R−2zθ
(
f11z+ f12
∂ iˆ2(zi1,θ)
∂ i1
)
=−R−2z2θ
(
f11 f22− f 212
− f22
)
< 0.
A.2.5 Proof of Lemma 2.2
The cross-partial derivative is
∂ 2Π(i1,θ ,z)
∂ i1∂ z
=R−2θ
(
f1+ z f11i1+ z f12
∂ iˆ2(zi1,θ)
∂ z
)
= R−2θ
{
f1−
(
f11 f22− f 212
− f22
)
zi1
}
,
126
which is positive if and only if Condition 2.1 holds.
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition 2.4
See Hartman (1976) for proof.
A.2.7 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Part (i): A first order stochastic dominance shift in z will increase i˜1 if ∂Π(i1,θ ,z)/∂ i1 is
increasing in z. For the CES production function (2.3), the sign of ∂ 2Π(i1,z)/(∂ i1∂ z) is deter-
mined by the sign of
b
(
1−d
1−b
)
(1−a)1−b(zi1)1−bi2+a1−bd(zi1)i1−b2 ,
which is positive if b≥ 0.
Part (ii): A mean-preserving spread in z reduces i˜1 if ∂Π(i1,θ ,z)/∂ i1 is concave in z. For
the CES production function (2.3), the sign of ∂ 3Π(i1,z)/(∂ i1∂ 2z) depends on the sign of
−
{
b
(
1−d
1−b
)2( a
1−a
)b−1(zi1
i2
)−b
+d
(
a
1−a
)1−b(zi1
i2
)b
+
(
1−d
1−b
)(
1−d
1−b − (1−2d)
)}
,
which is negative if b≥ 0.
A.2.8 Proof of Corollary 2.1
Follows directly from Lemma 2.1 and Propositions 2.4 and 2.5.
A.2.9 Proof of Proposition 2.6
Part (i): Follows from Lemma 2.1 and Lemma 2.2.
Part (ii): x˜ ≤ x and h˜2 ≤ h∗2 follows immediately from x˜ j = w j i˜1 and h˜2 = zi˜1. h˜2 ≤ h∗2 also
implies h˜3 ≤ h∗3. To show this, we differentiate h˜3 with respect to h˜2 to get
dh˜3
dh˜2
=
d
dh˜2
(
θ f
(
h˜2, iˆ2(h˜2,θ)
))
= θ
(
f1+ f2
∂ iˆ2(h˜2,θ)
∂ h˜2
)
= θ
(
f1− f2 f12f22
)
> 0,
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where we use Equation (A.3), and the inequality holds by Assumption 2.1. We state this result
for future reference.
Lemma A.2 θ f
(
h2, iˆ2(h2,θ)
)
is strictly increasing in h2.
Next, the marginal return to early investment zθ f1
(
zi˜1, iˆ2(zi˜1,θ)
)
is strictly decreasing in
i˜1 by Lemma 2.1. So we have
zθ f1
(
zi˜1, iˆ2(zi˜1,θ)
)≥ zθ f1(zi∗1, iˆ2(zi∗1,θ))= R2
if and only if i˜1 ≤ i∗1.
A.2.10 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Because i˜1 depends only on z˜, i˜1 = i∗1 holds when z˜ = z. From the conditional demand function
x˜ j = w˜ j i˜1 = w˜ ji∗1, we can see that x˜ j ≤ x∗j if and only if w˜ j ≤ w j. h˜2 < h∗2 directly follows
from i˜1 = i∗1 and the definition of optimization, but we explicitly prove this by showing that
τ(w˜)< 1.
τ(w˜)φ =
n
∑
j=1
w j
(
w˜ j
w j
)φ
<
(
n
∑
j=1
w j
(
w˜ j
w j
))φ
=
n
∑
j=1
w˜ j = 1,
where the inequality holds due to Jensen’s inequality and φ ∈ (0,1).
As shown in Lemma A.2, h˜2 < h∗2 also implies h˜3 < h
∗
3.
Finally, the marginal return to i1 can be written as
zτ(w˜)θ f1
(
h˜2, iˆ2(h˜2,θ)
)
= zτ(w˜)θ f1
(
zτ(w˜)i∗1, iˆ2
(
zτ(w˜)i∗1,θ
))
.
Because zτ(w˜) < z, this quantity is smaller than R2 = zθ f1
(
zi∗1, iˆ2(zi
∗
1,θ)
)
if Condition 2.1
holds for all values of productivity z′ between zτ(w˜) and z (Lemma 2.2).
A.2.11 Simplifying Condition 2.2
Condition 2 simplifies nicely if borrowing constraints are non-binding throughout adulthood
and the consumption intertemporal elasticity of substitution is constant. Notice that when
constraints are non-binding, we can write V (a,h) = v(Ra+χh) where
v(z) = max
c3,...,cT
T
∑
j=3
β j−3u(c j) subject to
T
∑
j=3
R3− jc j = z. (A.4)
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With u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , it is straightforward to show that v(z) =Ψ
z1−σ
1−σ whereΨ is a positive constant
that depends on β , R and T .
With these assumptions, Condition 2.2 can be re-written as:
f12 f
f1 f2
>−v
′′(−RL2+χh3)χ2h3
v′(−RL2+χh3)χ =
σχh3
−RL2+χh3 .
Taking the inverse of both sides produces the simplified condition in the text.
A.2.12 Properties of V (a3,h3)
Individuals entering adulthood with human capital h3 and assets a3 allocate consumption and
saving across their remaining life in the following way:
V (a3,h3) = max
c3,...,cT ,a4,...aT
T
∑
j=3
β j−3u(c j),
subject to budget constraints a j+1 = Ra j +h3Γ j− c j for j ∈ {3, ...,T}, borrowing constraints
a j+1 ≥ −L j for j ∈ {3, ...,T − 1}, and aT+1 = 0. Let {cˆ j(a3,h3)}Tj=3 and {aˆ j(a3,h3)}Tj=4 be
the solution to the problem. We sometimes omit the arguments of the policy functions in order
to simplify notations.
The value function can be rewritten as:
V (a3,h3) = u(Ra3+Γ3− aˆ4(a3,h3))+
T
∑
j=4
β j−3u(Raˆ j(a3,h3)+h3Γ j− aˆ j+1(a3,h3)).
Differentiate this with respect to initial human capital level, h3:
V2(a3,h3) =
T
∑
j=3
β j−3u′(cˆ j)Γ j+
T−1
∑
j=3
β j−3
∂ aˆ j+1
∂h3
[βRu′(cˆ j+1)−u′(cˆ j)] =
T
∑
j=3
β j−3u′(cˆ j)Γ j > 0,
where the second equality uses the fact that
∂ aˆ j+1
∂h3
[βRu′(cˆ j+1)−u′(cˆ j)] = 0.
This follows from the FOC: when the borrowing constraint binds, the derivative ∂ aˆ j+1∂h3 is zero;
and when it does not bind, the Euler equation is zero.
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Differentiating V2 with respect to the initial asset level, a3, yields:
V21(a3,h3) =
T
∑
j=3
β j−3Γ ju′′(cˆ j)
∂ cˆ j
∂a3
.
If optimal consumption in every period increases with an increase in initial assets, then ∂ cˆ j∂a3 ≥ 0
and V21 ≤ 0 given strict concavity of u(·). If ∂ cˆ j∂a3 > 0 for at least one j ∈ {3, ...T}, then V21 < 0.
We have two cases:
I. Suppose no borrowing constraint ever binds. In this case, we can rewrite V (a3,h3) as
v(ra3+ χh3), where v is defined above. All of the proofs carry through with V21 = χv′′,
V22 = χ2v′′ and V2 = χv′.
II. Let jb ∈ {3, ...,T −1} be the first period that any borrowing constraint binds, i.e. a jb+1 =
−L jb . In this case, as soon as the constraint binds, an increase in initial assets has no
impact on consumption, ∂ cˆ j∂a3 = 0, j ∈ { jb + 1, ...,T}. Prior to the binding constraint,
the increase in initial assets is spread across periods, strictly increasing consumption in
all, ∂ cˆ j∂a3 > 0, j ∈ {3, ..., jb}. This must be the case in order for the Euler equations to
hold in all periods: u′(c j) = βRu′(c j+1), j ∈ {3, ..., jb−1}. If any c j increases, they all
must. Note that even if the constraint immediately binds, the increase in initial assets
will increase consumption in period 3, and therefore (minimally) ∂ cˆ j∂a3 > 0, so V21 < 0.
In a similar fashion:
V22(a3,h3) =
T
∑
j=3
β j−3Γ ju′′(cˆ j)
∂ cˆ j
∂ (h3)
< 0.
Here, if an individual is constrained in a period and the Euler equation does not hold with
equality, the fact that income rises due to the increase in h3 implies that consumption will
rise as well. Again, if the individual faces no future constraints we can rewrite V (a3,h3) as
v(ra3+χh3). All of the proofs carry through with the V21 = χv′′, V22 = χ2v′′ and V2 = χv′.
A.2.13 Proof of Proposition 2.8
Combining FOCs for assets we have:
u′(c1)≥ (βR) j−1u′(c j), j ∈ {2,3, ...T}, (A.5)
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where inequalities are strict when the relevant borrowing constraint binds. We can write this
as:
u′(c j)≤ (βR)1− ju′(c1), j ∈ {2,3, ...T}. (A.6)
Part (i): Using equations (2.15) and (A.6) we have:
u′(c1) = β 2θ f1(i1, i2)
[
T
∑
j=3
β j−3Γ ju′(c j)
]
≤ β 2θ f1(i1, i2)
[
T
∑
j=3
β j−3Γ ju′(c1)(βR)1− j
]
,
which implies θχ f1(i1, i2) ≥ R2, with strict inequality if any borrowing constraint binds, and
equality if no borrowing constraint binds.
We next prove i˜1 ≤ i∗1. Towards a contradiction, suppose i˜1 > i∗1 and let h˜3 = θ f (i˜1, i˜2) and
h∗3 = θ f (i
∗
1, i
∗
2). Then the followings hold.
Claim 1: h˜3 ≥ h∗3.
h˜3 < h∗3, together with i˜1 > i
∗
1, implies f1(i˜1, i˜2) < R f2(i˜1, i˜2), which contradicts the first or-
der condition f1(i˜1, i˜2) ≥ R f2(i˜1, i˜2). To show this, let
(
i1(h3), i2(h3)
)
be the cost-minimizing
investment profile to produce h3 units of human capital. That is,(
i1(h3), i2(h3)
)≡ argmin
i1,i2
{
i1+R−1i2|θ f (i1, i2)≥ h3
}
.
By Assumption 2.1, both i1(h3) and i2(h3) are strictly increasing in h3 (dual of Lemma A.1).
So h˜3 < h∗3 implies i1(h˜3)< i1(h
∗
3) = i
∗
1 and we have i1(h˜3)< i˜1 by the assumption i
∗
1 < i˜1. Both
investment profiles
(
i1(h˜3), i2(h˜3)
)
and (i˜1, i˜2) produce the same amount of human capital h˜3,
but the former is efficient (because it achieves the minimum cost by definition) while the latter
uses too much i1 and too little i2 compared to the former. Because the isoquant is strictly convex
(Assumption 2.1 implies strict quasi-concavity of f (·), which in turn implies strict convexity
of the isoquant), the movement along the isoquant in the direction of higher i1 and lower i2
decreases the marginal rate of technical substitution:
R =
f1
(
i1(h˜3), i2(h˜3)
)
f2
(
i1(h˜3), i2(h˜3)
) > f1(i˜1, i˜2)
f2(i˜1, i˜2)
.
The inequality f1(i˜1, i˜2)<R f2(i˜1, i˜2) contradicts the first order condition f1(i˜1, i˜2)≥R f2(i˜1, i˜2),
so it must be h˜3 ≥ h∗3 if i˜1 > i∗1.
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Claim 2: i˜2 ≥ i∗2.
First, by Claim 1, h˜3 ≥ h∗3 and this implies i2(h˜3) ≥ i2(h∗3) = i∗2 (Lemma A.1). Second, the
first order condition f1(i˜1, i˜2) ≥ R f2(i˜1, i˜2) implies i˜1 ≤ i1(h˜3) and i˜2 ≥ i2(h˜3) due to the strict
convexity of the isoquant. From these two inequalities, we get i˜2 ≥ i∗2.
Combining Claim 1 and Claim 2 together, we have i˜1 > i∗1 and i˜2 ≥ i∗2. This means that
the income-maximizing investment (i∗1, i
∗
2) is affordable, but not chosen by the individual. This
contradicts the assumption that (i˜1, i˜2) solves the individual’s problem. For example, reducing
investment to (i∗1, i
∗
2) and saving the rest to increase only the period 3 consumption is a better
strategy, because over-investing in human capital makes the return lower than the return to
savings. Thus, if i˜1 is the optimal early investment, then it must be smaller than i∗1.
Next, we show that i˜1 ≤ i∗1 implies h˜3 ≤ h∗3. Let hˆ3(i1) ≡ θ f
(
i1, iˆ2(i1,θ)
)
be the uncon-
strained optimum human capital conditional on i1, where iˆ2(·) is defined in (2.9). By Lemma
A.2, i˜1 ≤ i∗1 implies hˆ3(i˜1)≤ hˆ3(i∗1) = h∗3. Moreover, h˜3 ≤ hˆ3(i˜1) holds because, conditional on
i1, over-investing in i2 is never optimal (i˜2 ≤ iˆ2(i˜1,θ)). From these two inequalities, we have
h˜3 ≤ h∗3.
We have proved that i˜1 ≤ i∗1 and h˜3 ≤ h∗3 when f1(i˜1, i˜2) ≥ R f2(i˜1, i˜2). We next show that
when some constraints are binding, the inequalities are strict, i.e. i˜1 < i∗1 and h˜3 < h
∗
3. Suppose
that θχ f1(i˜1, i˜2)> R2 = θχ f1(i∗1, i
∗
2) but i˜1 = i
∗
1. Obviously, the inequality f1(i˜1, i˜2)> f1(i
∗
1, i
∗
2)
cannot hold when f12 = 0. When f12 > 0, the inequality implies i˜2 > i∗2, which is a contradiction
because this, together with i˜1 = i∗1, means h˜3 > h
∗
3. When f12 < 0, the inequality implies
i˜2 < i∗2, which in turn implies f1(i˜1, i˜2)< R f2(i˜1, i˜2) due to the strict convexity of the isoquant.
This contradicts the first order condition f1(i˜1, i˜2)≥ R f2(i˜1, i˜2). Thus, it must be i˜1 < i∗1 when
θχ f1(i˜1, i˜2)> R2. In this case, h˜3 < h∗3 also holds because hˆ3(i1) is strictly increasing in i1.
Part (ii): By Part (i), when any borrowing contraint binds, i˜1 < i∗1 and h˜3 < h
∗
3. (a) If the
period one constraint does not bind, f1(i˜1, i˜2) = R f2(i˜1, i˜2), so i˜1 = i1(h˜3) and i˜2 = i2(h˜3) hold.
By Lemma A.1, i˜2 = i2(h˜3)< i2(h
∗
3)= i
∗
2. (b) If f12 > 0, i˜1 < i
∗
1 implies iˆ2(i˜1,θ)< iˆ2(i
∗
1,θ)= i
∗
2.
Because i˜2 ≤ iˆ2(i˜1,θ) always holds, we get i˜2 < i∗2.
Part (iii): A similar analysis to Part (i) shows that θχ f2(i1, i2) ≥ R, with strict inequality if
any borrowing constraint in period 2 or later binds, and equality otherwise.
A.2.14 Proof of Proposition 2.9
In the decision problem described in Section 2.8, substitute in for V (a3,h3) using equation
(2.14) and in for c1 and c2 using the budget constraints in equation (2.5).
132
Part I: Assuming this person is constrained as an old child, let a3 = −L2 and re-write the
decision problem as:
max
i1,i2,a2
u(y1− i1−a2)+βu(Ra2+ y2− i2+L2)+β 2V (−RL2,θ f (i1, i2)).
First order conditions for i1, i2 and a2 are:
−u′(c1)+β 2V2(−RL2,θ f (i1, i2))θ f1(i1, i2) = 0 (A.7)
−βu′(c2)+β 2V2(−RL2,θ f (i1, i2))θ f2(i1, i2) = 0 (A.8)
−u′(c1)+βRu′(c2) = 0. (A.9)
Together, these first order conditions imply f1 = R f2 at an optimum. Using this with Cramer’s
rule yields (dropping arguments of f (·) and V (−RL2, ·) for expositional purposes):
∂ i1
∂y1
=
Rβ 3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)θV2(R f22− f12)
∆2
> 0,
∂ i2
∂y1
=
Rβ 3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)θV2( f11−R f12)
∆2
> 0,
∂ i1
∂y2
= R−1 ∂ i1∂y1 and
∂ i2
∂y2
= R−1 ∂ i2∂y1 , where
∆2 ≡ β 4V2θ 2[u′′(c1)+βR2u′′(c2)][V2( f11 f22− f 212)+V22θ( f 21 f22+ f 22 f11−2 f1 f2 f12)]
+β 3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)V2θ( f11+R2 f22−2R f12)< 0. (A.10)
All of these expressions are signed using assumptions on V, Assumption 2.1 and f1 = R f2.
Finally, ∂h3∂y j = f1
∂ i1
∂y j
+ f2
∂ i2
∂y j
> 0 for j = 1,2, because all terms in this expression are strictly
positive; ∂h3∂y1 = R
∂h3
∂y2
follows directly from the fact that ∂ i j∂y1 = R
∂ i j
∂y2
for j = 1,2.
Part II: Let a2 = −L1. With no future constraints, we can rewrite the continuation value
V (a,h) = v(Ra+χh) as defined in equation (A.4). Substitute this into the problem:
max
i1,i2,a3
u(y1− i1+L1)+βu(−RL1+ y2− i2−a3)+β 2v(Ra3+χθ f (i1, i2)),
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where χ > 0 is defined above. First order conditions for i1, i2 and a3 are:
−u′(c1)+β 2v′(Ra3+χθ f (i1, i2))χθ f1(i1, i2) = 0
−βu′(c2)+β 2v′(Ra3+χθ f (i1, i2))χθ f2(i1, i2) = 0
−βu′(c2)+β 2Rv′(Ra3+χθ f (i1, i2)) = 0.
Combining first order conditions, we have χθ f2 = R. However, f1 > R f2 = R2/(χθ) because
L1 binds (see Proposition 2.8).
Cramer’s rule yields (dropping arguments of f (·) and v(·)):
∂ i1
∂y1
=
β 3u′′(c1)v′χθ f22[u′′(c2)+βR2v′′]
∆1
> 0
∂ i1
∂y2
=
−β 5Ru′′(c2)v′v′′χ2θ 2 f1 f22
∆1
< 0
∂ i2
∂y1
=
−β 3u′′(c1)v′χθ f12[u′′(c2)+βR2v′′]
∆1
∂ i2
∂y2
=
β 5Ru′′(c2)v′v′′χ2θ 2 f1 f12
∆1
where
∆1 ≡ β 3u′′(c1)v′[u′′(c2)+βR2v′′]χθ f22+β 5u′′(c2)v′v′′χ3θ 3 f 21 f22
+β 5[u′′(c2)+βR2v′′](v′)2χ2θ 2[ f11 f22− f 212]< 0 (A.11)
by Assumption 2.1. Clearly, ∂ i2∂y1 > 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0, and
∂ i2
∂y2
< 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0. Because
∂h3
∂y j
= f1
∂ i1
∂y j
+ f2
∂ i2
∂y j
for j = 1,2, Assumption 2.1 implies that ∂h3∂y1 > 0 and
∂h3
∂y2
< 0.
Part III: Because we are assuming this person is constrained in both childhood periods, let
a2 =−L1 and a3 =−L2. The decision problem can be written as:
max
i1,i2
u(y1− i1+L1)+βu(−RL1+ y2− i2+L2)+β 2V (−RL2,θ f (i1, i2)).
The first order conditions for i1 and i2 are given by equations (A.7) and (A.8), where c1 =
y1− i1+L1 and c2 =−RL1+ y2− i2+L2.
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Cramer’s rule yields (dropping arguments of f (·) and V (−RL2, ·)):
∂ i1
∂y1
=
βu′′(c1)[u′′(c2)+βV2θ f22+βV22θ 2 f 22 ]
∆12
> 0
∂ i1
∂y2
=
−β 3u′′(c2)θ [V2 f12+V22θ f1 f2]
∆12
∂ i2
∂y1
=
−β 2u′′(c1)θ [V2 f12+V22θ f1 f2]
∆12
∂ i2
∂y2
=
βu′′(c2)θ [u′′(c1)+β 2V2θ f11+β 2V22θ f 21 ]
∆12
> 0
where
∆12 ≡ βu′′(c1)u′′(c2)+β 2V2θ [u′′(c1) f22+βu′′(c2) f11]+β 2V22θ 2[u′′(c1) f 22 +βu′′(c2) f 21 ]
+β 4(V2)2θ 2( f11 f22− f 212)+β 4V2V22θ 3[ f2( f2 f11− f1 f12)+ f1( f1 f22− f2 f12)]> 0.(A.12)
Assumptions on V (·, ·) and Assumption 2.1 ensure that ∂ i1∂y1 ,
∂ i2
∂y2
, and ∆12 are strictly positive.
Both ∂ i1∂y2 and
∂ i2
∂y1
are strictly positive if and only if Condition 2.2 holds. Using these results for
investments, Assumption 2.1 implies that ∂h3∂y j > 0 for j = 1,2.
A.2.15 Proof of Proposition 2.10
Part (i): Based on the problem discussed in the proof of Proposition 2.9 part (I), we can
apply Cramer’s rule obtaining:
∂ i1
∂L2
=
β 4RV2V21θ 2 f2[u′′(c1)+βR2u′′(c2)]( f1 f22− f12)+β 3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)V2θ(R f22− f12)
∆2
> 0
∂ i2
∂L2
=
β 4RV2V21θ 2 f2[u′′(c1)+βR2u′′(c2)]( f11−R f12)+β 3u′′(c1)u′′(c2)V2θ( f11−R f12)
∆2
> 0,
where ∆2 < 0 is defined previously by equation (A.10). All three of these expressions are signed
using assumptions on V, Assumption 2.1 and f1 = R f2. Finally,
∂h3
∂L2
= f1
∂ i1
∂L2
+ f2
∂ i2
∂L2
> 0,
because all terms in this expression are positive.
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Part (ii): Based on the problem used in the proof of Proposition 2.9 part (III), Cramer’s rule
yields:
∂ i1
∂L2
=
β 4RV2V21θ 2( f1 f22− f2 f12)+β 3Ru′′(c2)V21θ f1−β 3u′′(c2)θ(V2 f12+θV22 f1 f2)
∆12
∂ i2
∂L2
=
βu′′(c2)[u′′(c1)+β 2V2θ f11+β 2V22θ 2 f 21 ]+β
2Ru′′(c1)V21θ f2+β 4RV2V21θ 2( f2 f11− f1 f12)
∆12
> 0,
where ∆12 > 0 is defined previously by equation (A.12). Using assumptions on V, and As-
sumption 2.1, it is clear that ∂ i1∂L2 > 0 if Condition 1 holds, and that
∂ i2
∂L2
> 0. Assumption 2.1
further implies that ∂h3∂L2 = f1
∂ i1
∂L2
+ f2
∂ i2
∂L2
> 0.
A.2.16 Proof of Proposition 2.11
Part (i): Based on the problem discussed in the proof of Proposition 2.9 part (II), we can
apply Cramer’s rule obtaining:
∂ i1
∂L1
=
f22
{
β 3u′′(c1)v′χθ [u′′(c2)+βR2v′′]+β 5R2u′′(c2)v′v′′χ2θ 2 f1
}
∆1
> 0
∂ i2
∂L1
=
− f12
{
β 3u′′(c1)v′χθ [u′′(c2)+βR2v′′]+β 5R2u′′(c2)v′v′′χ2θ 2 f1
}
∆1
where ∆1 < 0 is defined previously by equation (A.11). Clearly, ∂ i2∂L1 > 0 ⇐⇒ f12 > 0. Finally,
∂h3
∂L2
= f1
∂ i1
∂L2
+ f2
∂ i2
∂L2
> 0 by Assumption 2.1.
Part (ii): Based on the problem used in the proof of Proposition 2.9 part (III), Cramer’s rule
yields:
∂ i1
∂L1
=
βu′′(c1)[u′′(c2)+βV2θ f22+βV22θ 2 f 22 ]+β
3Ru′′(c2)θ [V2 f12+V22θ f1 f2]
∆12
∂ i2
∂L1
=
−βRu′′(c2)[u′′(c1)+β 2V2θ f11+β 2V22θ 2 f 21 ]−β 2u′′(c1)θ [V2 f12+V22θ f1 f2]
∆12
where ∆12 > 0 is defined previously by equation (A.12). Assumptions on V, and Assumption
2.1 imply that ∂ i1∂L1 < 1. If Condition 2.2 does not hold, then V2 f12 +V22θ f1 f2 < 0, which
implies that ∂ i1∂L1 > 0 and
∂ i2
∂L1
< 0.
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Appendix B
Chapter 3 Appendix
B.1 Proofs and Analytical Details
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
I prove Proposition 3.1 in two steps. First, I analyze the youth’s problem conditional on parental
transfers. Second, I analyze the parents’ problem. Combining theses two results completes the
proof.
Throughout this section, I assume that the choice set of schooling is S = [0,TR], and that
family characteristics are (W,δ ,a) ∈W ×D×A for some interval W ,D ,A in R++.
Youth’s Problem
I analyze youth’s behavior conditional on parental transfers B≥ 0. The following lemma char-
acterizes the schooling and borrowing decision of unconstrained youth.
Lemma B.1 If (BC) does not bind, then (i) schooling is nondecreasing in a, and independent
of B, (ii) debt at the end of schooling is nondecreasing in a and nonincreasing in B.
Proof When (BC) does not bind, youth first maximize lifetime income and then fully smooth
consumption over their life cycle. Since ρ = r, a constant path of consumption maximizes
utility.
Schooling The lifetime wealth of youth with parental transfers B, ability a, and schooling s
is B+ e−rsY (s,a)−P(s), where P(s) = ∫ s0 e−rt p(t)dt. Since B is additively separable, wealth-
maximizing schooling does depend only on ability. Define the net lifetime earnings of youth
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with (s,a):
F (s,a) = e−rsY (s,a)−P(s).
Let s∗(a) be the schooling that maximizes lifetime wealth. s∗(a) is nondecreasing in a if a
family of functions {F (·,a)}a∈A obeys single crossing differences (Milgrom and Shannon,
1994), that is, for all s′′ > s′ and a′′ > a′,
F (s′′,a′)−F (s′,a′)≥ (>)0⇒F (s′′,a′′)−F (s′,a′′)≥ (>)0. (B.1)
To show this condition holds, note that F (s′′,a)−F (s′,a) = ∫ s′′s′ ∂F (s,a)∂ s ds. Its derivative
with respect to a is
∂
∂a
[F (s′′,a)−F (s′,a)] =
∫ s′′
s′
∂ 2F (s,a)
∂ s∂a
ds
=
∫ s′′
s′
e−rs[Ysa(s,a)− rYa(s,a)]ds
≥
∫ s′′
s′
e−rs
∂ lnY (s,a)
∂a
[Ys(s,a)− rY (s,a)]ds
(
∵ ∂
2 lnY (s,a)
∂ s∂a
≥ 0
)
≥∂ lnY (s
′,a)
∂a
∫ s′′
s′
e−rs[Ys(s,a)− rY (s,a)]ds
(
∵ ∂
2 lnY (s,a)
∂ s∂a
≥ 0
)
≥∂ lnY (s
′,a)
∂a
∫ s′′
s′
∂F (s,a)
∂ s
ds (∵ p(s)≥ 0)
≥∂ lnY (s
′,a)
∂a
[F (s′′,a)−F (s′,a)].
This implies that F (s′′,a)−F (s′,a) is increasing in a whenever it is positive. Thus, the
condition (B.1) is satisfied.
For a′ < a′′, let s′ ∈ s∗(a′) and s′′ ∈ s∗(a′′). I want to show that min{s′,s′′} ∈ s∗(a′) and
max{s′,s′′} ∈ s∗(a′′) so that s∗(a′′)≥ s∗(a′) (in the strong set order). This is satisfied if s′ ≤ s′′.
It remains to show this for the case s′ > s′′. Since s′ ∈ s∗(a′), we have F (s′,a′) ≥F (s′′,a′).
By single crossing differences,F (s′,a′′)≥F (s′′,a′′), which implies s′ ∈ s∗(a′′). Furthermore,
F (s′,a′) = F (s′′,a′) should hold so that s′′ ∈ s∗(a′). If not, F (s′,a′) > F (s′′,a′), which
implies thatF (s′,a′′)>F (s′′,a′′), contradicting the assumption that s′′ ∈ s∗(a′′).
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Borrowing From (3.2), the amount of debt at the end of schooling can be derived as follows:
D(s) =
(
D(0)+
∫ s
0
(ck(t)+ p(t))exp
(
−
∫ t
0
rdt ′
)
dt
)
exp
(∫ s
0
rdt
)
=ers
(
−B+
∫ s
0
e−rt(ck(t)+ p(t))dt
)
.
For unconstrained youth who attain unconstrained optimal schooling, the constant flow of con-
sumption is
ck(t) =
B+ e−rs∗(a)Y (s∗(a),a)−P(s∗(a))
Λ(Tk)
.
Since y(s,a,x) is strictly increasing in a, e−rsY (s,a)− P(s) is also strictly increasing in a.
Therefore, ck(t) is also strictly increasing in a.
The debt at the end of schooling is
ers
∗(a)
{
−B+Λ(s∗(a))
(
B+ e−rs∗(a)Y (s∗(a),a)−P(s∗(a))
Λ(Tk)
)
+P(s∗(a))
}
. (B.2)
Since Λ(s∗(a)) and P(s∗(a)) are nondecreasing in a and ck(t) is strictly increasing in a, higher
ability youth borrow more.
Moreover, by differentiating (B.2) with respect to B, we get
ers
∗(a)
{
−1+ Λ(s
∗(a))
Λ(Tk)
}
< 0.
Thus, youth with higher parental transfers borrow less.
Next, I consider the case where (BC) binds. I first state a condition that is important for the
effects of ability.
Condition B.1
σ ≤
Ysa(s,a)
Ya(s,a)
− r
Ys(s,a)
Y (s,a)−D +
e−rTk∫ Tk
s e−rtdt
.
Lemma B.2 If (BC) binds, then condition (3.3) holds as a strict inequality and schooling is
(i) nondecreasing in a if Condition B.1 holds, and (ii) nondecreasing in B.
Proof When (BC) binds for a given level of schooling, consumption exhibits a jump as fol-
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lows:
ck(t) =

B−P(s)+e−rsD
Λ(s) for t < s
Y (s,a)−D
Λ(Tk−s) for t ≥ s
.
Let ck,0 and ck,1 be the consumption during and after schooling. Then we can write the objective
function of the constrained youth as follows:
F (s,a,B) = Λ(s)u(ck,0)+ e−rsΛ(Tk− s)u(ck,1).
The first order condition for s is
Fs(s,a,B) =Λ(s)u′(ck,0)
∂ck,0
∂ s
+ e−rsΛ(Tk− s)u′(ck,1)
∂ck,1
∂ s
+ e−rs(u(ck,0)−u(ck,1)) = 0,
where
∂ck,0
∂ s
=− Λ
′(s)
Λ(s)2
(B−P(s)+D)− P
′(s)
Λ(s)
< 0
∂ck,1
∂ s
=
Λ′(Tk− s)
Λ(Tk− s)2 (Y (s,a)−D)+
Ys(s,a)
Λ(Tk− s) .
Deriving Condition (3.3) The first order conditionFs = 0 can be written as
Ys(s,a) =rY (s,a)+ p(s)+
(
u′(ck,0)−u′(ck,1)
u′(ck,1)
)
(rD+ ck,0+ p(s))+
(
u(ck,1)−u(ck,0)
u′(ck,1)
)
− (ck,1− ck,0).
When (BC) binds, ck,0 < ck,1. Thus, u′(ck,0) > u′(ck,1) and u(ck,1)− u(ck,0) > u′(ck,1)(ck,1−
ck,0) hold due to the strict concavity of u(·). This gives the inequality Ys(s,a)> rY (s,a)+ p(s).
Schooling and Ability By differentiatingFs with respect to a, we get
Fsa(s,a,B) =
e−rsu′(ck,1)
Λ(Tk− s)
{
− σ
Y (s,a)−DΛ(Tk− s)Ya(s,a)
(
Λ′(Tk− s)
Λ(Tk− s) (Y (s,a)−D)+Ys(s,a)
)
+
(
Λ′(Tk− s)Ya(s,a)+Λ(Tk− s)Ysa(s,a)
)−Ya(s,a)}. (B.3)
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Schooling is nondecreasing in ability ifFsa ≥ 0. This condition holds if and only if
Ysa(s,a)− rYa(s,a)≥ σYa(s,a)
(
re−r(Tk−s)
1− e−r(Tk−s) +
Ys(s,a)
Y (s,a)−D
)
.
Therefore, if Condition (B.1) holds, schooling is nondecreasing in ability.
Schooling and Parental Transfer The derivative ofFs(s,a,B) with respect to B is
FsB(s,a,B) =−u′′(ck,0) 1Λ(s)
(
Λ′(s)
Λ(s)
(B−P(s)+D)+P′(s)
)
> 0,
which implies that schooling is nondecreasing in B.
Parents’ Problem
Let sˆ(B,a), cˆk,0(B,a), and cˆk,1(B,a) be the schooling and consumption during and after school
of youth with (B,a). Also let cˆk(B,a) be the minimum cost
cˆk(B,a) = u
−1
(
Λ(sˆ(B,a))
Λ(Tk)
u(cˆk,0(B,a))+
e−rsˆ(B,a)Λ(Tk− sˆ(B,a))
Λ(Tk)
u(cˆk,1(B,a))
)
.
Its derivative with respect to B is
∂ cˆk(B,a)
∂B
=
1
Λ(Tk)
u′(cˆk,0(B,a))
u′(cˆk(B,a))
≥ 1
Λ(Tk)
,
where the inequality is strict if and only if (BC) binds.
The derivative with respect to a is
∂ cˆk(B,a)
∂a
=
e−rsˆ(B,a)
Λ(Tk)
u′(cˆk,1(B,a))
u′(cˆk(B,a))
Ya(sˆ(B,a),a)> 0.
Parental Transfer Write the objective function of the parent with (W,δ ,a) as follows:
F (B,W,δ ,a) = Λ(Tp)v
(
W −B
Λ(Tp)
)
+δΛ(Tk)v(cˆk(B,a)).
The first order condition with respect to B is
FB(B,W,δ ,a) =−v′
(
W −B
Λ(Tp)
)
+δv′(cˆk(B,a))
u′(cˆk,0(B,a))
u′(cˆk(B,a))
= 0.
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The derivatives with respect to w and δ are
FBw(B,W,δ ,a) =− v′′
(
W −B
Λ(Tp)
)
1
Λ(Tp)
> 0,
FBδ (B,W,δ ,a) =v′(cˆk(B,a))
u′(cˆk,0(B,a))
u′(cˆk(B,a))
> 0.
Therefore, Bˆ(W,δ ,a) is nondecreasing in w and δ .
When (BC) does not bind, cˆk,0(B,a) = cˆk(B,a), and the derivative of FB(B,W,δ ,a) with
respect to a is
FBa(B,W,δ ,a) =δv′′(cˆk(B,a))
∂ cˆk(B,a)
∂a
< 0.
When (BC) binds,
FBa(B,W,δ ,a) (B.4)
=
∂
∂a
(
δv′(cˆk(B,a))
u′(cˆk,0(B,a))
u′(cˆk(B,a))
)
=δ cˆk(B,a)
σ−η−1cˆk,0(B,a)−σ−1
{
(σ −η)∂ cˆk(B,a)
∂a
cˆk,0(B,a)−σ
∂ cˆk,0(B,a)
∂a
cˆk(B,a)
}
.
(B.5)
When Condition B.1 is satisfied, ∂ sˆ(B,a)/∂a≥ 0 and ∂ cˆk,0(B,a)/∂a≤ 0, soFBa(B,W,δ ,a)≥
0 if σ ≥ η .
Thus, Bˆ(W,δ ,a) is nonincreasing in a at low levels of a where (BC) does not bind, and
nondecreasing in a at high levels of a where (BC) binds.
Schooling Because sˆ(B,a) is nondecreasing in B and Bˆ(W,δ ,a) is nondecreasing in w and
δ , sˆ(Bˆ(W,δ ,a),a) is nondecreasing in w and δ . sˆ(B,a) is nondecreasing in a. For low levels
of ability where (BC) does not bind, Bˆ(W,δ ,a) is nonincreasing in a but B does not affect s, so
sˆ(Bˆ(W,δ ,a),a) is nondecreasing in a. For high levels of ability where (BC) binds, Bˆ(W,δ ,a)
is nondecreasing in a, so sˆ(Bˆ(W,δ ,a),a) is also nondecreasing in a.
B.1.2 Proof of Corollary 3.1
I first show that the game with one-time transfers and that with two-time transfers lead to
identical equilibrium allocations in terms of schooling and total parental transfers. Then the
comparative statics result is straightforward.
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Equivalence of Equilibrium Allocations
Lemma B.3 Suppose that D = 0 and η ≤ σ . Then sˆ(W,δ ,a) = s˜(W,δ ,a) and Bˆ(W,δ ,a) =
B˜s(W,δ ,a)+ B˜n(W,δ ,a).
Proof Let dp and dk be the debt of the parent and the youth at the end of schooling period. Let
(sˆ, Bˆ) be the equilibrium allocation of the game with one-time transfers and let (cˆp, cˆk,0, cˆk,1) be
the associated flow consumption of the parent and the child. From these allocations, construct
(s˜, B˜s, B˜n, D˜p, D˜k) as follows.
s˜ =sˆ,
B˜s =Λ(sˆ)cˆk,0+P(sˆ),
B˜n =Bˆ− B˜s,
D˜p =B˜s+Λ(sˆ)cˆp−W,
D˜k =0.
The new allocation generates the same consumption path for both the parent and the youth.
Therefore, it maximizes the parent’s utility if it is achievable. Now I show that the youth
does not have an incentive to deviate from the allocation, so this allocation is the equilibrium
allocation. Because the youth cannot borrow, it suffices to show that the youth does not have
an incentive to save (i.e., dk < 0 is not a profitable deviation).
Consider the final stage of the game where (s,Bs,dp,dk) is pre-determined. I first show that
Bn is nondecreasing in dk at the pre-determined allocation (s˜, B˜s, D˜p, D˜k). The parent’s problem
is
max
Bn≥0
{
Λ(Tp)v(cp)+δΛ(Tk)v(ck)
}
,
where
ci =u
−1
(
Λ(s)
Λ(Ti)
u(ci,0)+
e−ρsΛ(Ti− s)
Λ(Ti)
u(ci,1)
)
for i ∈ {p,k},
cp,0 =
W + e−rsdp−Bs
Λ(s)
, ck,0 =
Bs+ e−rsdk−P(s)
Λ(s)
,
cp,1 =
−dp− ersBn
Λ(Tp− s) , ck,1 =
Y (s,a)−dk + ersBn
Λ(Tk− s) .
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The first order condition for Bn is
−v′(cp)
u′(cp,1)
u′(cp)
+δv′(ck)
u′(ck,1)
u′(ck)
≤ 0,
where the inequality is strict (i.e., Bn ≥ 0 binds) if and only if cˆk,0 < cˆk,1.
I establish conditions under which the choice of Bn is strictly increasing in dk. It is obvious
that Bn is constant when Bn ≥ 0 binds. Thus, consider the case where Bn ≥ 0 does not bind.
By differentiating the left hand side with respect to dk,
δv′(ck)
u′(ck,1)
u′(ck)ck
{
(σ −η)∂ck
∂dk
+
σ
Λ(Tk− s)
}
,
where
∂ck
∂dk
=
e−rs
Λ(Tk)
(
u′(ck,0)−u′(ck,1)
u′(ck)
)
.
First note that ∂ck/∂dk ≥ 0 at the allocation (s˜, B˜s, D˜p, D˜k) because cˆk,0 ≤ cˆk,1. Therefore, if
η ≤ σ , an increase of dk from D˜k will lead to strictly higher Bn than B˜n (Edlin and Shannon,
1998).
Next, I show that dk < D˜k = 0 is not a profitable deviation for the child. Consider the saving
decision of the child when (s˜, B˜s, D˜p) is pre-determined. Let Bˆn(dk) be the non-schooling
transfer conditional on dk. Then we can write the objective function of the child as follows:
F (dk) = Λ(s˜)u
(
B˜s+ e−rs˜dk−P(s˜)
Λ(s˜)
)
+ e−ρ s˜Λ(Tk− s˜)u
(
Y (s˜,a)−dk + ers˜Bˆn(dk)
Λ(Tk− s˜)
)
.
First, consider the case where Bˆn(0)> 0. In this case, cˆk,0 = cˆk,1. Therefore, for dk < 0,
F (dk)≤max
d′k
{
Λ(s˜)u
(
B˜s+ e−rs˜d′k−P(s˜)
Λ(s˜)
)
+ e−ρ s˜Λ(Tk− s˜)u
(
Y (s˜,a)−d′k + ers˜Bˆn(dk)
Λ(Tk− s˜)
)}
<max
d′k
{
Λ(s˜)u
(
B˜s+ e−rs˜d′k−P(s˜)
Λ(s˜)
)
+ e−ρ s˜Λ(Tk− s˜)u
(
Y (s˜,a)−d′k + ers˜Bˆn(0)
Λ(Tk− s˜)
)}
=F (0),
where the strict inequality follows from Bˆn(dk)< Bˆn(0).
Next, consider the case where Bˆn(0) = 0. In this case, cˆk,0 ≤ cˆk,1 and, for all dk < 0,
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Bˆn(dk) = 0 and ck,0 < ck,1. Therefore, for dk < 0,
F (dk)<max
d′k
{
Λ(s˜)u
(
B˜s+ e−rs˜d′k−P(s˜)
Λ(s˜)
)
+ e−ρ s˜Λ(Tk− s˜)u
(
Y (s˜,a)−d′k + ers˜Bˆn(dk)
Λ(Tk− s˜)
)}
≤F (0).
SinceF (dk)<F (0) for all dk < 0, dk = D˜k = 0 is the optimal choice of the youth. This proves
that the allocation (s˜, B˜s, B˜n, D˜p, D˜k) is achievable, and therefore, the equilibrium allocation.
Comparative Statics
Define
X(a) = e−rs
∗(a)Y (s∗(a),a)−P(s∗(a)).
When X(a) is strictly concave in a, for all values of (W,δ ,a) such that s˜(W,δ ,a) < s∗(a),
B˜n(W,δ ,a) = 0. This is proved as follows. Suppose not. Then there exists (W,δ ,a) such
that s˜(W,δ ,a) < s∗(a) but B˜n(W,δ ,a) > 0. In this case, intertemporal and intergenerational
consumption smoothing is fully achieved, but schooling is not chosen to maximize total family
consumption. Then a small increase in s increases net family income and improves the parent’s
utility.
First, consider the case where s˜(W,δ ,a) < s∗(a) and B˜n(W,δ ,a) = 0. Then B˜s(W,δ ,a) =
Bˆ(W,δ ,a), which is nondecreasing in (W,δ ) and also nondecreasing in a if Condition 3.1
holds.
When s˜(W,δ ,a) = s∗(a), both B˜s(W,δ ,a) and B˜n(W,δ ,a) are nondecreasing in w and δ .
To see this, note that
B˜s(W,δ ,a) =Λ(s∗(a))cˆk(W,δ ,a)+P(s
∗(a)),
where
cˆk(W,δ ,a) =
Bˆ(W,δ ,a)+ e−rs∗(a)Y (s∗(a),a)−P(s∗(a))
Λ(Tk)
.
Since Bˆ(W,δ ,a) is nondecreasing in w and δ , so is cˆk(W,δ ,a) and B˜s(W,δ ,a). Moreover,
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B˜n(W,δ ,a) is also nondecreasing in w and δ because it can be written as follows:
B˜n(W,δ ,a) =Bˆ(W,δ ,a)− B˜s(W,δ ,a)
=
(
1− Λ(s
∗(a))
Λ(Tk)
)(
Bˆ(W,δ ,a)−P(s∗(a)))− Λ(s∗(a))
Λ(Tk)
e−rs
∗(a)Y (s∗(a),a).
Next, I show that B˜s(W,δ ,a) is nondecreasing in a. This holds when youth’s consumption
is nondecreasing in a.
∂ cˆk(W,δ ,a)
∂a
=
1
Λ(Tk)
(
∂ Bˆ(W,δ ,a)
∂a
+X ′(a)
)
=
 −v
′′
(
W−Bˆ(W,δ ,a)
Λ(Tp)
)
1
Λ(Tp)
−
[
v′′
(
W−Bˆ(W,δ ,a)
Λ(Tp)
)
1
Λ(Tp) +δv
′′
(
Bˆ(W,δ ,a)+X(a)
Λ(Tk)
)
1
Λ(Tk)
]
 X ′(a)Λ(Tk)
>0,
where
∂ Bˆ(W,δ ,a)
∂a
=
δv′′
(
Bˆ(W,δ ,a)+X(a)
Λ(Tk)
)
X ′(a)
Λ(Tk)
−
[
v′′
(
W−Bˆ(W,δ ,a)
Λ(Tp)
)
1
Λ(Tp) +δv
′′
(
Bˆ(W,δ ,a)+X(a)
Λ(Tk)
)
1
Λ(Tk)
]
is used.
Because cˆk(W,δ ,a) is nondecreasing in a, B˜s(W,δ ,a) is also nondecreasing in a, which
implies that B˜n(W,δ ,a) is nonincreasing in a.
B.1.3 Comparative Statics with Heterogeneous Tastes for Schooling
In this section, I derive comparative statics results, that are similar to Proposition 3.1, about
how heterogeneous tastes affect schooling and parental transfers.
Let Ψ(s,τ)≥ 0 be the psychic cost of schooling, where τ is the taste parameter. Ψ(s,τ) is
twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex in s, and Ψ(0,τ) = 0
for all τ . Youths with higher τ have higher ‘psychic return’ to schooling in the sense that they
face lower total as well as marginal psychic cost:
∂Ψ(s,τ)
∂τ
< 0,
∂ 2Ψ(s,τ)
∂ s∂τ
< 0.
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The psychic cost enters the utility function of youth as follows:
Vk = Λ(Tk)ck(Uk)−Ψ(s,τ)
and parents care about Vk/Λ(Tk) = ck(Uk)−Ψ(s,τ)/Λ(Tk) instead of ck(Uk).
Proposition B.1 Let sˆ(W,δ ,a,τ) and Bˆ(W,δ ,a,τ) be the solution to the family’s problem. If
(B.7) holds, then
1. sˆ(W,δ ,a,τ) is nondecreasing in τ;
2. Bˆ(W,δ ,a,τ) is (i) nonincreasing in τ if (BC) does not bind; (ii) nondecreasing in τ if
(BC) binds.
Proof
Youth’s Problem I begin with analyzing the unconstrained youth’s problem. When (BC)
does not bind, the youth’s objective function is
F (s,a,τ,B) = B+ e−rsY (s,a)−P(s)−Ψ(s,τ).
The cross partial is
Fsτ(s,a,τ,B) =−Ψsτ(s,τ)> 0.
Thus, schooling is nondecreasing in taste.
Let s∗(a,τ) be unconstrained optimal schooling. For unconstrained youth, constant flow of
consumption is
ck(t) =
B+ e−rs∗(a,τ)Y (s∗(a,τ),a)−P(s∗(a,τ))
Λ(Tk)
.
Note that e−rs∗(a,τ)Y (s∗(a,τ),a)−P(s∗(a,τ)) is nondecreasing in τ because Ψ(s,τ) is increas-
ing in s. Therefore, ck(t) is also nondecreasing in τ .
The debt at the end of schooling is
ers
∗(a,τ)
{
−B+Λ(s∗(a,τ))
(
B+ e−rs∗(a,τ)Y (s∗(a,τ),a)−P(s∗(a,τ))
Λ(Tk)
)
+P(s∗(a,τ))
}
.
(B.6)
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Since Λ(s∗(a,τ)), P(s∗(a,τ)), and ck(t) are nondecreasing in τ , youth with higher τ borrow
more.
The objective function of constrained youth is
F (s,a,τ,B)
=Λ(Tk)u−1
(
Λ(s)
Λ(Tk)
u
(
B−P(s)+ e−rsD
Λ(s)
)
+
e−rsΛ(Tk− s)
Λ(Tk)
u
(
Y (s,a)−D
Λ(Tk− s)
))
−Ψ(s,τ).
The derivative with respect to B is
Fs(s,a,τ,B)
=
1
u′(ck)
{
Λ(s)u′(ck,0)
∂ck,0
∂ s
+ e−rsΛ(Tk− s)u′(ck,1)
∂ck,1
∂ s
+ e−rs(u(ck,0)−u(ck,1))
}
−Ψs(s,τ).
It is straightforward to seeFsτ(s,a,τ,B)> 0. Taking another derivative with respect to B,
FsB(s,a,τ,B)
=
−u′′(ck)
u′(ck)
∂ck
∂B
{
Λ(s)u′(ck,0)
∂ck,0
∂ s
+ e−rsΛ(Tk− s)u′(ck,1)
∂ck,1
∂ s
+ e−rs(u(ck,0)−u(ck,1))
}
+
1
u′(ck)
{
−u′′(ck,0) 1Λ(s)
(
Λ′(s)
Λ(s)
(B−P(s)+D)+P′(s)
)}
> 0
so schooling is nondecreasing in parental transfers and taste.
Parent’s Problem Write the objective function of the parent with (W,δ ,a,τ) as follows:
F (B,W,δ ,a,τ) = Λ(Tp)v
(
W −B
Λ(Tp)
)
+δΛ(Tk)v
(
cˆk(B,a,τ)−
Ψ(sˆ(B,a,τ),τ)
Λ(Tk)
)
.
The first order condition with respect to B is
FB(B,W,δ ,a) =−v′
(
W −B
Λ(Tp)
)
+δv′
(
cˆk(B,a,τ)−
Ψ(sˆ(B,a,τ),τ)
Λ(Tk)
)
u′(cˆk,0(B,a,τ))
u′(cˆk(B,a,τ))
= 0.
When (BC) does not bind, cˆk,0(B,a,τ) = cˆk(B,a,τ), and the derivative of FB(B,W,δ ,a,τ)
with respect to τ is
FBτ(B,W,δ ,a,τ) =δv′′
(
cˆk(B,a,τ)−
Ψ(sˆ(B,a,τ),τ)
Λ(Tk)
)−Ψτ(sˆ(B,a,τ),τ)
Λ(Tk)
< 0.
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When (BC) binds,
FBτ(B,W,δ ,a,τ)
=δv′′
(
cˆk(B,a,τ)−
Ψ(sˆ(B,a,τ),τ)
Λ(Tk)
)
∂
∂τ
(
cˆk(B,a,τ)−
Ψ(sˆ(B,a,τ),τ)
Λ(Tk)
)
u′(cˆk,0(B,a,τ))
u′(cˆk(B,a,τ))
+δv′
(
cˆk(B,a,τ)−
Ψ(sˆ(B,a,τ),τ)
Λ(Tk)
)
∂
∂τ
(
u′(cˆk,0(B,a,τ))
u′(cˆk(B,a,τ))
)
,
which is positive if and only if
η ≤
∂ ln
(
u′(cˆk,0(B,a,τ))
u′(cˆk(B,a,τ))
)
∂τ
∂ ln
(
cˆk(B,a,τ)−Ψ(sˆ(B,a,τ),τ)Λ(Tk)
)
∂τ
. (B.7)
Thus, Bˆ(W,δ ,a,τ) is nonincreasing in τ at low levels of τ where (BC) does not bind, and
nondecreasing in τ at high levels of τ where (BC) binds if (B.7) is satisfied.
For low levels of τ where (BC) does not bind, Bˆ(W,δ ,a,τ) is nonincreasing in τ but B does
not affect s, so sˆ(Bˆ(W,δ ,a,τ),a,τ) is nondecreasing in τ . For high levels of τ where (BC)
binds, Bˆ(W,δ ,a,τ) is nondecreasing in τ , so sˆ(Bˆ(W,δ ,a,τ),a,τ) is also nondecreasing in τ .
B.1.4 Properties of C(V,δ )
The family welfare level is
C(V,δ ) =min
cp,ck
{
Λ(Tp)cp+Λ(Tk)ck|Λ(Tp)v(cp)+δΛ(Tk)v(ck)≥V
}
.
This standard cost minimization problem has the solution
C(V,δ ) =
{
Λ(Tp)+Λ(Tk)δ
1
η
} −η
1−η
[(1−η)V ] 11−η ,
and its derivative with respect to V is
∂C(V,δ )
∂V
=
{
Λ(Tp)+Λ(Tk)δ
1
η
} −η
1−η
[(1−η)V ] η1−η .
Let Vˆ (W,a,δ ) be the utility under a policy G(·) and let cˆi = ci(Uˆp(W,a,δ )) be associated
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constant-equivalent consumption. Then
1
δ
(
cˆk
cˆp
)η> 1 if (BC) or (TC) binds,= 1 if (BC) and (TC) do not bind.
Comparing Welfare Levels
Then the derivative of C with respect to δ is
dC(Vˆ (W,δ ,a),δ )
dδ
=
∂C(Vˆ (W,δ ,a),δ )
∂V
∂Vˆ (W,δ ,a)
∂δ
+
∂C(Vˆ (W,δ ,a),δ )
∂δ
=
{
Λ(Tp)+Λ(Tk)δ
1
η
} −1
1−η [
(1−η)Vˆ (W,δ ,a)] η1−η Λ(Tk)Λ(Tp)cˆ1−ηk
× 1
1−η
1−
[
1
δ
(
cˆk
cˆp
)η] 1−η−η  .
Thus,
dC(Vˆ (W,δ ,a),δ )
dδ
> 0 if (BC) or (TC) binds,= 0 if (BC) and (TC) do not bind.
Welfare Effects of a Lump-sum Transfer
Consider a perturbed policy G˜(s)=G(s)+z and let V˜ (z,W,δ ,a) and U˜i(z,W,δ ,a) be the utility,
and c˜i = ci(U˜p(z,W,δ ,a)) be associated constant-equivalent consumption under the perturbed
policy.
Non-binding (TC) (Proof of Lemma 3.1) In this case, the marginal value of a lump-sum
transfer given to youth is equivalent to the marginal value of parental wealth. From the Enve-
lope condition,
∂C(V˜ (z,W,δ ,a),δ )
∂V
∂V˜ (z,W,δ ,a)
∂ z
(B.8)
=
{
Λ(Tp)+Λ(Tk)δ
1
η
} −η
1−η
Λ(Tp)+Λ(Tk)δ 1η
[
1
δ
(
c˜k
c˜p
)η] 1−ηη 
η
1−η
. (B.9)
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Thus, we have
∂C(V˜ (z,W,δ ,a),δ )
∂V
∂V˜ (z,W,δ ,a)
∂ z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=0
> 1 if (BC) binds at z = 0,= 1 if (BC) does not bind at z = 0.
Moreover, ∂C(V˜ (z,W,δ ,a),δ )/∂V ·∂V˜ (z,W,δ ,a)/∂ z|z=0 is nondecreasing in a. By Proposi-
tion 3.1, Bˆ(W,δ ,a) is nondecreasing in a, which implies that cˆp is nonincreasing in a and cˆk is
nondecreasing in a. Therefore, cˆk/cˆp is nondecreasing in a.
Binding (TC) and Non-binding (BC) In this case, the marginal value of a subsidy given to
youth is
∂C(V˜ (z,W,δ ,a),δ )
∂V
∂V˜ (z,W,δ ,a)
∂ z
=
{
Λ(Tp)+Λ(Tk)δ
1
η
} −η
1−η
Λ(Tp)
[
1
δ
(
c˜k
c˜p
)η]η−1η
+δ
1
ηΛ(Tk)

η
1−η
.
Therefore, when only (TC) binds,
∂C(V˜ (z,W,δ ,a),δ )
∂V
∂V˜ (z,W,δ ,a)
∂ z
∣∣∣∣∣
z=0
< 1.
B.1.5 Formulating the Planning Problem and Deriving Optimality Con-
ditions
I first formulate the planner’s problem as a direct mechanism. The planner assigns schooling
s(δ ) and net payment P(δ ) to students whose parents report δ . After reporting δ , parents give
a one-time transfer B ≥ 0 and youth borrow and pay P(δ ) to attain s(δ ) years of schooling.
Conditional on B, parents’ and youth’s objectives coincide because parents are altruistic, so
youth do not have incentives to deviate from the allocation (s(δ ),P(δ )) that is chosen by
parents. Attending college involves a fixed cost χ > 0. I model this as a negative monetary
payment for schooling level s = 0.
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Single-Crossing Property
I define an indirect utility function conditional on schooling and payment (s,P). For s≥ 0,
U (s,P,δ ) =max
B
C
(
Λ(Tp)v
(
cp
)
+δΛ(Tk)v(ck) ,δ
)
, (B.10)
subject to (TC) and
cp =max
c(·)
{
1
Λ(Tp)
u−1
(∫ Tp
0
e−rtc(t)dt
)∣∣∣∫ Tp
0
e−rtc(t)dt ≤W −B
}
,
ck =max
c(·)
{
1
Λ(Tk)
u−1
(∫ Tk
0
e−rtc(t)dt
)∣∣∣∫ Tk
0
e−rtc(t)dt ≤ B−P+ e−rsY (s,a),∫ s
0
e−rtc(t)dt+P−B≤ e−rsD
}
.
Let B(s,P,δ ) be the solution to (B.10). B(s,P,δ ) is strictly increasing in δ as long as (TC)
does not bind.
Lemma B.4 U s(s,P,δ )/|U P(s,P,δ )| is nondecreasing in δ .
Proof First, note that, for a given level of (s,P), there exists B such that (BC) binds for B < B
and (BC) does not bind for B > B.
B = P+
Λ(s)Y (s,a)−Λ(Tk)D
Λ(Tk− s)
Let δ be the altruism level for which B =B(s,P,δ ), that is, δ solves
v′
(
W −B
Λ(Tp)
)
= δv′
(
B−P+ e−rsY (s,a)
Λ(Tk)
)
. (B.11)
Then for all δ ≥ δ ,
U (s,P,δ ) =W −P+ e−rsY (s,a).
Therefore, the marginal rate of substitution is
U s(s,P,δ )
|U P(s,P,δ )| = e
−rs[Ys(s,a)− rY (s,a)].
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For all δ < δ , (BC) binds, and
U s(s,P,δ )
|U P(s,P,δ )| =
Λ(s)u′(ck,0)
∂ck,0
∂ s + e
−rsΛ(Tk− s)u′(ck,1)∂ck,1∂ s + e−rs(u(ck,0)−u(ck,1))
Λ(s)u′(ck,0)|∂ck,0∂P |
,
where
ck,0 =
B(s,P,δ )−P+ e−rsD
Λ(s)
,
ck,1 =
Y (s,a)−D
Λ(Tk− s) ,
∂ck,0
∂ s
=− Λ
′(s)
Λ(s)2
(B(s,P,δ )−P+D)< 0,
∂ck,0
∂P
=− 1
Λ(s)
< 0,
∂ck,1
∂ s
=
Λ′(Tk− s)
Λ(Tk− s)2 (Y (s,a)−D)+
Ys(s,a)
Λ(Tk− s) .
Note that by the envelope theorem, first derivatives are taken by holdingB(s,P,δ ) fixed.
Altruism affects U s(s,P,δ )/|U P(s,P,δ )| only throughB(s,P,δ ). I first show that
U s(s,P,δ )/|U P(s,P,δ )| is strictly increasing in B. Since B(s,P,δ ) is strictly increasing in
δ , this proves that U s(s,P,δ )/|U P(s,P,δ )| is strictly increasing in δ . By differentiating the
numerator with respect to B,
Λ(s)u′′(ck,0)
∂ck,0
∂B
∂ck,0
∂ s
> 0. (B.12)
Moreover, the denominator of U s(s,P,δ )/|U P(s,P,δ )| is also strictly decreasing in B, so
U s(s,P,δ )/|U P(s,P,δ )| is strictly increasing in B. Therefore, for all δ < δ , U s(s,P,δ )
/|U P(s,P,δ )| is strictly increasing in δ .
Planning Problem and Optimality Conditions
The social planner chooses an allocation (s(·),P(·)), taking into account the fact that families
have an option not to go to college. The value of not attending college can be written as
U (0,−χ,δ ). The single crossing condition implies that the allocation is incentive compatible
if and only if the first order condition of the reporting problem is satisfied and the allocation is
monotone in δ . Therefore, if some students do not attend college, they are from families with
low δ . Let δ be the threshold value such that all families with δ ≤ δ do not attend college.
It is convenient to deal with a single control variable by implicitly defining a functionP(·)
160
satisfying
V =U (s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ ).
Then the planner’s problem can be written as follows:
max
V (·),s(·),q(·),V ,s,δ
∫ δ
δ0
U (0,−χ,δ ) f (δ )dδ +
∫ δ1
δ
V (δ ) f (δ )dδ
subject to
∫ δ1
δ
[K(s(δ ))−P(s(δ ),V (δ ),δ )] f (δ )dδ ≤ E,
V (δ ) =U (s(δ ),P(s(δ ),V (δ ),δ ),δ ),
V˙ (δ ) =U δ (s(δ ),P(s(δ ),V (δ ),δ ),δ ), V (δ ) = V ,
s˙(δ ) = q(δ ), s(δ ) = s, q(δ )≥ 0,
V =U (0,−χ,δ ), δ ∈ [δ0,δ1].
The Hamiltonian is
H (V ,s,q,δ ,ψ,ϕ,λ ) = [V +λ (P(s,V ,δ )−K(s))] f (δ )+ψU δ (s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )+ϕq,
and the small Lagrangian is
L (V ,s,δ ) =
∫ δ
δ0
U (0,−χ,δ ) f (δ )dδ +ζ
{
V −U (0,−χ,δ )
}
Following Hellwig (2009) and Weber (2011), the optimality conditions are as follows:
Adjoint Equation For almost all δ ∈ [δ ,δ1],
ψ˙(δ ) =−HV
(
V (δ ),s(δ ),q(δ ),δ ,ψ(δ ),ϕ(δ ),λ
)
, (B.13)
ϕ˙(δ ) =−Hs
(
V (δ ),s(δ ),q(δ ),δ ,ψ(δ ),ϕ(δ ),λ
)
, (B.14)
where
HV (V ,s,q,δ ,ψ,ϕ,λ ) =
(
1+
λ
U P(s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )
)
f (δ )+ψ
U δP(s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )
U P(s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )
,
Hs(V ,s,q,δ ,ψ,ϕ,λ ) =λ
(
U s(s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )
|U P(s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )| −K
′(s)
)
f (δ )
+ψ|U P(s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )|
(
∂
∂δ
U s(s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )
|U P(s,P(s,V ,δ ),δ )|
)
.
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Transversality
ψ(δ ) =−LV (V ,s,δ ), ζ
{
V −U (0,−χ,δ )
}
= 0, ψ(δ1) = 0, (B.15)
ϕ(δ ) =ϕ(δ1) = 0, (B.16)
where
LV (V ,s,δ ) = ζ .
For almost all δ ∈ [δ ,δ1], ϕ(δ )≤ 0 and ϕ(δ ) = 0 if s(δ ) is strictly increasing at δ . Moreover,
∫ δ1
δ
ϕ(δ )ds(δ ) = 0.
Endpoint Optimality For interior solution δ ∈ [δ0,δ1],
H
(
V ,s,q(δ ),δ ,ψ(δ ),ϕ(δ ),λ
)
=Lδ (V ,s,δ ), (B.17)
where
Lδ (V ,s,δ ) =U (0,−χ,δ ) f (δ )−ζU δ (0,−χ,δ ).
B.1.6 Proof of Proposition 3.2
I first show how the optimality conditions in Section B.1.5 are modified when all students attend
college. In this case, δ ≥ δ0 is binding and V (δ0)>U (0,−χ,δ0). Therefore, ψ(δ0) =−ζ = 0
and the endpoint optimality condition (B.17) does not hold with equality at δ0.
Lemma B.5 λ > 1 and δλ exists.
Proof From the conditions ψ(δ0) = ψ(δ1) = 0 and (B.13),
∫ δ1
δ0
(
1+
λ
U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
)
exp
(∫ δ
δ0
U δP(s(δ ′),P(δ ′),δ ′)
U P(s(δ ′),P(δ ′),δ ′)
dδ ′
)
f (δ )dδ = 0.
By rewriting this condition, the expression for λ can be derived as follows:
λ =
∫ δ1
δ0
exp
(∫ δ
δ0
U δP(s(δ ′),P(δ ′),δ ′)
U P(s(δ ′),P(δ ′),δ ′) dδ
′
)
f (δ )dδ∫ δ1
δ0
1
−U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ ) exp
(∫ δ
δ0
U δP(s(δ ′),P(δ ′),δ ′)
U P(s(δ ′),P(δ ′),δ ′) dδ
′
)
f (δ )dδ
.
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Note that−U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )=m(s(δ )). Since (TC) does not bind for all δ ,−U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
≥ 1 holds for all δ by Lemma 3.1. Moreover,−U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )> 1 holds for a strictly pos-
itive measure of families for which (BC) binds. So λ > 1 follows. Next, for families with
δ = δ1, −U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ ) = 1 < λ . Thus, δλ exists.
Lemma B.6 There exists δ and (s,P) such that (s(δ ),P(δ )) = (s,P) for almost all [δ ,δ1] and
(BC) does not bind for all δ ∈ [δ ,δ1] and (BC) would bind for all δ ∈ [δ0,δ ) if they chose
(s,P).
Proof Let δ be the minimum type such that (BC) does not bind at the allocation (s(δ1),P(δ1))
(as defined in (B.11)). I first show that (BC) does not bind for all δ ∈ [δ ,δ1] at (s(δ ),P(δ )).
Suppose not. Then there exists δ ∈ [δ ,δ1] such that, for δ , (BC) binds at (s(δ ),P(δ )) but it does
not bind at (s(δ1),P(δ1)). By incentive compatibility, the type δ weakly prefers (s(δ ),P(δ ))
to (s(δ1),P(δ1)):
e−rs(δ1)Y (s(δ1),a)−P(δ1)≤U (s(δ ),P(δ ),δ ).
Moreover, as shown in Section B.1.4, U (s(δ ),P(δ ),δ ) <U (s(δ ),P(δ ),δ1) since U (s,P,δ )
is strictly increasing in δ if (BC) binds, which gives
e−rs(δ1)Y (s(δ1),a)−P(δ1)<U (s(δ ),P(δ ),δ1).
Therefore, the type δ1 strictly prefers (s(δ ),P(δ )) to (s(δ1),P(δ1)), which violates incentive
compatibility.
Next, I show that s(δ ) and P(δ ) are constant almost everywhere on [δ ,δ1]. Suppose not.
Then there exist δ ′ and δ ′′ such that δ < δ ′ < δ ′′ < δ1, s(δ ′) < s(δ ′′), and P(δ ′) < P(δ ′′).
Since (BC) does not bind for δ ′ and δ ′′, by incentive compatibility,
e−rs(δ
′)Y (s(δ ′),a)−P(δ ′) = e−rs(δ ′′)Y (s(δ ′′),a)−P(δ ′′).
Define (s,P) as follows:
s = argmax
s∈[s(δ ),s(δ1)]
{
e−rsY (s,a)−K(s)
}
,
P =e−rsY (s,a)− [e−rs(δ ′)Y (s(δ ′),a)−P(δ ′)].
By the strict concavity of e−rsY (s,a)−K(s), s is unique. By definition, for all δ ≥ δ , P−
K(s)≥ P(δ )−K(s(δ )), and the inequality is strict if s(δ ) 6= s.
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Consider an alternative allocation (s˜(·), P˜(·)).
s˜(δ ) =
s(δ ) for δ < δs for δ ≥ δ , P˜(δ ) =
P(δ ) for δ < δP for δ ≥ δ .
This allocation does not change the social welfare, but reduces the total spending by
∫ δ1
δ
[K(s(δ ))−P(δ )]dF(δ )− [K(s)−P][1−F(δ )]> 0,
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that s(δ ) 6= s for a strictly positive measure of
families. Therefore, the original allocation that is not constant over [δ ,δ1] is not optimal.
Thus, there exists δ such that s(δ ) and P(δ ) are constant almost everywhere on [δ ,δ1] and
(BC) does not bind for all δ ∈ [δ ,δ1]. Without loss of generality, assume that s(δ ) and P(δ )
are constant on [δ ,δ1] and let (s,P) be the allocation. By the definition of δ , for all types with
δ < δ , (BC) would bind if they chose (s,P).
Lemma B.7 ψ(δ )< 0 for all δ ∈ [δλ ,δ1).
Proof By condition (B.13) with ψ(δ1) = 0, ψ(δ ) for δ ∈ [δ0,δ1] can be written as
ψ(δ ) =
∫ δ1
δ
(
1+
λ
U P(s(δ ′),P(δ ′),δ ′)
)
exp
(∫ δ ′
δ
U δP(s(δ ′′),P(δ ′′),δ ′′)
U P(s(δ ′′),P(δ ′′),δ ′′)
dδ ′′
)
f (δ ′)dδ ′.
By the definition of δλ , −U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ ) < λ for all δ ∈ [δλ ,δ1]. Thus, ψ(δ ) < 0 holds
for all δ ∈ [δλ ,δ1).
Now I proceed with additional assumption that s(δλ )< limδ↑δ s(δ ).
Lemma B.8 s(δ ) is strictly increasing at δ 1 and s = s∗.
Proof Suppose not. Then there exists δ˜ < δ such that s(δ˜ ) = s and s(δ˜ − ε) < s(δ˜ ) for all
ε > 0. Note that δλ < δ˜ due to the assumption that s(δλ )< limδ↑δ s(δ ). Therefore, ψ(δ )< 0
holds for all δ ∈ [δ˜ ,δ1).
Note that, by the definition of δ , (BC) binds for all types with δ ∈ [δ˜ ,δ ). By the condition
(B.16), we have ϕ(δ˜ ) = ϕ(δ1) = 0, and ϕ(δ )≤ 0 holds for all δ ∈ [δ˜ ,δ1]. Therefore,
ϕ(δ ) =ϕ(δ1)−
∫ δ1
δ
ϕ˙(δ )dδ = λ
{
∂
∂ s
[
e−rsY (s,a)−K(s)]} [1−F(δ )]≤ 0,
1That is, s(δ − ε)< s(δ + ε) for all ε > 0.
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which implies s≥ s∗. Moreover, the Spence-Mirrless condition implies that, for all δ < δ
U s(s,P,δ )
|U P(s,P,δ )|
<
U s(s,P,δ )
|U P(s,P,δ )|
=
∂
∂ s
[
e−rsY (s,a)
]
.
Using this inequality and the condition ϕ(δ˜ ) = 0,
0 = ϕ(δ˜ ) =ϕ(δ )−
∫ δ
δ˜
ϕ˙(δ )dδ
<λ
{
∂
∂ s
[
e−rsY (s,a)−K(s)]}(1−F(δ ))
+
∫ δ
δ˜
ψ(δ )|U P(s,P,δ )|
(
∂
∂δ
U s(s,P,δ )
|U P(s,P,δ )|
)
dδ
<0,
which is a contradiction. Thus, all families choosing (s,P) are unconstrained and s(δ ) is strictly
increasing at δ . s = s∗ follows from the conditions ϕ(δ ) = ϕ(δ1) = 0.
Lemma B.9 s(δ ) is not continuous at δ .
Proof Suppose not. Then s(δ −ε)< s(δ ) for all ε and limδ↑δ s(δ ) = s(δ ). Because ϕ(δ ) = 0
whenever s(δ ) is strictly increasing, we have limδ↑δ ϕ˙(δ ) = 0, which gives
lim
δ↑δ
{
λ
(
U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )| −K
′(s(δ ))
)
f (δ )
+ψ(δ )|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|
(
∂
∂δ
U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|
)}
= 0.
Because families with δ < δ are constrained if they were offered (s,P),
lim
δ↑δ
∂
∂δ
U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )| = limδ↑δ
∂
∂δ
U s(s,P,δ )
|U P(s,P,δ )|
> 0.
Therefore, we have
lim
δ↑δ
λ
(
U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )| −K
′(s(δ ))
)
f (δ )
=− lim
δ↑δ
ψ(δ )|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|
(
∂
∂δ
U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|
)
> 0.
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This condition, combined with local incentive compatibility constraints,
U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )s˙(δ )+U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )P˙(δ ) = 0, (B.18)
gives
lim
δ↑δ
{
P˙(δ )−K′(s(δ ))s˙(δ )
}
> 0.
Then unconstrained families have incentives to deviate downward. To see this, consider the
highest type δ1 to ensure that (BC) does not bind in the neighborhood of (s,P). For this type,
the gain from downward deviation is
− lim
δ↑δ
{
∂
∂ s
[
e−rs(δ )Y (s(δ ),a)
]
s˙(δ )− P˙(δ )
}
= lim
δ↑δ
P˙(δ )− ∂
∂ s
[
e−rsY (s,a)
]
lim
δ↑δ
s˙(δ )
= lim
δ↑δ
P˙(δ )−K′(s) lim
δ↑δ
s˙(δ )
= lim
δ↑δ
{
P˙(δ )−K′(s(δ ))s˙(δ )}
>0.
Therefore, s(δ ) is not continuous at δ .
Lemma B.10 Let (s−,P−) = limδ↑δ (s(δ ),P(δ )). Then K(s−)−P− > K(s)−P.
Proof I first show that families with δ ∈ [δ ,δ1] are indifferent between (s,P) and (s−,P−).
Note that the following inequality holds for all δ < δ
V (δ ) =U (s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )≤U (s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )≤U (s,P,δ ) = V (δ ),
where the first inequality holds due to the fact that U (s,P,δ ) is nondecreasing in δ as long as
(TC) does not bind, and the second inequality is the incentive compatibility condition for the
type δ .
Taking the limit from below,
lim
δ↑δ
V (δ ) =U (s−,P−,δ )≤U (s,P,δ ) = V (δ ).
Because V (δ ) is absolutely continuous, limδ↑δ V (δ ) = V (δ ), which implies that
U (s−,P−,δ ) =U (s,P,δ ).
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Moreover, the following also hold.
e−rsY (s,a)−P≤e−rs−Y (s−,a)−P−
e−rsY (s,a)−K(s)>e−rs−Y (s−,a)−K(s−)
The first inequality holds due to U (s,P,δ ) = U (s−,P−,δ ) ≤ e−rs−Y (s−,a)− P− and the
second inequality holds due to the fact that s = s∗. Combining these inequalities, we get
K(s−)−P− > K(s)−P.
Lemma B.11 K(s(δ ))−P(δ ) is nonincreasing in δ for all δ ∈ [δλ ,δ1] where s(δ ) is continu-
ous in δ .
Proof Consider the case where s(δ ) is differentiable. By differentiating K(s(δ ))−P(δ ) with
respect to δ ,
K′(s(δ ))s˙(δ )− P˙(δ ) =
(
K′(s(δ ))− U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|
)
s˙(δ ).
When s˙(δ ) = 0, this is equal to zero. When s˙(δ )> 0, ϕ(δ ) = ϕ˙(δ ) = 0 and
K′(s(δ ))− U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )| =
ψ(δ )|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|
λ f (δ )
(
∂
∂δ
U s(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
|U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )|
)
.
(B.19)
Therefore, the sign of K′(s(δ ))s˙(δ )− P˙(δ ) depends on the sign of ψ(δ ). Because ψ(δ ) ≤ 0
for all δ ∈ [δλ ,δ1], K′(s(δ ))s˙(δ )− P˙(δ )≤ 0. The case where s(δ ) is not differentiable can be
treated similarly by taking left or right derivatives.
B.1.7 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Suppose that δ ∈ (δ0,δ1) and ζ 6= 0. Then V = U (0,−χ,δ ). Suppose that s(δ ) is strictly
increasing at δ so that q(δ ) > 0. Then ϕ(δ ) = ϕ˙(δ ) = 0 and condition (B.19) holds at δ .
Therefore, the sign of g(s) depends on the sign of ψ(δ ). Rewriting the endpoint optimality
condition (B.17),
ψ(δ )
{
U δ (s,P,δ )−U δ (0,−χ,δ )
}
= λ [K(s)−P] f (δ ),
where P=P(s,V ,δ ). Because s > 0 and the type δ is indifferent between (s,P) and (0,−χ),
all types with δ > δ strictly prefer the former to the latter due to the single-crossing condition.
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Therefore, we have U δ (s,P,δ )>U δ (0,−χ,δ ) and the sign of ψ(δ ) depends on the sign of
K(s)−P = G(s).
B.1.8 Deriving Formula Based on Behavioral Responses
I first define behavioral responses to policy changes and then rewrite the formula for the optimal
policy based on these responses. Throughout this section, I assume that the first order condition
for schooling holds at all levels of schooling, U (s,P,δ ) is twice differentiable, s(δ ) and P(δ )
are continuous and differentiable.
Behavioral Responses
For a given policy G(·), consider a family δ with schooling choice sˆ > 0. Consider a perturbed
policy that changes the slope as well as the level of G(s):
G˜(s,ν ,z) = G(s)+ z+ν · e−rsˆΛ(s− sˆ).
Then the objective function of the family facing the perturbed policy is
F (s,ν ,z,δ ) =U (s,K(s)− G˜(s,ν ,z),δ ).
The derivative with respect to s is
Fs(s,ν ,z,δ ) =U s+U P · [K′(s)− G˜s(s,ν ,z)].
Suppose that the first order condition for s holds for family δ at sˆ. Then Fs = 0 at ν = z = 0
and s = sˆ, which gives
e−rsˆ(κ(sˆ)−g(sˆ)) = U s|U P| . (B.20)
Substitution Effect
The response of schooling to an increase in ν is due to the substitution effect:
ε =
∂ s
∂ν
=
Fsν
−Fss
∣∣∣
s=sˆ,ν=z=0
,
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where
Fsν |s=sˆ,ν=z=0 =
{
U sP+U PP · (K′(s)− G˜s(s,ν ,z))
}
(−G˜ν)+U P(−G˜sν)
∣∣∣
s=sˆ,ν=z=0
=− e−rsˆU P.
Income Effect The response of schooling to an increase in z is due to the income effect:
υ =
∂ s
∂ z
∣∣∣
s=sˆ,ν=z=0
=
Fsz
−Fss
∣∣∣
s=sˆ,ν=z=0
,
where
Fsz|s=sˆ,ν=z=0 =
{
U sP+U PP(K′(s)− G˜s(s,ν ,z))
}
(−G˜z)+U P(−G˜sz)|s=sˆ,ν=z=0
=−U sP+U PPU s
U P
.
Altruism Effect The response of schooling to an increase in δ is
∂ s
∂δ
∣∣∣
s=sˆ,ν=z=0
=
Fsδ
−Fss
∣∣∣
s=sˆ,ν=z=0
,
where
Fsδ |s=sˆ,ν=z=0 =U sδ +U Pδ e−rsˆ(κ(sˆ)−g(sˆ)) =U sδ −U Pδ
U s
U P
=U P ·
(
∂
∂δ
U s
U P
)
.
∂ s/∂δ and ε are related in the following way:
∂ s
∂δ
= υ
(
∂
∂δ
U s
U P
)(
U P
−U sP+U PP U sU P
)
=−ε
(
∂
∂δ
U s
U P
)
ersˆ. (B.21)
Extensive Margin If the family is indifferent between going to college and not going to
college, an increase in z leads to responses along the extensive margin of college attendance.
Suppose that
U (s,K(s)−G(s)− z,δ )
∣∣∣
z=0
=U (0,−χ,δ ).
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Consider the effect of an increase in z on the threshold type δ . By differentiating both sides
with respect to z,
∂δ
∂ z
∣∣∣
z=0
=
U P(s,K(s)−G(s),δ )
U δ (s,K(s)−G(s),δ )−U δ (0,−χ,δ )
.
Then the change of college attendance with respect to subsidy level is
∂ (1−F(δ ))
∂ z
∣∣∣
z=0
=
−U P(s,K(s)−G(s),δ )
U δ (s,K(s)−G(s),δ )−U δ (0,−χ,δ )
f (δ ).
Derivation of Formula
Now I rewrite the optimality conditions stated in Section B.1.5 in terms of behavioral re-
sponses.
First, define
X(δ ) =
−U P(s(δ ),P(δ ),δ )
λ
ψ(δ ).
From the condition ϕ˙(δ ) = 0,
K′(s)− U s|U P| =
ψ|U P|
λ f (δ )
(
∂
∂δ
U s
|U P|
)
=
X(δ )
f (δ )
(
∂
∂δ
U s
|U P|
)
. (B.22)
By differentiating X(δ ) with respect to δ and using (B.13), (B.20), (B.18), (B.21), and
(B.22),
X˙(δ ) =− ψ(δ )
λ
(U Pss˙(δ )+U PPP˙(δ )+U Pδ )−
U P
λ
ψ˙(δ ),
=
{(
1+
U P
λ
)
+ e−rs(δ )g(s(δ ))υ(δ )
}
f (δ ).
Using X(δ1) = 0,
X(δ ) =−
∫ δ1
δ
X˙(δ ′)dδ ′,
=−
∫ δ1
δ
{(
1+
U P(δ ′)
λ
)
+ e−rs(δ
′)g(s(δ ′))υ(δ ′)
}
f (δ ′)dδ ′.
Also note that
∂
∂δ
U s
|U P| = e
−rsˆ s˙(δ )
ε(δ )
.
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Then condition (B.22) can be rewritten as
e−rs(δ )g(s(δ )) =−e−rs(δ ) s˙(δ )
ε(δ ) f (δ )
∫ δ1
δ
{(
1+
U P(δ ′)
λ
)
+ e−rs(δ
′)g(s(δ ′))υ(δ ′)
}
f (δ ′)dδ ′.
From the identity Φ(s(δ )) = F(δ ), we get
φ(s(δ ))s˙(δ ) = f (δ ).
Then the above equation is
g(s(δ )) =
−1
ε(δ )φ(s(δ ))
∫ δ1
δ
{(
1+
U P(δ ′)
λ
)
+ e−rs(δ
′)g(s(δ ′))υ(δ ′)
}
f (δ ′)dδ ′.
Finally, by changing the variable of integration from δ to s, we get (3.16)
g(s) =
−1
ε(s)φ(s)
∫ s1
s
{(
1− m(s
′)
λ
)
+ e−rs
′
g(s′)υ(s′)
}
dΦ(s′).
Next, condition (3.17) can be derived from X(δ ):
X(δ ) =−
∫ δ1
δ
{(
1+
U P(δ ′)
λ
)
+ e−rs(δ
′)g(s(δ ′))υ(δ ′)
}
f (δ ′)dδ ′ (B.23)
First, note that
X(δ ) =
−U P
λ
ψ(δ ) =U P
[K(s)−P] f (δ )
U δ (s,P,δ )−U δ (0,0,δ )
=
∂ (1−F(δ ))
∂ z
[P−K(s)],
where the following conditions are used:
ψ(δ ) =− λ [K(s)−P] f (δ )
U δ (s,P,δ )−U δ (0,0,δ )
,
∂ (1−F(δ ))
∂ z
∣∣∣
z=0
=
−U P(s,K(s)−G(s),δ )
U δ (s,K(s)−G(s),δ )−U δ (0,0,δ )
f (δ ).
Then (B.23) can be written as:
∂ (1−F(δ ))
∂ z
∣∣∣
z=0
[P−K(s)] =−
∫ δ1
δ
{(
1+
U P(δ ′)
λ
)
+ e−rs(δ
′)g(s(δ ′))υ(δ ′)
}
f (δ ′)dδ ′,
(B.24)
which gives (3.17).
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B.1.9 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The definition of the indirect utility function as well as the planning problem and the optimality
conditions can be derived by replacing δ with a. I first show that the indirect utility function
U (s,P,a) satisfies the single-crossing condition. The result largely depends on the proofs of
Proposition 3.1 and Lemma B.4.
Lemma B.12 U s(s,P,a)/|U P(s,P,a)| is strictly increasing in a if Condition 3.1 is satisfied.
Proof Let B(s,P,a) be the parental transfer conditional on (s,P,a). It is straightforward to
apply Proposition 3.1 to show that B(s,P,a) is nonincreasing in a when (BC) does not bind
andB(s,P,a) is nondecreasing in a when (BC) binds and η ≤ σ (see (B.5)).
When (BC) does not bind, the marginal rate of substitution between s and P is
U s(s,P,a)
|U p(s,P,a)| = e
−rs[Ys(s,a)− rY (s,a)],
which is strictly increasing in a due to the properties of Y (s,a).
When (BC) binds,
U s(s,P,a)
|U P(s,P,a)| =
Λ(s)u′(ck,0)
∂ck,0
∂ s + e
−rsΛ(Tk− s)u′(ck,1)∂ck,1∂ s + e−rs(u(ck,0)−u(ck,1))
Λ(s)u′(ck,0)|∂ck,0∂P |
.
Ability affects U s(s,P,a)/|U P(s,P,a)| directly through Y (s,a) as well as indirectly through
B(s,P,a). Holding B constant, U s(s,P,a)/|U P(s,P,a)| is strictly increasing in a if and only
if Condition B.1 holds (see (B.3)). Moreover, holding a constant, U s(s,P,a)/|U P(s,P,a)|
is strictly increasing in B (see (B.12)). Since B(s,P,a) is nondecreasing in a, U s(s,P,a) /
|U P(s,P,a)| is strictly increasing in a.
Next, I show that ψ(a) ≥ 0 for all a ∈ [a0,a1]. From ψ(a0) = ψ(a1) = 0 and (B.13), we
get
λ =
∫ a1
a0 exp
(∫ a
a0
U aP(s(a′),P(a′),a′)
U P(s(a′),P(a′),a′) da
′
)
f (a)da∫ a1
a0
1
−U P(s(a),P(a),a) exp
(∫ a
a0
U aP(s(a′),P(a′),a′)
U P(s(a′),P(a′),a′) da
′
)
f (a)da
. (B.25)
When (BC) does not bind,−U P(s(a),P(a),a) = 1, so−U P(s(a),P(a),a) does not depend on
a. When (BC) binds, −U P(s(a),P(a),a)> 1 and it is nondecreasing in a, as shown in Section
B.1.4. This, combined with (B.25), implies that there exists a˜ such that, −U P(s(a),P(a),a)≤
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λ for all a≤ a˜ and −U P(s(a),P(a),a)≥ λ for all a > a˜. Thus, from the condition
ψ(a) =−
∫ a
a0
(
1+
λ
U P(s(a′),P(a′),a′)
)
exp
(
−
∫ a
a′
U aP(s(a′′),P(a′′),a′′)
U P(s(a′′),P(a′′),a′′)
da′′
)
f (a′)da′
it is straightforward to see that ψ(a) ≥ 0. Using the same argument as in Lemma B.11, the
conclusion follows.
Bibliography
Edlin, Aaron S. and Chris Shannon. 1998. “Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics.” Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 81 (1):201 – 219.
Hellwig, Martin. 2009. “A Maximum Principle for Control Problems with Monotonicity Con-
straints.” Working Paper, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods .
Milgrom, Paul and Chris Shannon. 1994. “Monotone Comparative Statics.” Econometrica
62 (1):pp. 157–180.
Weber, Thomas A. 2011. Optimal Control Theory with Applications in Economics. MIT Press.
173
Appendix C
Chapter 4 Appendix
C.1 Proofs and Analytical Details
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
First, note that, from (4.6), Cov(wt ,∆wt ′|c) = µt∆µt ′Var(θt |c) for t ′− t ≥ k. For t ′− t ≥ k, the
covariances conditional on cohort c are
Cov(wt ,∆wt ′|c) =µt∆µt ′
[
Var(θt−1|c)+Var(νt |c)
]
, (C.1)
Cov(wt−1,∆wt ′|c) =µt−1∆µt ′Var(θt−1|c). (C.2)
By taking a difference between cohort c and c′ such that Var(νt |c) = Var(νt |c′), we get
Cov(wt ,∆wt ′|c)−Cov(wt ,∆wt ′|c′)
Cov(wt−1,∆wt ′|c)−Cov(wt−1,∆wt ′|c′)
=
µt
µt−1
In this way, µt is identified for all t < t− k.
To identify µt for t ≥ t− k, note that, for t ′− t ≥ k,
Cov(wt ,∆wt ′+1|c)
Cov(wt ,∆wt ′|c)
=
µt∆µt ′+1 Var(θt |c)
µt∆µt ′Var(θt |c)
=
∆µt ′+1
∆µt ′
.
Therefore, µt−k is identified using Cov(wt−2k−1,∆wt−k−1|c), Cov(wt−2k−1,∆wt−k|c), µt−k−2,
and µt−k−1 provided that t−2k−1≥ t. Similarly, µt for t > t− k are also identified.
Once we know µt , then Var(θt) for all t < t− k can be identified from (C.2): for t ′− t ≥ k,
Var(θt) =
Cov(wt ,∆wt ′)
µt∆µt ′
.
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Finally, for all t < t− k, Var(ut) = Var(wt)−Var(µtθt) is identified.
C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
With the assumption of log-normality, the market clearing condition (4.15) becomes
lnΘˆt(s,zt)−E[lnΘt |s]
σ(lnΘt |s) =
lnzt−E[lnzt |s]
σ(lnzt |s) ,
which gives
lnΘˆt(s,zt) = E[lnΘt |s]+ σ(lnΘt |s)σ(lnzt |s) (lnzt−E[lnzt |s]).
Let zˆt(s,Θt) be the inverse of Θt = Θˆt(s,zt) with respect to zt , that is,
ln zˆt(s,Θt) = E[lnzt |s]+ σ(lnzt |s)σ(lnΘt |s)(lnΘt−E[lnΘt |s]).
Then the first order condition (4.14) becomes
∂Wt(s,Θt)
∂Θt
=pt(s)λt(s)Θ
λt(s)−1
t zˆt(s,Θt)γt(s)
=pt(s)λt(s)exp
(
γt(s)
{
E[lnzt |s]− σ(lnzt |s)σ(lnΘt |s) E[lnΘt |s]
})
Θµt(s)−1t ,
where
µt(s) = λt(s)+ γt(s)
σ(lnzt |s)
σ(lnΘt |s) .
Next, note that Wt(s,0) = 0 because Wt(s,0)> 0 would give negative profits for producers with
zt = 0. Then, by integrating the above equation, we get
Wt(s,Θt) =Wt(s,0)+
∫ Θt
0
∂Wt(s,Θ′t)
∂Θt
dΘ′t
=pt(s)
λt(s)
µt(s)
exp
(
γt(s)
{
E[lnzt |s]− σ(lnzt |s)σ(lnΘt |s) E[lnΘt |s]
})
Θµt(s)t ,
which gives (4.18).
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Note that
pt(s)yt
(
s,Θt , zˆt(s,Θt)
)
=pt(s)Θ
λt(s)
t zˆt(s,Θt)γt(s)
=pt(s)exp
(
γt(s)
{
E[lnzt |s]− σ(lnzt |s)σ(lnΘt |s) E[lnΘt |s]
})
Θµt(s)t
=Wt(s,Θt)
µt(s)
λt(s)
.
Therefore,
Wt(s,Θt)
pt(s)yt
(
s,Θt , zˆt(s,Θt)
) = λt(s)
µt(s)
.
C.1.3 Identification with ARMA(1,1) Transitory Shocks
Suppose that there exist (t, t ′,c) such that Var(θt |c) =Var(θt |c+1) and Var(θt ′|c) =Var(θt ′|c+
1). Then the AR(1) coefficient ρ is identified. The assumption is satisfied if, for example, there
is no cohort trend in initial skill and Var(νt) = 0 for some t. Once ρ is identified, the rest of
the identification is simliar with that of the MA(q) process.
Identification of ρ Let ci denote the year when individual i enters the labor market. Then
εi,t =ξi,t +(β +ρ)ξi,t−1+ρ(β +ρ)ξi,t−2+ . . . ,+ρ t−ci−1(β +ρ)ξi,ci,
εi,t+k =ξi,t+k +(β +ρ)ξi,t+k−1+ρ(β +ρ)ξi,t+k−2+ . . .
+ρk−1(β +ρ)ξi,t +ρk(β +ρ)ξi,t−1+ . . .+ρ t+k−ci−1(β +ρ)ξi,ci.
Then the autocovariance of the transitory component is
Cov(εt ,εt+k|c)
=ρk−1
{
(β +ρ)Var(ξt)+ρ(β +ρ)2 Var(ξt−1)+ . . .+ρ2(t−c)−1(β +ρ)2 Var(ξc)
}
,
which gives the following autocovariance of earnings residual:
Cov(wt ,∆wt+k|c)
=µt∆µt+k Var(θt |c)+Cov(εt ,εt+k|c)−Cov(εt ,εt+k−1|c)
=µt∆µt+k Var(θt |c)
+ρk−2(ρ−1)
{
(β +ρ)Var(ξt)+ρ(β +ρ)2 Var(ξt−1)+ . . .+ρ2(t−c)−1(β +ρ)2 Var(ξc)
}
.
176
By differencing across neighboring cohorts, we get
Cov(wt ,∆wt+k|c)−Cov(wt ,∆wt+k|c+1)
=µt∆µt+k
[
Var(θt |c)−Var(θt |c+1)
]
+ρk−2+2(t−c)−1(ρ−1)(β +ρ)2 Var(ξc)
Therefore, if there exists (t, t ′,c) such that Var(θt |c) = Var(θt |c+ 1) and Var(θt ′|c) =
Var(θt ′|c+1), ρ is identified as follows:
ρk−k
′
=
Cov(wt ,∆wt+k|c)−Cov(wt ,∆wt+k|c+1)
Cov(wt ,∆wt+k′|c)−Cov(wt ,∆wt+k′|c+1)
.
Identification of µt Note that
∆wt+1−ρ∆wt =[∆µt+1θt+1+µtνt+1+ηt+1+∆εt+1]−ρ[∆µtθt +µt−1νt +ηt +∆εt ]
=[∆µt+1θt+1+µtνt+1+ηt+1]−ρ[∆µtθt +µt−1νt +ηt ]+∆ξt+1+β∆ξt .
Then
Cov(wt−2,∆wt+1−ρ∆wt) =µt−2(∆µt+1−ρ∆µt)Var(θt−2),
and the difference across cohorts is
Cov(wt−2,∆wt+1−ρ∆wt |c)−Cov(wt−2,∆wt+1−ρ∆wt |c′)
=µt−2(∆µt+1−ρ∆µt)
{
Var(θt−2|c)−Var(θt−2|c′)
}
.
Therefore, if Var(νt−1|c) = Var(νt−1|c′), then Var(θt−2|c)−Var(θt−2|c′)
= Var(θt−3|c)−Var(θt−3|c′) and
Cov(wt−2,∆wt+1−ρ∆wt |c)−Cov(wt−2,∆wt+1−ρ∆wt |c′)
Cov(wt−3,∆wt+1−ρ∆wt |c)−Cov(wt−3,∆wt+1−ρ∆wt |c′) =
µt−2
µt−3
.
C.1.4 Calculating Standard Errors
Let m = 1, . . . ,M be the index of moments. Let di,m be the indicator of whether individual i
contributes to the mth moment Cov(wt ,wt ′|s,A j). That is, both wi,t and wi,t ′ are non-missing
and si = s and ai,t ∈ A j. Also let pm(Λ) = C˜ov(wt ,wt ′|s,A j,Λ). Then we can write
hm(zi,Λ) = di,m
[
wi,twi,t ′− pm(Λ)
]
,
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where zi includes wi,t di,m for all t and m for individual i. Let h(z,Λ)= (h1(z,Λ), . . . ,hM(z,Λ)).
Then the following moment condition holds for the true parameter Λ0:
E[h(z,Λ0)] = 0.
The minimum distance estimator Λˆ is equivalent to the GMM estimator that solves
min
Λ
[
1
N
N
∑
i=1
h(zi,Λ)
]′
W
[
1
N
N
∑
i=1
h(zi,Λ)
]
,
where W = diag[N
2
N21
, . . . , N
2
N2M
] and Nm = ∑Ni=1 di,m.
The GMM estimator Λˆ is asymptotically normal with a variance matrix V = (H ′W H)−1×
(H ′WΩW H)×(H ′W H)−1 where H is the Jacobian of the vector of moments, E[∂h(z,Λ0)/∂Λ′],
and Ω = E[h(z,Λ0)h(z,Λ0)′]. Both expectations are replaced by sample averages and evalu-
ated at the estimated parameter:
Hˆ =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
∂h(zi, Λˆ)
∂Λ′
=W−
1
2
∂ p(Λˆ)
∂Λ′
,
Ωˆ =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
h(zi, Λˆ)h(zi, Λˆ)′,
where W−
1
2 = diag[N1N , . . . ,
NM
N ].
We can test r linear parameter restrictions H0 : RΛ = 0 using Wald test statistic:
Wald = N(RΛˆ)′(RVˆ R′)−1RΛˆ d−→ χ2r .
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C.2 Additional Estimates for Log Annual Earnings
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Figure C.1: Estimates with MA(5) Transitory Shocks
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Figure C.2: Estimates with ARMA(1,1) Transitory Shocks
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C.3 Estimates for Log Weekly Earnings
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Figure C.3: Total, Between-, and Within-group Variance of Log Weekly Earnings
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Figure C.4: Estimates with Log Weekly Earnings and MA(3) Transitory Shocks
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Figure C.5: Actual and Counterfactual Returns (µt(s))
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